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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first chapter is an empirical investigation of
social change, looking at the Prohibition Era in the U.S. It explores how the
implementation of policies affects the evolution of beliefs about their effects, giving rise
to a feedback between preferences and policy choices. Using city-level data on law
enforcement and crime, it estimates a structural model where crime outcomes are the
result of Prohibition enforcement, and lead to changes in public opinion about Alcohol-
related policies. Enforcement depends on moral views and beliefs, but only beliefs are
shaped by the outcomes of past policies. The model can account for the variation in
public opinion changes, and for the heterogeneous responses of enforcement and violence
across cities. Its estimates are used to perform a series of counterfactual exercises.
The second chapter is a theoretical investigation of entrenchment and encroachment of
rulers. It studies the strategic interaction between competition and ratchet effect
incentives in a coalition-formation game of incomplete information. Rulers require the
support of a subset of politically powerful groups to remain in power. These have private
information about their cost of providing political support. A ruler can attempt to exploit
the competitive nature of the coalition formation game to induce revelation. Its ability to
do so determines the extent of entrenchment and encroachment. By restricting attention
to Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibria, the model shows that limited learning is possible,
and that learning dynamics are shaped by an informational commitment problem arising
when rulers are "too optimistic".
In joint work with James Robinson, the final chapter is a comparative empirical study of
the impact of Frontier availability on long-run development across the Americas. It calls
into question the notion of American exceptionalism due to its Westward Frontier, first
proposed by Frederick J. Turner. Almost every country in the Americas had a substantial
Frontier, but its allocation varied due to differences in the quality of political institutions
around the mid-19* century, making the effect of the Frontier conditional on political
institutions at the time of Frontier expansion. The empirical evidence is consistent with
this "conditional Turner thesis".
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics

Chapter 1: The Political Economy of Moral Conflict:
An Empirical Study of Learning and Law Enforcement
under Prohibition*
Camilo Garcia-Jimeno.t
June, 2011
Abstract
The U.S. Prohibition experience shows a remarkable policy reversal. In only 14 years, a drastic
shift in public opinion necessitated two amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The adoption of
many other policies and laws is similarly driven by initially optimistic beliefs about potential costs
of their enforcement. Their implementation, in turn, affects the evolution of beliefs, giving rise
to an endogenous feedback between preferences and policy choices. This paper uses data on U.S.
cities during the Prohibition Era to investigate how changes in beliefs about the enforcement costs
of Prohibition affected the mapping from moral views to policy outcomes, ultimately resulting in
the repeal of Constitutional Prohibition. It first develops a dynamic equilibrium model in which
communities make collective choices about law enforcement. Individuals differ in their baseline
moral views about alcohol consumption and in their priors about the effects of Prohibition on
crime. While both beliefs and moral views determine policy outcomes through the process of
democratic decision-making, beliefs are in turn shaped by the outcomes of past policies. The
model is estimated using a maximum likelihood approach on city-level data on public opinion,
police enforcement, crime, and alcohol-related legislation. The estimated model can account for
the variation in public opinion changes, and for the heterogeneous responses of enforcement and
violence across cities. Shutting down the learning channel significantly limits the model's ability
to match the moments of interest. The paper concludes with a series of counterfactual exercises
that explore the equilibrium implications of changes in moral views, priors concerning the costs
of enforcement, the degree of polarization in society, and the local political environment.
*This paper constitutes the first chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at MIT. I am extremely grateful to Daron
Acemoglu, James Robinson, and James Snyder for their advice and guidance, and to Abhijit Banerjee and the
participants at MIT's Political Economy Breakfast for their helpful suggestions. I also thank Maria Angelica Bautista,
Angela Fonseca, Juanita Gonzalez, Catalina Herrera, Lucas Higuera, Thomas Morin, Michael Peters, and Maria
Fernanda Rosales for their help at different stages of the project, and the staff at Harvard's Law Library Special
Collections Room for their kind help. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support of MIT's George and Obie
Schultz Fund, and of the Banco de la Republica de Colombia. Errors are all my own.
tMIT, Department of Economics. 50 Memorial Drive, Of. E52-201, Cambridge, MA 02139. cgarcia-mit.edu.
"Man learns by the disappointment of expectations." Hayek (1960, p. 60)
1 Introduction
In Individual Choice and Social Values, Arrow (1963) argues that a proper understanding of collective
choices requires taking into account the moral views of individuals because, as part of their pref-
erences, they are analyticaly similar to externalities'. This insight proves particularly relevant in
contemporary societies, where cultural heterogeneity is widespread and has been increasing over
time, and polities are constituted by peoples with varying cultural backgrounds, and thus, different
moral views. Indeed, differences in moral views have become a mayor source of disagreement about
policy issues in many Western societies 2
How differences in moral views affect policies is inexorably linked to individuals' beliefs about the
implications of bans on certain activities, practices and expressions. While moral views and beliefs
are mutually self-reinforcing, for example because those who find certain behaviors abhorrent also
think that banning them can be effective and would have only minor unintended consequences, there
is also a fundamental difference between moral views and beliefs. Moral views are slow-changing
or even fixed, whereas beliefs about the implications of different types of bans and restrictions are
frequently subject to a large extent of uncertainty, and can change rapidly as individuals observe
their outcomes over time. Indeed, learning may be one reason why societies sometimes undergo
radical social change and policy reform away from policies originally motivated by moral views, such
as during the U.S. alcohol Prohibition experience of the early 20th Century. In this paper I argue
that the reversal of Prohibition legislation in the United States can be understood as a result of
belief changes about the implications of bans on the alcohol market. While Prohibition received
support from a fraction of the population that held moral views against alcohol consumption, their
beliefs that such bans could be implemented effectively and would reduce rather than increase crime
contributed to their zeal. These beliefs changed rapidly, however, as communities experienced sharp
increases in crime following the implementation of Prohibition. Many former supporters of the
policy then found themselves in a situation similar to that of John D. Rockefeller, himself a radical
prohibitionist, who recognized such a tension in the late 1920s:
When Prohibition was introduced, I hoped that it would be widely supported by public opinion
and the day would soon come when the evil effects of alcohol would be recognized. I have slowly
1"From a formal point of view, one cannot distinguish between an individual's dislike for having his grounds
ruined by factory smoke and his extreme distaste for the existence of heathenism in Central Africa... I merely
want to emphasize here that we must look at the entire system of values, including values about values, in
seeking for a truly general theory of social welfare." Arrow (1963. p. 18) In Arrow's terms, an individual who
performs a private activity which another individual considers immoral will, as a result, impose an externality onto him,
out of the latter's regard of the former's action as immoral. Thus, for example, there is widespread agreement across
individuals regarding the immorality of murder, but widespread disagreement regarding the morality of abortion.
2 The salience of moral issues in the political agenda could be a result of convexity of preferences over them, as in
Kamada and Kojima (2010), or because they are strategically exploited by an interest group, as in Baron (1994). In
the context of Prohibition in the U.S., the latter seems a better description of the process leading to the adoption of
Prohibition.
and reluctantly come to believe that this has not been the result. Instead, drinking has generally
increased; the speakeasy has replaced the saloon; a vast army of lawbreakers has appeared;
many of our best citizens have openly ignored Prohibition; respect for the law has been greatly
lessened; and crime has increased to a level never seen before. (John D. Rockefeller, quoted in
Okrent (2003, p. 246-247))
In this paper I study the relationship between policy reform and social change, and argue that ex-ante
uncertainty about the effects of radical changes in society's legal standards, coupled with the ability
of individuals to learn about the effects of those policies, can be at the heart of the dynamics of
social change, through a feedback between the effects of policies and changing attitudes in response
to their effects, modulated by the endogenous extent of enforcement of those same policies. More
specifically, I exploit the Prohibition experience of the 1910s-1930s to investigate the extent to which
support for different types of bans is determined by the interplay between moral views and beliefs,
and how this support changes as beliefs evolve as a result of learning from the outcomes of those
policies.
In fact, as a methodological contribution, I argue that the mechanism proposed in this paper may
have relevance outside the experience of Prohibition to understand the evolving attitudes towards
moral issues. and more generally to think about the forces shaping social change. Attitudes towards
Catholics in the 19th Century U.S., towards the role of women around the mid 20th Century,
towards blacks in the South after the Civil War and after the Civil Rights Movement, or more
recently towards Muslims in Western countries, for example, could be better understood by studying
how the enforcement of policies targeted towards specific groups has effects that change collective
preferences over those policies, endogenously feeding back into changes in policy choices, and in
individual attitudes in the long run.
With this purpose, I develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of Prohibition enforcement
and crime, where heterogeneity in moral views and beliefs interplay, and have observable and un-
observable components. Learning is rational, and communities decide the enforcement margin of
Prohibition through a collective decision. Law enforcement shifts the distribution of crime, and indi-
viduals update their beliefs about the effects of Prohibition by observing homicide rate realizations.
Because law enforcement is endogenous to preferences and beliefs, the speed of learning by rational
agents is affected not only by their priors, but also, indirectly, by the distribution of moral views
giving rise to such collective choices of law enforcement.
I estimate this model by Conditional Maximum Likelihood, using a dataset of U.S. cities during the
period 1911-1936, when the country experienced a Prohibitionist wave which reached Constitutional
status, and focus on the homicide rate, the drunkenness arrest rate, and police expenditure as the
main observable outcomes. I start by showing that crime and law enforcement during Prohibition
presented a rise and fall pattern, and that the alcohol market contracted and rebounded quickly
thereafter (see figures 1-2). Then I document how these patterns differed between cities with varying
moral preferences, by using observable variation in the distribution of religious ascriptions and other
demographics: drier (i.e., more favorable to Prohibition) cities experienced initially higher levels of
law enforcement, while wet (i.e.. less favorable to Prohibition) communities observed higher increases
in criminality and larger changes in public support for the policy.
The estimated structural model explains a large fraction of the variation, both across cities, and over
time, in the choices of policing expenditure in cities, the observed evolution of criminality measured
through the homicide rate, and the alcohol-market dynamics. With the model I also estimate the
extent to which Prohibition as a legal standard, and Prohibition enforcement, were responsible for
the increase in criminality observed during the period. Prohibition was associated with an average
homicide rate increase of 15 to 20%, while it was unable to shrink the alcohol market. At its lowest
point, around three years into Prohibition, the effective alcohol supply fell by around 35%, but
rebounded quickly thereafter. Moreover, I estimate that the Prohibition-related homicide rate was
increasing in the level of law enforcement. Relatedly, cities in smuggling areas had a lower potential
for crime to develop under Prohibition, and I argue this was due to the reduced constraints faced
by the black alcohol market in those areas.
The structural model also allows for the estimation of several moments of the joint distribution of
moral views about Prohibition, and prior beliefs about its effects. I find that beliefs were extremely
optimistic across the distribution of moral views, so that the variation in moral views across cities
was larger than the variation in initial beliefs. Although people had strong opinions about alcohol
Prohibition at its outset, there was not much disagreement about its effects. Nevertheless, the
estimated correlation between moral views and beliefs is large, implying that drier individuals held
even more optimistic prior beliefs about the effects of the policy.
I conclude with a series of counterfactual exercises based on the structural model, which illuminate
the key interactions taking place during Prohibition. I find that local policy was highly responsive
to community preference changes. As a result, a more polarized society would have learned faster,
but also would have observed higher crime increases during Prohibition. Communities would have
responded to Prohibition by offsetting it with reduced law enforcement choices if prior beleifs had
been less optimistic; this would have reduced the crime spike of the 1920s. but would have limited the
speed of change in public opinion. Finally, in an exercise where local decision-making power is shifted
away from the median voter, the increased misalignment between the community's distribution of
preferences and the equilibrium law enforcement choice alters the speed of learning by changing the
informativeness of the crime signals.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to several research areas. The first studies the determinants of civil liberties.
To my knowledge, Lagunoff (2001) is the only work which directly addresses the question of why
democracies are able to sustain civil liberties for minorities. According to his argument, when
a majority is likely to become a minority in the future, it will have incentives in the present to
weaken the enforcement technologies available, which could otherwise be used against them in the
future. Political Scientists. on the other hand, have stressed that the salience of moral issues is
relevant to understand the extent of civil liberties. because it determines the degree to which the
legal standards adopted will respond to interest group politics (Haider-Markel and Meier (1996)).
Indeed, through the political system, different practices are prohibited or restricted based on moral
motivations alone. In autocractic societies, rulers and elites directly impose their moral views upon
the community; in democracies, majorities can impose restrictive legal standards upon minorities
through the ballot box. Legal restrictions on individual liberties are of economic and political
importance for several reasons. First, they directly have welfare implications over both individuals
who favor and disfavor the prohibition. More interestingly, they often have potentially uncertain
side effects. The imposition of a restrictive legal standard creates dissatisfaction in a subset of the
population, leading to non-conformist behavior, political mobilization, unrest, or violence.
As a result, de jure prohibitions require concomitant de facto enforcement. Because they are prone to
widespread loopholes, enforcing restrictions on the behavior of individuals requires costly monitoring
and willingness to enforce, both by the community and by its enforcement agents. In fact, within the
literature on "crime and punishment" pioneered by Becker (1968), concerned with the understanding
of the determinants of crime enforcement and the effects of law enforcement on the equilibrium levels
of illegal activity, this paper highlights that what society defines as crime is endogenous, and that, as
a result, punishment is a social chioce. These considerations have been overlooked in the literature,
and suggest that agreement about punishment within society, and social learning about its costs
and benefits, might be important to understand the success of alternative policies.
In this paper, the main channel driving public opinion and law enforcement outcomes is the interac-
tion between beliefs and moral views, making it close to the research on policy and rational learning.
Landier et al. (2008) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) study how ideological differences have
affected beliefs about capitalism. Sargent et al. (2006) develop a statistical model about monetary
policy in the U.S., where policymakers endogenously learn about the Phillips curve. Buera et al.
(2010) is a recent example of structural estimation of a learning model, where policymakers update
their beliefs about the merits of market oriented versus interventionist policies by observing their
neighboring countries' outcomes. A theoretical paper in the same spirit is Mukand and Rodrik
(2005), who argue that experimentation and imitation might explain why, over the last decades,
countries have converged in the adoption of policies, but not in economic performance. Strulovici
(2010) is also an important recent contribution, which studies the incentives for policy experimen-
tation in a dynamic voting framework, in which incentives for experimentation are limited by the
trade-off between learning about the effects of policies and the pivotality of voters.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on crime (See Dills et al. (2008) for a recent
survey where the authors conclude that the most robust correlate of crime is the prohibition of
drugs). The literature has stressed factors like the age composition of the population (and abor-
tion), the deterrence effects of incarceration, access to firearms, investment in policing, inequality,
or the economic cycle (Levitt (2004); Donohue and Levitt (2001); Dills et al. (2008)). Miron (1999a)
and Goldstein (1985) stress the main channel I explore in this paper, where non-conformism and
law enforcement over activities involving traded commodities create the potential for violence and
corruption to arise as salient side effects. Competition for black market rents, unavailability of in-
stitutionalized channels of dispute resolution, and the use of coercion by law enforcers, all create
incentives for crime and corruption to develop (Miron (1999b)). Thus, tightening law enforcement
can magnify the effects of the prohibition on crime. It drives out the marginal producers (which are
less likely to engage in criminal behavior), weakens social norms sustaining peaceful dispute resolu-
tion among criminals, and crowds out resources for overall crime enforcement (Becker (1968); Miron
(1999b)). The literature has mostly focused on reduced-form or instrumental variables strategies,
whereas I explicitly model the endogenous relationship between law enforcement choices and crime
that arises in the context of Prohibition, highlighting the role of rational learning and beliefs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a historical overview of the Pro-
hibition experience in the United States during the early decades of the Twentieth century, and
discusses its institutional and political background. Section 3 then presents and discusses the data
collected and used in the paper. Based on the historical discussion, section 4 subsequently presents
reduced-form results, which guide the development of the model presented in section 5. Section 6
proceeds with the estimation results from the structural model, and presents some counterfactual
exercises. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Prohibition: A Historical Overview
2.1 Prohibition Politics
Nation-wide alcohol Prohibition in the United States was written into the Constitution as the 18th
Amendment in January 1919, and repealed from it just fourteen years later, as the 21st Amend-
ment, in December 1933. Given the constitutional supermajority requirements to amend the U.S.
Constitution, such a policy reversal is striking3 . The increase in criminality during the Prohibition
period, best illustrated by figure 1, was as striking, and a first-order reason why public opinion had
such a radical swing in such a short period of time. Alcohol Prohibition. though, was not a sudden
appearance; it was the endpoint of a prohibitionist wave with origins dating as far back as the 1870s,
when a group of Ohio women organized the so-called Temperance Crusade, which would later give
rise to the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).
Prohibition was introduced staggeredly across counties and states through a gradualist political
strategy of religiously motivated temperance groups, closely related to the Baptist, Methodist and
Evangelical churches, and composed mostly of native-born whites and women (Sinclair (n.d.): Okrent
(2010)). The two most prominent were the WCTU, and the Anti-Saloon League (ASL). Both
developed a nationwide organizational structure, but the ASL took the lead in the beginning of the
Twentieth century. Initially these groups were not a majority of the population. Their political
success was due to their pivotal character in the competitive context of bipartisan politics, based
on strong campaigning and lobbying in state legislatures, towns, and cities, and on the intensive
use of referenda initiatives. Republicans and Democrats were frequently so evenly divided that
a switch of the temperance vote could easily decide local elections. Prohibitionist groups were
able to become pivotal even in the within party races of the Democratic-dominated South. Their
persistence in lobbying also was important because Prohibition was not an issue that politicians
paid much attention to at the time4.
Key to the political success of the drys was their strategic avoidance of aligning with either party.
While the ASL was relatively antagonistic to Northern Democrats whose constituencies were mostly
3 Constitutional amendments require approval by two thirds of the vote in both the House and the Senate, and a
plurality of the vote in either both chambers of at least three fourths of the State Legislatures, or in at least three
fourths of State Constitutional Conventions.
4 Talking about the 18th Amendment, Sinclair (n.d., p. 182) argues that "... boredom played some part in the
passage of the amendment. The members of Congress were sick of being badgered by the Anti-Saloon League and
their dry constituents."
in large urban areas, it was much closer to Southern Democrats for whom Prohibition was another
channel for social and political control of blacks (Asbury (1950, p. 93), Sinclair (n.d., p. 182)).
There was disagreement on the issue within Democrats in the South too, as a faction of the party
believed that allowing the Federal government to make decisions regarding Prohibition could be the
first step to further undermine Southern autonomy (Szymansky (2003)). An indicator of the lack of
partisan alignment on Prohibition is the House roll call on the 18th Amendment; 64 Democrats and
62 Republicans voted against, while 140 Democrats and 138 Republicans did so for Prohibition. A
second important element to explain the success of the dry campaign was its gradual approach. Local
option measures were followed by state-wide legislation, so that right before the 18th Amendment
was adopted, almost 80% of U.S. counties were already under some form of Prohibition, starting from
no more than 15% in 1900. Figure 3 shows the dates of state-adoption of Prohibition legislation.
The rise of prohibitionist attitudes in the U.S. was part of the so called "Progressive Era", a much
broader set of social and political changes taking place in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries, associated with the rapid expansion of State capacity throughout the country. The
establishment of the income tax under the 16th Amendment and the enfranchisement of women
under the 19th Amendment also were part of the expansion of the role of the State in society. In
this perspective, Prohibition expanded the role of the State into the private activities of individuals.
This required an unprecedented involvement of the churches in politics, fueled by a context of rapid
social change and urbanization, which was increasing the heterogeneity of the American society.
On the dry side, priests moved from claiming the sinfulness of drinking5, to advocating explicitly
prohibition legislation (Isaac (1965. p. 263)). On the wet side, it was about "whether or not the
American people were going to hand over to government the paternalistic power to regulate lives
and habits" (Kyvig (1979, p. 51)).
2.2 Law Enforcement
Before Constitutonal Prohibition, enforcement of the alcohol laws in states under Prohibition was
usually mild. In dry communities it was redundant, while in wet communities it was relatively
ignored. A large share of alcohol consumption took place in saloons and other public spaces, which
made public intoxication a widespread phenomenon (See, for example, Blocker (2006); Stayton
(1923)). Prohibitionist associations were concerned about the social consequences of saloons, and
arrests for drunkenness were seen as a key indicator of successful enforcement of dry laws. But loop-
holes were abundant and often overlooked (Franklin (1971)). The biggest loophole was probably
interstate shipping of alcohol into states under Prohibition. As a response, the ASL lobbied inten-
sively until it achieved the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913, banning interstate shipping
of alcohol into dry states. Although later it was practically unenforced, at the time of its passage
this law was very controversial. President Taft vetoed it, and Congress subsequently overrode his
veto. Wets, backed by the Brewers Association, argued the law violated the First Article of the U.S.
5Okrent (2010, p. 33) quotes a WCTU strategist who, being asked why alcohol was inconvenient, gave the
following account: "... selling in prohibited hours, gambling, selling to intoxicated men, rear rooms, unclean places,
invading residential districts, the country saloon, the social evil, selling to minors, keeping open at night, brewers
financing ignorant foreigners who are not citizens, the American bar, brewery-controlled saloons, cabarets, Sunday
selling, treating. free lunch, sales to speakeasies. bucket trade, signs. screens,. character of the men, too many saloons".
Constitution, but the Supreme Court later upheld it.
At the same time, although the passage of the 18th Amendment and its enforcement law (the
Volstead Act) 6 appeared as highly restrictive by banning any liquor with more than 0.5% alco-
holic content, Congress did not make large appropriations for its federal enforcement. In fact, the
Amendment established concomitant enforcement by the local, state and federal levels, so Congress,
expecting cooperation from local and state policing agencies and general compliance with the law,
created a modest federal enforcement organization (Kyvig (1979, p. 23)). The weakness of federal
enforcement is best exemplified by the constant changes in Prohibition administration during the
1920s 7.
Table 1 presents the main Federal Prohibition law enforcement outcomes during the 1920s. Trends
are very similar across the four main U.S. regions, and suggest that enforcement intensity peaked
around 1928. Early during national Prohibition, given the initial absence of domestic producers,
most of the supply of illegal liquor came from international smuggling (Okrent (2010)). Over time,
local production based on illegal distilleries and stills caught-up with demand. Nevertheless, the
number of distillers and fermenters seized fell sharply in the later Prohibition years, which suggests
a sharp fall in the enforcement activities against producers. The number of killed or injured agents
during enforcement activities shows that the 1927-1930 period was particularly violent, and that
subsequently few risky law enforcement activities took place. The 1927-1930 period coincides with
the years in which Prohibition administration was under the Bureau of Prohibition, in what his-
torians have acknowledged as the last attempt form the federal government to control the liquor
trade, in response to the fall in state and local law enforcement throughout the country. Indeed,
by 1928 several states had already repealed their own enforcement legislation. To have an idea of
the limited extent of law enforcement at the federal level, notice that in 1929-1930, total liquor
seizures in the U.S., including spirits, malts, wines, cider, mash, and pomace, were approximately 74
million gallons. Compared to the 3, 375 million gallons of booze which, according to Okrent (2010,
p. 202), were produced and distributed annually by Max Hoff, an illegal producer in Pennsylvania,
the federal enforcement looks almost irrelevant.
In fact, most of the law enforcement, in practice, relied on local efforts. This was not only because
of the inherent difficulties in enforcing alcohol restrictions throughout the country, which limited the
federal law enforcement stategies to infrequent raids and a focus oii some particularly troublesome
areas, but also because of the inefficiency of the federal agency. Complaining about this issue in
1926, Colvin (1926. p. 497) argued that, "Although the United States had adopted a national
standard throughout the nation, the administration of the law so perverted this objective as to
make enforcement substantially a matter of local opinion because it was administered to so large
6 President Wilson also vetoed the Volstead Act, and his veto was also overridden by Congress.
7 Originally, the Volstead Act created the Prohibition Unit as a department of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
with Prohibition Directors in each state. The Coolidge administration avoided dealing with the Prohibition problem
throughout. and in 1925, there was a sharp reduction in the size of the Prohibition Unit (Colvin (1926, p. 495)). The
critical situation regarding corruption and venality within it resulted in a reform of Federal Prohibition administration
under the Prohibition Reorganization Act of 1927. This act created the Bureau of Prohibition, ascribed to the Treasury
Department, putting its employees under the Civil Service and creating 27 Prohibition Districts (Schmeckebier (1929),
Schmekebier (1923)). Finally, in 1930 the Prohibition Bureau was transferred to the Justice Department, but at this
point, "...as useful as these congressional steps may have been... the enforcement effort had acquired a dismal reputation
and doubts as to whether Prohibition could possibly be effective had become deeply engrained" (Kyvig (1979., p. 32)).
a degree by men owing their appointment to local political influences and subject to local political
pressures... it was the worst form of local option -the option of the local politicians to determine
the extent to which the law should be enforced-, politicians, many of whom were personally wet,
others of whom wanted to placate a wet element in their constituencies, and all of whom belonged
to political parties which sought wet votes as well as dry ones". While a dry such as Colvin saw the
problem in the ineptitude and corruption of enforcers, a wet such as Tydings would argue that "If
moral force... does not make them stop, physical force must be used. Where is the physical force
to come from? Plainly, in a nation of 120 million people, scattered over an area of 3 millon square
miles, the force must be predominantly supplied by the local enforcement authorities... but the
police, the courts and the juries are the servants and reflectors of local sentiment"(Tydings (1930, p.
125)).
Thus, the degree of law enforcement of Prohibition was responsive to the local demand for both
Prohibition and alcohol, and elected authorities were agents of both groups. This seems to have been
true not only during Constitutional Prohibition, but also during state-level Prohibition. Franklin
(1971), for example, quotes a local judge in dry Oklahoma claiming that a candidate for sheriff
would not possibly be elected, if it were known that he intended to enforce Prohibition. In the same
way, judges and juries tended to be lenient in their decisions regarding Prohibition violation cases
(Szymansky (2003, p. 184), Kyvig (1979, p. 25), Tydings (1930, p. 127)). Judicial leniency was
even institutionalized through the so-called "bargain days",8 which arose in response to the courts'
congestion created by the overwhelming number of violations of the Volstead Act. In fact, initiated
criminal prosecutions in federal courts for violations of Prohibition increased from slightly more
that 100 per million inhabitants in 1920, to almost 500 in 1925, which made up 80% of all criminal
prosecutions9.
If law enforcement varied as a function of local preferences, the effects of Prohibition also varied
between communities. This is acknowledged by a Commissioner traveling around the State of New
York in 1930 who argued that the problems varied between and within states, particularly between
the rural and urban areas1 0 . According to Kyvig (1979), Scandinavians in Minnesota continued to
drink, while Idaho, Oregon, and Washington had come to accept Prohibition. Los Angeles and even
San Francisco had large dry constituencies, and relatively dry areas ran from California to Texas.
Louisiana, on the other hand, was extremely wet and law enforcement relied almost exclusively
on federal authorities. In the rest of the South, Prohibition was enforced particularly on blacks.
Finally, in the large wet cities of the Northeast such as Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Boston and
New York. Prohibition was largely unobserved, and weakly enforced, particularly after the second
half of the 1920s.
The weakening of law enforcement took place not only by a reduction in policing and prosecution,
but also through the repeal of state enforcement legislation. The most prominent case was that
8Violators would plead guilty and be charged a small fine.
9I collected the data on judicial prosecutions at the judicial district level for the period 1915-1933 directly from
the Attorney General Annual Reports.
10 "New York City presents a problem quite distinct from the up-state section, and the border region presents an
entirely different situation... the problem varies as the population is homogeneous or heterogeneous... throughout
the rural and smaller cities... there is a greater respect for the law and established order" (Wickersham-Commission
(1928-1931b, Box 13-2, Prohibition Survey of New York, p.2)).
of New York, which very early on, in 1923, repealed the state enforcement law. Alfred Smith,
the Democratic Presidential candidate in the 1928 election, was then the Governor of New York.
The repeal was by no means a consensual decision, and in fact, many dry organizations lobbied
Smith to veto it. It was a difficult decision because, although openly wet, alienating the dry vote
could prove costly for his future political career. In his own words, "Some seem to think that my
approval [of the repeal] will mean the preservation of American Institutions. Many others impeled by
equally patriotic motives seem to feel that my approval will be destructive of American government.
Obviously, both cannot be right..." (Smith (1923, p. 601)).
2.3 Repeal
The early repeal of state enforcement legislation in New York was driven more by the morally anti-
Prohibitionist character of its large share of urban population than by a rise in criminality, which
by that time, had not yet peaked. The shift in public opinion in other regions of the country took
place at a slower pace, and more in response to the observable increase in criminality. Initially dry
individuals, who were morally compeled by Prohibitionist reasoning, could not avoid acknowledging
the adverse consequences that the policy was having.
The rise in crime and undermining of the rule of law was not homogeneous across the country,
and as a result, neither was the fall in support for the policy. The Democratic party, which had
been out of power throughout the 1920s, managed to capture most of the rise in anti-Prohibitionist
sentiment. In the 1928 Presidential election this hurt Al Smith, but in the 1932 campaign it played
in favor of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The distribution of public opinion did shift massively against
Constitutional Prohibition, and opposition became better organized. The Association Against the
Prohibition Amendment, for example, began its advertising campaigns in 1928, focusing on providing
information about the ill-effects of Prohibition. In 1929, the Women's Organization for National
Prohibition Reform was founded with the same intentions. Nevertheless, even after the repeal of the
18th Amendment, six states remained dry"1 . Among the rest of the states, some instituted systems
of "state operation", in which the state directly controlled the distribution of alcohol, while others
just imposed some regulation over a free market (Harrison and Laine (1936, p. 43)).
3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.0.1 Data on Criminality
Criminality was the main source of concern and learning about Prohibition for the public. The
homicide rate is the variable for which most comprehensive information is available, and one for
which measurement error is likely to be very limited. Thus, I collected information from the Mortality
Statistics published yearly by the Bureau of the Census, reporting the number of non-traffic-related
homicides for a sample of U.S. cities. I complemented this information with the homicide data
"These were Alabama, Kansas. Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota and Oklahoma. Nonetheless, all of
these, except Alabama and Kansas. allowed for the sale of beer (Kyvig (1979, p. 188))
reported in the Wickersham Commission documents, finally putting together yearly data for the
period 1911-1936 and a sample of up to 93 cities. Data on drunkenness arrests, on the other hand, is
very detailed and covers a total of 573 cities for the period 1910-192912. Finally, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation began compiling and publishing its Uniform Crime Report (UCR) in 1930, which
contains yearly city-level data on murders and other offences reported to the authorities. Offences
include robbery, assult, burglary, larceny and auto theft.
3.0.2 Law Enforcement Data
Law enforcement is a difficult concept to measure because it depends on the discretion of the en-
forcer, and thus, is necessarily unobservable. Moreover, measuring law enforcement through its
outcomes is problematic; an increase in liquor stills seized, for example, could be explained by an
increase in Prohibition enforcement on a constant level of illegal alcohol production, or by a reduced
level of law enforcement which allows for illegal production to increase. Because a great deal of
Prohibition enforcement, and all of local crime enforcement, was decided and implemented at the
city level, I focused on collecting data on city public finances, and specifically, on police expendi-
ture. I use the Financial Statistics of Cities published yearly by the Bureau of the Census, which
report disaggregated data on city public finances for cities with populations above 30,000 (around
250 cities), and obtain data on total city public expenditure and investment, police expenditure and
investment, and all protection expenditure and investment (all protection includes police, fire and
other expenditure), for the period 1911-1936. I computed 1913-constant prices expenditure data by
using the U.S.-wide CPI as of June of each year as the deflator' 3 .
3.0.3 Demographic and Religious Data
City and county-level data on demographic characteristics are taken from the decennial population
censuses. I focus on the age distribution, the ethnicity distribution' 4 , and total population, from the
1910-1940 Censuses. Given the strong relationship between ethnicity and religiosity with attitudes
towards the liquor problem, I use religious ascription data from the decennial Censuses of Religions
(1906, 1916, 1926,. and 1936), to capture heterogeneity in moral views about Prohibition. I aggre-
gated religious ascriptions in the following nine groups, directly from their names: Baptist, Eastern
Orthodox, Evangelical, Jewish, Mormon, Lutheran, Methodist Episcopal, Catholic, Presbyterian,
and other. The consensus amongst historians is that Baptist, Evangelical. Mormon, Methodist,
Episcopal and Presbyterian communities held the strongest views in favor of Prohibition, while
Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish and Lutherans had much more favorable positions regarding alcohol
consumption (See Foster (2002); Lewis (NA); Szymansky (2003)). I refer to the former as "dry", and
2 The data on drunkenness arrests contained in the Wickersham Commission papers appears to have been originally
compiled by the World League. Dills et al. (2005) use this source, covering a shorter time period, together with an
alternative source compiled independently by the Moderation League. Both series appear to be highly correlated, so
I restrict attention to the World League data, which covers the whole 1911-1929 period.
1 3Data for the years 1914 and 1920 is unavailable. For the balanced panel estimations below, I use the interpolated
values (1913-1915 average for 1914, and 1919-1921 average for 1920) for these two years.
141 focus on the distribution of the population between native white, foreign white, and black individuals.
to the latter as "wet" religions. I then computed the share in each religion directly as the number of
adherents divided by the total number of adherents to any religion in the city (or county).
3.0.4 Public Opinion Data
To measure public opinion about Prohibition, I collected electoral returns data on referenda on
alcohol-related issues for the different states, taking place during the 1900s-1930s. These referenda
were usually ballot measures proposed to the citizens to approve or repeal liquor laws, or ammend
the state constitutions. In states where local option was in place, county or city-level referenda had
the purpose of allowing or forbidding the sale of alcohol. When submitting the 21st Amendment
to the states, the U.S. Congress determined that Constitutional Conventions should be elected in
the different states to decide over the issue, and candidates should run in either a dry or a wet
slate (Brown (1935)). All of the referenda returns allow me to directly compute the fraction of
(anti-Prohibitionist) wet vote, which I use as a proxy of wet support15 . Almost all of the electoral
returns data is available at the county level, except for referenda in the states of Connecticut and
Massachusetts, for which city-level data was reported. Overall, I have referenda election returns for
2, 083 counties.
3.0.5 Legislation Data
Alcohol-related legislation across states comes from three main sources: the Anti-Saloon League's
1916 Yearbook and the information in Szymansky (2003), and in Cherrington (1920). The latter
source was in particular very useful since the author makes a state-by-state compilation of all of
the dry legislation up to 1920, detailing the time of its passage and/or repeal, and providing a
brief description of it. Based oil these sources, I coded a state-level variable for the number of dry
laws in place in each year, an indicator variable for being under Prohibition (either state-level or
federal-level), and an indicator variable for having a Prohibition enforcement law in place.
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports population-weighted summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper,
summarizing the available information for up to 340 cities (counties for the referenda election returns
data), and disaggregating the sample in the four main U.S. geographic regions. The table presents
the baseline distribution of religious ascriptions and demographics, together with data on legislation.
It also includes summary statistics for the different outcomes of interest, comparing average values
in the 1910s and 1920s.
For the religious distribution, I present summary statistics from the 1916 Census of Religions. As
expected, Southern cities were heavily Baptist and Methodist relative to the rest of the country (29%
and 24% respectively). The South was also less Lutheran and Catholic. Indeed, Catholicism was
1
5 The main caveat here is that differences in turnout rates might differ systematically between Prohibitionist
and anti-Prohibitionist voters, not reflecting the true distribution of political preferences in the community. For an
empirical model of turnout on alcohol-related referenda., see Coate and Conlin (2004).
concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest, where more than half the adherents in the sample belong
to this religion. Evangelicals were mostly concentrated in the Midwest, while Mormon communities
were mostly found in the West. In fact, with almost a 50-50 split between dry and wet religions,
the Western cities present the more uniform distribution of religious membership. In contrast,
religious membership in Southern cities was heavily skewed towards dryness, while in the Midwest
and Northeast wet religions were majoritarian.
Looking at the basic ethnic composition across regions from the 1910 Population Census, 26% of the
population in the Southern cities in the sample was black, in sharp contrast with all other regions
where the black population was between 1.3 and 3.1 percent. The foreign white population was
especially prevalent in the Northeast, where 32% were whites born outside the United States, as
compared to only 7% in the South. In the Midwest, on the other hand, almost three quarters of the
population was native white.
A look at the outcome variables reveals that real per capita expenditure in police was significantly
larger in the 1920s than in the 1910s, with an average increase of around 0.3 dollars. Northeastern
cities had the highest levels of expenditure in both decades, but Southern cities experienced the
largest average increase. Although per capita expenditure in police rose, the data on police expendi-
ture as a share of total city expenditure reveals a fall everywhere, due to the fast increase in public
spending in other categories during these Progressive Era decades. Cities in the West had the lowest
police shares (around 8%). While per capita policing was lowest in the South, Southern cities had
the highest share of their budget allocated to police (11 - 12%). The average behavior of the data
on drunkenness arrests reveals considerable differences between regions. In Southern cities, average
arrests were very similar in the 1910s and 1920s. In contrast, cities in the West do show a large fall
in arrests for drunkenness between both decades, falling from 22.5 to 13.9 per 1, 000 inhabitants.
Although arrests in the Midwest and Northeast also are somewhat lower in the 1920s, the fall is not
as large.
The homicide rate, on the other hand, shows significantly higher levels in the 1920s in all regions,
and large level differences across them. While homicide rates were on average 5.3 per 100, 000 in
Northeastern cities during the 1910s, they were almost five times higher in the South during the
same decade. The variance of the homicide rate was also much larger in the South. It is also worth
noticing that the smallest average increases in the homicide rate took place in the West, where it
only increased from 9.8 to 11.6.
Support for Prohibition, as measured by the electoral returns on alcohol referenda, was higher in
the South and the West, where the wet vote shares were 0.46 and 0.45 on average, while it was
slightly above 50% in the Midwest and the Northeast. A comparison of these numbers between
decades reveals the striking shift in public opinion; wet support was around 20 percentage points
higher in the West and Midwest, 30 percentage points higher in the Northeast, and 10 percentage
points higher in the South after Prohibition. Interestingly, the South showed the smallest increase
in wet support, while, despite its higher initial anti-Prohibitionism, Northeastern cities experienced
the largest average shift against Prohibition.
4 Some Reduced Form Results
I begin the empirical analysis by focusing on three first-order sources of variation in the effects of
Prohibition. Differences in the timing of its adoption across states, in preferences over the legal
standard (i.e. moral views about alcohol consumption), and in state-level legislation and its enforce-
ment both at the local and federal levels. I focus on three outcome variables: as a direct measure
of criminality, the homicide rate shows a large increase, happening with some delay after the in-
troduction of Prohibition, and reaching its highest levels around the mid 1920s. Crime increases
were larger in cities with bigger potential alcohol markets and populations less inclined to the pol-
icy. However, they were similar between cities facing different initial crime levels. By looking at
the drunkenness arrest rate, I document a drastic contraction of the alcohol market right after the
introduction of Prohibition, but a steady and relatively fast recovery. Neighboring markets reduced
the extent of contraction in alcohol consumption, and the time path was remarkably similar across
different cities. Finally, there is evidence of a steady increase in law enforcement following the in-
troduction of Prohibition, with a subsequent fall starting in the late 1920s. The early increases in
law enforcement were faster in cities with constituencies more favorable to Prohibition, but for late
Prohibition years, these cities show lower spending in policing. Subsequently, I look at changes in
public opinion regarding Prohibition by exploiting electoral data on liquor referenda, and document
a non-monotonic relationship between changes in public opinion and overall moral views of cities'
constituencies: communities with intermediate levels of initial support towards the policy saw the
largest shifts in public opinion against Prohibition.
4.1 Crime, Law Enforcement, and the Timing of Prohibition
A natural first approach is to compare outcomes before, during, and after repeal of Constitutional
Prohibition. Figure 1 shows that the advent of Prohibition saw a sharp increase in crime, here
measured by the homicide rate (although a mild, positive pre-trend can be observed since the early
1910s). Nonetheless, it also suggests that the difference was not constant throughout the fourteen
years after its adoption; the homicide rate increased rapidly during the early years of Constitutional
Prohibition, and slowly started to fall back to pre-Prohibition levels around 1926.
Observed arrests for drunkenness are the equilibrium outcome of alcohol demand, alcohol supply,
and intensity of arrest enforcement. Their evolution captures changes in all of these components.
Figure 2 presents the population-weighted average per-capita drunkenness arrest rate for the 255
U.S. cities for which this variable is available throughout the whole 1911-1929 period. Its sharp
fall started well before Constitutional Prohibition was adopted. It fell to around 39% of its initial
level (from around 18 to only 7 arrests per 1, 000) in just a few years. On the other hand, it
was precisely in 1920, the year when the 18th Amendment entered into force, that drunkenness
arrests started bouncing back at an even faster rate. They finally converged to around 83% of their
average initial level, at a time when federal Prohibition was still in place. The breaks in both the
homicide rate and the drunkenness arrest rate series do not appear to match the introduction of
Constitutional Prohibition. This suggests differential short-run and long-run effects of Prohibition,
and the relevance of state-level Prohibition. which, as mentioned in section 2. occured staggeredly
across states during the first two decades of the century.
In fact, throughout the 1910s arrests have a sharp fall in every city, but at different points in time
across cities in different states. The fall appears to be highly correlated with the timing of adoption
of state-level Prohibition. Figure 3 presents the dates of adoption of state-level Prohibition. It
shows how the Prohibitionist wave moved across the United States during the 1910s, up until the
introduction of nationwide Prohibition with the 18th Amendment 16.
In the context of alcohol Prohibition, time under the policy is a convenient reduced-form way to
look at its time-varying effects for several reasons. First, because of the alcohol supply dynamics;
after Prohibition is adopted, the legal market for alcohol is closed on impact. This implies a large
negative shock on the availability of liquor. The black market requires time to develop smuggling
networks and establish hidden production facilities. Moreover, because crime is a necessary input
into the production and trade of any illegal commodity, costly and time-consuming investments are
also necessary for the development of criminal organizations supporting the illegal market. Finally,
law enforcement was a key channel through which Prohibition had an impact on the development of
criminality, and equilibrium law enforcement depended on the community's beliefs about the policy.
The evolution of these beliefs over time was also a dynamic force shaping the time-varying effects of
Prohibition as a legal standard. Thus, Prohibition is likely to have varying short-run and long-run
effects. To obtain an estimate of the overall effects of Prohibition, a comparison of cities which have
experienced similar lengths of time under the policy is needed.
To take a first look at short-run and long-run effects of Prohibition, I start by estimating fixed-effects
models of the form
k
yet = ac + Bt + Z5TDcr + -tXct + Ect (1)
where c indexes cities and t indexes years. yet can be either the homicide rate, the drunkenness arrest
rate, or police expenditure, for which I look at two alternative measures: Police expenditure as a
share of total city public expenditure, and per capita police expenditure. The ac are city-specific
effects, the #t are year-effects, and the Der are indicator variables for each cumulative number of
years under Prohibition17 . The vector Xct includes a constant, the log of population to capture any
scale effects, and time-varying effects for border and state-capital indicators. The focus of Equation
(1) is in the estimates of o,, the time-varying effects of Prohibition. Since this model looks only
at within-city variation over time, the 6, can be interpreted as the average-across-cities difference
in yet relative to the city average, when a city has been under Prohibition for T years. Standard
errors reported are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustered at the city level to adjust for
arbitrary within-city correlation over time. Because of the strong trend in the police expenditure
6 1n figure 3, Kansas. Maine and North Dakota are not shown because these three states were already under
Prohibition since the late 19th century. Kansas adopted Prohibition in 1880, Maine in 1884, and North Dakota in
1889 (at the same time it acquired statehood). Kansas and Maine had already been under Statewide Prohibition in
the mid-1800s during the first Prohibitionist wave.
1
'In the sample T runs up to 55, given that Kansas was under Prohibition since 1880. Because only very few cities
experienced Prohibition for more than eighteen years, I restrict k to be 19. and leave observations with more than
nineteen years under Prohibition as part of the omitted category.
data, I also ran "random trend" models for some specifications for this outcome variable, allowing
for city-specific linear trends.
I present regressions for two alternative samples, labeled as B and C18. B is a balanced sample
of the 66 cities for which complete data is available for the whole period 1911-1936, which will be
the sample used for the stuctural estimation in sections 5 and 6. Sample C is an unbalanced panel
excluding cities for which there are less than ten years of data for drunkenness arrests or police
expenditure, or less than eight years of homicide rate data. Thus, B C C c A. The complete
regression results can be found in Appendix 4. For brevity and ease of illustration, the left panel in
figure 4 graphs the estimated 6's of the baseline specification with no year effects. It nicely shows
how the homicide rate is relatively unresponsive for the first few years after a city has been under
Prohibition, and then trends upwards until around the 10th year under Prohibition. The homicide
rate then starts slowly falling back to a level similar to the pre-Prohibition average. The set of cities
experiencing lengthier periods under Prohibition shrinks over time, so late 6,'s are less precisely
estimated. At its peak, cities were on average experiencing 3.1 homicides per 100, 000 more than
before Prohibition was introduced (s.e.= 2.7).
Analogous regression results for drunkenness arrests provede a complementary picture. The esti-
mated 64's are presented in the right panel of figure 4. The figure illustrates the dramatic fall in
drunkenness arrests during the first two years after a city was under Prohibition. This is the ex-
pected outcome of prohibiting the liquor trade, due to the impact closing of most of the supply
sources of alcohol which, during this period, were to a large extent domestic. The reduction in the
supply of alcohol is likely to be underestimated in figure 4, given that law enforcement does not
show a fall during early Prohibition years, relative to years without Prohibition. During the second
year under Prohibition, drunkenness arrests attain a minimum. The estimated coefficient for 62 is
-9.73 (s.e.= 1.4), which implies that at its lowest point, the alcohol supply would have contracted
50% (= 12.7/19) in the absence of changes in law enforcement or demand. The figure also illus-
trates the steady recovery of the alcohol market, if we are willing to assume that arrest intensity
did not change significantly throughout Prohibition. Approximately fifteen years into Prohibition,
drunkenness arrests are indistinguishable from Pre-Prohibition levels 19 .
The patterns in panel A of figure 4 are consistent with the idea that legal Prohibition immediately
had a large effect on the supply of alcohol. When looking at crime, it had a much smaller short-run
impact, likely due to the slow development of alternative (illegal) sources of alcohol and their asso-
ciated crime networks. On the other hand, the figure does not support the claim of Prohibitionists
of the time, who claimed Prohibition would reduce criminality and the social disruptions associated
with liquor consumption and the saloon: despite the large contraction of the alcohol market dur-
ing the early prohibitionist years, a time when criminal organizations were still not developed, the
homicide rate remained relatively steady.
Finally, panel B in figure 4 presents the estimates of the 6,s both for the police share and for the
1"I call A the complete sample including all observations for which data is available, and also ran regression on it
which I omit from the paper. Thoughout, no significant differences arise from results using either sample.
19 The identification assumption here is that the introduction of Prohibition did not also induce changes in indi-
vidual's preferences over alcohol consumption. As an effort to check how reasonable this assumption is., Appendix 4
presents some evidence exploiting variation in the availability of neighboring alcohol markets. The evidence there is
consistent with no changes in demand after the introduction of Prohibition.
per capita police expenditure. Both measures of law enforcement increase steadily until around
ten to twelve years into Prohibition, only to subsequently fall back at a mildly faster pace. The
pattern follows the one of the homicide rate; both variables appear to increase during the first years
of Prohibition, and to start falling at relatively similar times. Below I will argue that the rise and
fall patterns in police enforcement and crime can be understood as the equilibrium outcomes of a
dynamic learning process about the effects of Prohibition, and its interaction with the distribution
of moral preferences and the dynamics of the illegal alcohol market and its associated criminal
networks2 0
4.2 Preferences and Moral heterogeneity
Communities with varying preferences over the legal standard were likely to collectively respond in
different ways to the introduction of Prohibition. The trends in figure 4 are likely to be averaging
out heterogeneous responses across cities with different moral profiles and beliefs, and thus, with
differing willingness to enforce the policy. On the one hand, drier constituencies should be willing
to enforce more because for the decisive voter, her marginal valuation of reducing her community's
alcohol consumption was larger, and because she was likely to be more optimistic about the effects
of law enforcement under Prohibition. On the other hand, drier communities were likely to face
smaller potential alcohol markets, and hence less crime increases due to Prohibition. Thus, holding
moral views constant, the decisive voter in cities with larger drinking populations faced an incentive
to increase law enforcement, relative to cities with smaller alcohol markets. If moral views were
relatively fixed, changes in equilibrium law enforcement should be due to belief updating about the
effects of Prohibition.
The empirical analysis below is based upon comparing changes in outcomes over time, in cities having
different distributions of moral tastes, exploiting both the timing of adoption of Prohibition laws
and the variation in community preferences. I follow the historical literature, and use the variation
in the religious ascription distribution and in the ethnicity and age distribution of the population, as
the main observable characteristics correlated with moral views about alcohol Prohibition, and prior
beliefs about its effects. I construct a straightforward proxy for the "wet share" in the population,
pct as the sum of the fractions of the population in any of the religions considered as "wet" in the
literature, the share of non-native white individuals, and the share of the population in the 15-44
years range21 There is fairly widespread consensus that Baptist, Evangelical, Methodist, Mormon,
and Presbyterian religious ascriptions were more favorable to Prohibition, while Catholic, Orthodox,
2 0 Evidence that Prohibition enforcement was weakened after an "experimentation" also comes from the repeal of
enforcement laws in several states during the 1920s, as mentioned in section 2 when discussing the controversy over the
repeal of New York's enforcement law. States under Prohibition before the adoption of the 18th Amendment had their
own alcohol enforcement legislation, which was in many cases strengthened or harmonized with federal legislation after
Congress passed the Volstead Act. All other states, with the exception of Maryland, adopted state-level enforcement
legislation right after the passage of the Volstead Act, thus complying with the shared-enforcement responsibilities
established by the 18th Amendment. Throughout the 1920s several states decided to repeal their state-enforcement
laws, effectively leaving the federal government alone in the enforcement of Prohibition. The state of New York took
the lead by repealing its enforcement law in 1923, very much against the will of the Federal government and of a large
share of upstate voters. It was followed by Montana in 1925, Nevada and Wisconsin in 1928, Massachussetts in 1930,
and Arizona, California. Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan. North Dakota. New Jersey. Oregon. and Washington in 1931.
21I normalize this variable dividing by 3, the total measure of the religious, ethnicity, and age distributions.
Jewish, and Lutheran communities had much more positive views about alcohol consumption. On
the other hand, while native whites, especially native white women, were strongly prohibitionist,
foreign whites (Irish, Italians, Germans, Polish, Scandinavians) and blacks were more liberal about
alcohol consumption. Finally, it is likely that younger populations also had more liberal views about
liquor (See for example Foster (2002); Sinclair (n.d.); Szymansky (2003); Blocker (1989); Asbury
(1950)). Thus I define "wetness" as:
1
pet - (1 - %Baptistet - %Evangelicalet - %Methodistt - %Mormont - %Presbyterianct)
1 1
+ -(1 - %NativeWhitect) + I(%PopulationAges15 - 4 4 et) (2)3 3
In 1911, its mean is 0.49, with a standard deviation of 0.085. Similar to the empirical strategy in
Equation (1), I regress each of the outcome variables yct on the years-under-Prohibition indicators,
and their interaction with the initial value of the "wetness" measure 22. As a benchmark for com-
parision, I ran analogous regressions using only the Constitutional Prohibition indicator, just as in
the models in section 4.1. The models I estimate take the form:
k k
Yct = ac + ft + 6 c5TDCT + pTDCTic + 'YXct + Ect (3)
T=1 T=1
Interest lies in the differential evolution of outcomes over time under Prohibition. captured by the
estimates of the #/'s, which measure how the several outcome variables changed differentially over
the years under Prohibition, between cities with varying "moral" distributions (relative to a city
with zero "wet"' population). For ease of exposition, panel A in figure 5 graphs the estimated #, 's
for the specifications using sample C. (See table A4-2, column (4), in Appendix 4). Estimates are
very similar in magnitude for the alternative samples. The figure shows an increasing differential
gap in the homicide rate during the first years under Prohibition, which subsequently closes over
time, for cities with relatively "wetter" constituencies. This happened especially during the years
in which the homicide rate was high. Because the differential increases in crime followed the same
time pattern of overall crime during Prohibition, this suggests that a large fraction of the increase
in criminality occured in cities with wetter constituencies. Differential changes in the drunkenness
arrest rate, which can be seen in the right panel of figure 5, appear to be small and significantly
different from zero only in a few of the years under Prohibition when the alcohol supply was likely
experiencing its fastest recovery.
Panel B plots the estimated #,'s for the police share and per capita police equations. Both show
a similar pattern: cities with "wetter" constituencies increased police expenditure differentially less
during early Prohibition years, but this gap closes over time, and for later Prohibition years, wetter
221 take 1911 as the baseline value for Id. For cities without religious distribution data before that year, I use the
earliest year available (1916 in most cases). As a robustness check I ran identical regressions using the 1911 data on
the somewhat reduced sample of cities without data before 1916, and results varied only marginally (available upon
request).
cities have differentially higher spending in police. The relatively tighter law enforcement in drier
cities during the early Prohibition years is consistent with their constituencies having relatively
optimistic beliefs about the its effects, making them more willing to repress the alcohol market, and
expecting little response of crime. But criminality was increasing relatively more in wetter cities, and
their alcohol markets were bouncing back faster. This suggests that criminality was very sensitive to
the size of the potential alcohol market, requiring higher levels of crime enforcement in wetter cities,
despite their preferences for a more lenient enforcement of the Prohibition laws. Indeed, panel B in
figure 5 shows that changes in police expenditure were differentially higher in wetter cities during
the later years under Prohibition. These were years in which cities were, overall, reducing police
expenditure, so the figure implies that wet cities were unable to reduce law enforcement as fast2 3 .
These patterns suggest that the alignment between the legal standard and community preferences
played a major role in determining law enforcement outcomes. In cities where the median individual
disfavored alcohol consumption and the alcohol market was small, there was little potential for
crime to arise after the introduction of Prohibition; Prohibition enforcement could be tightened
without concomitantly high crime increases. If individuals learn about the effects of Prohibition
by observing crime outcomes, these communities should not alter their preferences too much over
time. In contrast, communities where Prohibition was in stark contrast to average moral preferences
over alcohol faced a much more demanding problem. In those cities. the alcohol market was large,
so the potential for Prohibition-related criminality was much higher. The median citizen in this
community should be unwilling to enforce Prohibition tightly, not only because she was likely to
enjoy alcohol consumption and was morally liberal about others' alcohol consumption, but also
because she was less optimistic about the response of criminality to Prohibition enforcement. This
is what the early behavior of police expenditure suggests in figures 4 and 5, and is consistent with
the repeal of state-level enforcement legislation.
If tightening Prohibition enforcement drove illegal producers towards a more intensive use of violence,
why did police enforcement fall more slowly in wet cities in the later years under Prohibition, if these
were the ones most unwilling to enforce it? I suggest the answer is the impossibility to separate
overall crime enforcement and the enforcement of restrictions over a specific market, when the
legal standard prescribes full Prohibition. The prohibited market itself becomes a major source of
criminality, so that combatting crime also indirectly tightens the alcohol market. Under Prohibition,
the ability to specifically target crime without restricting the alcohol market was limited, especially
for policing activities. Thus, Prohibition in wet cities not only had adverse effects over crime, but
also was costly because for a given level of police expenditure, it would lead to a larger response of
crime relative to a city with a smaller alcohol market. This predicts larger shifts in preferences over
Prohibition in these communities.
The timing of adoption of State-level Prohibition could be correlated with unobservables at the city
level, which themselves would be causing the observed trends. However, this is unlikely because
such trends should also have a non-linear effect over time. Moreover. I am looking at the effects of
Prohibition on a sample of U.S. cities, which did not directly choose a Prohibitive legal standard,
2 3 As a placebo test for the results on police expenditure, I ran analogous models using the expenditure in fire. I
do not include the results here to save space, but no discernible differences appear between cities with different moral
profiles.
but rather saw it imposed upon them by state and federal decisions, making it less likely that
the timing of adoption of Prohibition is correlated with city-specific unobservables. Nevertheless,
other variation in previous legislation, in particular other alcohol-related laws, and women's suffrage,
appear as potential correlates of the introduction of Prohibition. In Appendix 4 I look at variation in
the availability of neighboring alcohol supply sources, in pre-Prohibition state-level alcohol-related
legislation, and in women's suffrage legislation. The evidence does not suggest that alternative
legislation was driving the patterns described above.
4.3 Public Opinion
To look at changes in political support for Prohibition during this period I exploit alcohol-related
referenda election returns, available at the county level for most of the U.S. states, taking place in
different years during the 1910s-1930s. I focused on finding for each state, electoral returns on a liquor
referendum taking place prior to the introduction of Prohibition in the State (the pre-Prohibition
period), and for a year in the later Prohibition period or after the repeal of federal Prohibition (the
post-Prohibition period). Because most of the information is available at the county level, here I
present results for both a county panel and a city panel, assigning the county vote to the city(ies)
in the county24 . A comparison of the distribution of wet vote shares prior to and after Prohibition
reveals the dramatic shift in public opinion. Figure 6 presents the histograms of county wet vote
shares in both periods. In the pre-Prohibition referenda, the 75th percentile of the distribution
of wet vote shares is 0.5. Thus, in three quarters of the counties some type of Prohibition had
majoritarian support. In the post period, only 35% of counties had majorities favoring Prohibition.
On the other hand, the comparison of both histograms suggests a spreadout in the distribution of
public opinion regarding the policy.
Figure 7 shows differential patterns of opinion shift between communities with varying moral profiles.
There was strong convergence of public opinion against Prohibition, but it was restricted to commu-
nities that were morally more favorable to alcohol in the first place. The figure breaks the sample of
counties between those with a value of my "moral wetness"' measure, y, below (left figure) and above
(right figure) the median of 0.355 25, and plots the pre-Prohibition and the post-prohibition wet vote
shares in the horizontal and vertical axes respectively, together with a 45 degree line. Almost all
counties above the median had a public opinion shift against Prohibition, while in the set of below
median counties, a considerable fraction even observed shifts towards Prohibition. Moreover, among
the latter group of counties there is no evidence of "convergence of opinion", since pre-Prohibition
vote shares are a very good predictor of post-prohibition ones. In contrast, among above-median
counties the shift against Prohibition was on average much larger in counties initially more favorable
to Prohibition. The shift in public opinion was concentrated in the upper part of the distribution
of moral preferences. Analogous figures for the city sample reveal the same patterns.
More formally, I estimate fixed-effects regressions for both the county and the city samples, with two
2 4 Except for cities in Massachusetts and Connecticut, for which city-level data is available.
251 computed y for each county directly from equation 2 for county-level data. I used the 1916 and 1926 Census of
Religions for the religious ascriptions distribution. For the age and ethnicity distribitions I used the 1920 and 1930
Population Censuses because the county-level age distribution from the 1910 census is unavailable.
periods, t E {0, 1}. t = 0 is the pre-Prohibition period, and t = 1 is the post-Prohibition period, for
a year in which there was a liquor-related referendum. The models I estimate take the basic form
wet = a'c + 13t + pet +#pcot + -'Xct + Ect (4)
where wet is the wet vote share. In this model the interaction term for the post period uses the
initial period's wetness, given that it is based on baseline moral preferences that law enforcement
and its equilibrium effects are endogenously determined. Xct is a vector of time-varying controls,
including the log of population (1910 data for t = 0 and 1930 for t = 1), the urban share of the
county (or of the county's city), the number of dry laws in place, the year in which the referendum
took place, and indicator variables for the type of referendum (a Prohibition law, a constitutional
convention election or a constitutional amendment (omitted category)). The estimate of # should
capture the differential increase in the wet vote share in wetter communities.
Table 3 presents the main results. Columns (1) - (5) present results for the complete sample of
counties. For comparative purposes, columns (6) - (10) present estimates for analogous models but
restricting the sample to counties with a population larger than 30,000. Finally columns (11) - (15)
present results for the sample of cities. Columns (1), (6), and (11) first simply regress the wet
vote share on a post-Prohibition period indicator. The estimated coefficient in column (1) implies
that the average county experienced a 13 percentage points larger wet vote share after Prohibition
(s.e.= 0.004). Column (2) then presents estimates of the main specification in equation (4) without
additional controls. Column (3) controls for the log of population and the urban share, the year
in which the referendum took place, and indicators for the type of referendum. Both the type of
referendum in consideration and the year in which it took place are likely to be endogenous to the
vote share, given that the timing and kind of referendum were likely to depend on the trends of
public support for Prohibition; for example, a proposal for a constitutional amendment was likely
to take place in states where public opinion favoring Prohibition was believed to be widespread.
Thus, I do not stress the results of the models in columns (3), (8), and (13); nonetheless, estimates
are very similar to those excluding these variables. Column (4) includes state-cross-post Prohibition
interactions, and finally column (5) accounts for the potential selection problem arising from the fact
that a subset of wet states never held pre-Prohibition liquor referenda, by controlling for the inverse
Mills ratio of the estimates of a Probit selection equation for holding a referendum (See Appendix
4). In all regressions I run a completely balanced panel. The estimates of the selection equation are
shown in panel B. If anything, the size of #. the estimated differential effect of having a larger wet
constituency, increases when accounting for selection.
The estimate of # from column (5) implies that a county with a one standard deviation higher pco
would differentially increase its wet vote share by 6 percentage points (0.062 = 0.48 x 0.13). The
interaccion terms are very precisely estimated across specifications, and the regression results suggest
that most of the increase in support for anti-Prohibitionism occured through the differentially larger
growth in wet support of morally wet communities. The magnitude and significance of the estimates
for the city sample are very close to those of the county sample, as can be seen in columns (11)- (15).
Estimates for the restricted sample of more populous counties are even larger in magnitute, and imply
that the result is not driven by a comparison of extremely dry versus extremely wet communities.
Given that wetter communities were initially less in favor of Prohibition, there was less room for
an increase in anti-Prohibitionist sentiment. Nevertheless, the referenda electoral results suggest
these communities did experience larger public opinion shifts. One possibility is that learning in dry
communities was slower because of large differences in prior beliefs about the effects of the policy,
coupled with uninformative local law enforcement decisions. It could also be that all communities
were learning at similar speed, but that differences in moral views were so large that for the driest of
communities indirect preferences over the policy were very inelastic to changes in beliefs. Finally, it
is also possible that very dry communities did in fact benefit from Prohibition. Although this seems
at odds with the reduced-form results on crime presented above, the experience of rural and very
dry counties might have been very different, given that local preferences were much more aligned to
a prohibitionist legal standard.
Overall the reduced-form results show that the introduction of Prohibition had heterogeneous effects
across cities varying in their moral preferences over the policy, and directly point towards a set of
elements that a comprehensive theory of endogenous law enforcement in the context of U.S. Pro-
hibition should incorporate. First, that responses varied over time, and that restricting attention
to Nationwide Prohibition is insufficient to understand the trends in the different outcomes I fo-
cused on; the passage of state legislation and enforcement laws, together with local law enforcement
decisions, appear as first order. Second, that learning about the effects of the policy is likely to
have driven not only the evident changes in public opinion but also the equilibrium law enforcement
choices during Prohibition years. Third, that the dynamics of the alcohol market were important
for the evolution of criminality during Prohibition. Finally, that variation in the potential alcohol
markets across cities implied differential constraints on the extent to which communties could vary
law enforcement.
5 A Statistical Model of Prohibition, Learning, and Endogenous
Law Enforcement
In this section I develop a simple political economy model of Prohibition enforcement and learning. It
incorporates the central interactions at the heart of the dynamics of criminality and public opinion
during Prohibition, based on the discussion above. It provides enough structure to be directly
estimated. Importantly, it is an equilibrium dynamic model where equilibrium outcomes are the
result of the optimal choices of agents, and where learning is rational. Prohibition altered the Data
Generating Process (DGP) of several economic outcomes through two main channels. First, in the
absence of Prohibition there is no direct link between law enforcement and criminality; this link
arises through the enforcement of dry legislation when Prohibition is adopted. Second, differences
in beliefs and uncertainty about the effects of Prohibition created a new dynamic channel affecting
law enforcement choices at the local level, because many communities were experimenting a new
legal standard with unknown consequences at the time of its adoption. In the model, the interaction
between moral preferences and beliefs determines the political-equilibrium choices of law enforcement
which, by affecting crime, determines the endogenous evolution of learning about the effects of the
policy. The evolution of beliefs subsequenty shift optimal law enforcement choices and public opinion
over Prohibition. This requires that individuals know the mapping from indirect preferences to law
enforcement choices (the political process), and have beliefs about the mapping from law enforcement
to expected outcomes.
5.1 Environment and Preferences
Consider a society made up of a large number of small communities c = 1. 2, ..., in discrete time.
Community c is populated by a continuum measure 1 of adult citizens indexed by i. Each period t =
0, 1,2, ... , every citizen makes a private decision about alcohol consumption, and through majority
voting, collectively decides how to distribute a fixed public budget among public goods. Each adult
lives for one period, and has a child.
In addition, society as a whole (out of which the individual community is small) can decide a legal
standard over the alcohol market for the community, either to be under Prohibition (Pt = 1) or not
under Prohibition (Pt = 0). In the latter regime, alcohol is freely traded (though possibly with some
regulation), whereas in the former, an illegal alcohol market is the only source of liquor. Under no
Prohibition the alcohol market is perfectly competitive, while under Prohibition, the black market
is monopolistic. When Prohibition is in place, the community collectively decides the extent of
enforcement of the law. Finally. Po = 0, so that society's initial legal standard is liberal.
Citizens are heterogeneous in several private and common-values dimensions (Arrow (1963)). In
regard to private values, each adult citizen is either dry Dt or wet Wt, and I denote Pt =I Wt I as
the share of wet adult citizens. The two groups differ in their preferences over individual alcohol
consumption h. For simplicity, dry individuals do not derive any utility from their own consumption
of alcohol, while wet adult individuals do enjoy consuming a unit of alcohol every period (h e {0, 1}).
This type is not inherited from parent to child, but during every period the share of wet individuals
is a random variable drawn from a beta distribution (See Coate and Conlin (2004) or Degan and
Merlo (2009) for a modeling choice in the same spirit):
f ( a, b) = - a1(1 - v)b-Id a, b > 0 (5)
Individuals know the parameters of the distribution, but do not observe the draw directly (they
do not observe the type of their fellow citizens). Each individual is also characterized by a "moral
view" zi. which is a measure of the marginal disutility she gets from her community-wide alcohol
consumption. I will call z' her moral view, and will assume it is inherited from parent to child.
On the other hand, individuals in the community have common values about consumption of a public
good G, and crime, but there is heterogeneity in prior beliefs (beliefs of the cohorts living prior to
and during the first period under Prohibition) about how the introduction of Prohibition might
impact crime within the community. Thus, conflicting views over Prohibition arise not only from
differences in individual moral stands (tastes), but also from informational differences (or differences
in the way prior information was interpreted). Nevertheless, these are correlated in the population
26 Throughout this section I drop the community indices c, since no confusion arises. In section 6 I specify which
parameters are city-specific for estimation purposes.
to allow individuals with more radical views against alcohol consumption (by others) to be more
optimistic about the response of criminality to Prohibition.
Specifically, the information structure, which will imply parsimonious learning dynamics, is as fol-
lows. Individual i's moral view (distaste for her community's aggregate alcohol consumption) is
zi = z + (, where z is her community's average moral view, and (' is her individual-specific moral
shock. On the other hand, her prior beliefs (about the elasticity of crime to the enforcement of
Prohibition, as will be explained below) are 0' = B+ 2, where B can be thought of as the common
component of prior beliefs (which possibly includes a bias), and ( is an individual-specific bias.
((,(i) is drawn from a joint-normal distribution
.r ~N ,C (6
012(* 0 polaa
Here moral views are understood as the set of beliefs about the world, which an individual takes
as true. This is, to which she assigns a degenerate prior probability of 1, and are thus not subject
to updating with the arrival of new information. On the other hand, all other beliefs can evolve
through rational updating as the individual receives new information. In the context of Prohibition,
it is natural to think of crime as the source of information about 0. Observe that if p < 0, individuals
who have stronger moral views against alcohol will be on average more optimistic about the response
of crime to the introduction of Prohibition. For simplicity, both wet and dry individuals get their
(C,(2) drawn from the same distribution.
The expected utility of a citizen is given by
Et U(h', A 1 , G.Pt) E - zAt + V(Gt) - qt] (7)
where At is the aggregate alcohol consumed in his community, q, is the crime rate, G E [0, 1] is the
share of the public budget allocated to public goods other than policing, and E is the expectations
operator conditional on all the information available to individual i. The term -z'At represents the
"moral externality". Finally, V(G) = exp(G). Notice that from the point of view of individuals the
optimization problem is static, since they only live for one period.
5.2 The Alcohol Market
Imagine a very simple alcohol market, where the price of consuming a unit of liquor is normalized
to zero under no Prohibition, but individuals must engage in a costly search. The probability of
successful search is a decreasing function of the level of Prohibition enforcement chosen by the
community 27 . As communities decide to tighten enforcement of dry laws, the availability of alcohol
is diminished. Specifically I allow this probability to take the form Pr(h' = 1|Pt = 0) = exp(-et)
where et > 0 is the level of dry law enforcement.
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7Recall that under no Prohinition dry laws were in place. These restricted the availability of liquor by regulating
the alcohol market along different dimensions.
The introduction of Prohibition, on the other hand, makes legal alcohol unavailable (and increases
market power since black markets are likely to be captured by a small set of criminal organizations).
The search for alcohol becomes costlier, and I will allow the probability of a successful search to also
become a function of the amount of time the community has been under Prohibition, Tt, to flexibly
capture the possibility that the illegal market adjusts over time. After Prohibition is adopted, the
legal market for alcohol is closed on impact, which by itself has an effect on the quantities traded.
The supply response from illegal producers does not occur immediately because it takes time to
build up a black market, and the development of crime networks associated with the illegal activity
also requires costly and staggered investments. Thus, the probability of successful search under
Prohibition is given byPr(h = 1it = 1) = k(rt)exp(-et), where
k(Tt) = 1 - ATtexp(-tTt) (8)
with K, A > 028. It follows that aggregate alcohol consumption is
At (et) = J 1k(Tt)exp(-et)di = ptk(rF)exp(-et) (9)
so that during the rth year under Prohibition, holding law enforcement constant, the alcohol market
is a fraction k(Tt) of what it would be uinder no Prohibition. This highlights why individuals with
moral views opposed to alcohol might want to choose high levels of law enforcement. By reducing
the equilibrium consumption of alcohol, their moral externality is directly reduced. The fact that
after an initial fall k(rt) rises as time under Prohibition increases, implies that over time, higher
levels of law enforcement are required to maintain a given size of the illegal alcohol market.
5.3 Crime, Prohibition, and Law Enforcement
I allow crime to be related to alcohol consumption by assuming that baseline crime is proportional
to the size of the alcohol market. Formally,
q - Os + A(et) = Os + k(Tt)ptexp(-et) + Et (10)
where Et ~ N(0, o ) is an iid normally distributed shock. Because the homicide rate levels vary
significantly across states but are relatively similar between cities in the same state, I allow for a
state-specific parameter Os. Central to the understanding of the variation in criminality across the
United States during Prohibition is the fact that different communities were structurally different
in how the ban on the alcohol trade would affect criminality, and there was disagreement about
28I introduce two parameters for k(Tt) to be flexible enough to separately capture the initial fall in the alcohol
market once Prohibition is enacted (A), and the speed at which the alcohol market bounces back (K), and will restrict
them to be constant across cities in the empirical analysis below. Note that for no-Prohibition years, k(-rt) = k(O) = 1.
A graph of k(Tt) is presented in the first panel of figure 11 for K = 0.26 and A = 0.25 (the lILE estimates). This curve
has its unique minimum at -rt = 1/K, so that K is also the inverse of the time at which the alcohol market reaches its
mimimun size. I also impose the condition KCxp(1) > A, which is necessary and sufficient for k(Tt) to be everywhere
positve. A comparison of figures 2 and 11 illustrates why the functional form choice in 8 is likely to be appropriate.
this issue. I will assume the following relationship between law enforcement and Prohibition-related
crime:
q O = [At(et = 0) - At(et)] = Ok(rt)pt[1 - exp(-et)] (11)
Equations (10) and (11) capture the two main channels from the alcohol markt to crime. Alcohol
consumption can cause crime by altering the behavior of consumers, and by giving incentives for
the development of crime networks when it is prohibited 29. Total crime is qt = qt + Ptqf. In
equation (11), 6 is the true state, a city-specific shifter of crime to the size of the alcohol market
under Prohibition. Formally, this implies a structural change in the Data Generating Process for
crime when Prohibition is introduced. For 0 > 0, it measures the extent to which crime increases
as the alcohol market is tightened through law enforcement, relative to the size of the market at
zero law enforcement. Observe that qP = 0 if et = 0, or under no Prohibition. Also, as et -- 4 c,
Prohibition-related crime qf -+ Oek(rt)pt. This functional form captures a set of key aspects about
the link between criminality and law enforcement under Prohibition. First, sustaining a smaller black
market when alcohol is prohibited, translates into more crime. Second, a larger wet share implies a
larger potential alcohol market, and hence, more Prohibition-related crime for a given level of law
enforcement. Third, the time-variation in crime should be correlated with the time-variation in the
alcohol-market dynamics. Fourth, and most importantly, a link between restrictions in the alcohol
market and criminality only appears when Prohibition is in place. There is common knowledge up
to the uncertainty about the value of 0.
The drunkenness arrest rate is, by definition, the conditional probability of being arrested times the
alcohol market size. It is a function of law enforcement, and I will allow the probability of being
arrested to take the flexible form Pr(Arrestlet) - , with x > 030. The drunkenness arrest
rate is thus:
d = Pr(Arrestjet)At(et) ptk(-) (12)
x+ exp(et)
Notice this equation holds both under no Prohibition and under Prohibition, since under no Prohibi-
tion public drunkenness was also prosecuted. The equilibrium drunkenness arrest rate is a decreasing
29In a classic Sociology paper, Paul Goldstein discusses the different channels from drug use to violence. The
author identifies two sources of criminality in a no Prohibition environment: psychopharmacological and economycally
compulsive: In the former, "... some individuals, as a result of short or long term ingestion of specific substances,
may become excitable, irrational, and may exhibit violent behavior". In the latter, "...some drug users engage in
economically oriented violent crime, e.g., robbery. in order to support costly drug use.... Violence generally results
from some factor in the social context in which the economic crime is perpetrated." Then he identifies systemic
violence as an added source of crime under Prohibition: "... the aggressive patterns of interaction within the system of
drug distribution and use... 1. disputes over territory between rival drug dealers. 2. assaults and homicides committed
within dealing hierarchies as a means of enforcing normative codes. 3. robberies of drug dealers and the usually violent
retaliation by the dealer or his/her bosses. 4. elimination of informers. 5. punishment for selling adulterated or phony
drugs. 6. punishment for failing to pay one's debts. 7. disputes over drugs or drug paraphernalia. 8. robbery violence
related to the social ecology of copping areas." Goldstein (1985. pp.146-149)
3 0 The choice of this logistic functional form for the conditional probability of being arrested under drunkenness
charges is flexible enough to allow any arrest probability at zero law enforcement: Pr(Arrest 0) = 1/(1 + x), which
is a convenient way to interpret x.
function of law enforcement. Equation (12) highlights that variation in the drunkenness arrest rate
can come from changes in the size of the alcohol market, (the wet share pt and the "secular" dy-
namics of the alcohol supply under Prohibition k(Tt)), or from the extent of law enforcement et.
Moreover, when identifying these two channels separately, the structural estimation will exploit the
common variation in drunkenness arrests, crime, and police expenditure due to changes in the size
of the alcohol market and in law enforcement.
Prohibition enforcement is a function of the amount of police expenditure pt, and the current legal
standard, which includes dry laws, enforcement laws, and Prohibition. I will assume Prohibition
enforcement can be expressed as et = atpt, with at > 1, which depends on the legal standard in
place. The multiplicative form is intended to capture the inherent non-separability between crime
and Prohibition enforcement. Observe, nonetheless, that liberalizing the legal standard (by lowering
at) weakens the link between both, at the cost of reducing the restrictions on the alcohol market.
Each community has a unit of public resources to allocate between policing pt and other public
goods Gt, and I assume, for simplicity, they can be exchanged one-for-one. Thus,
Gt = 1 - pt (13)
5.4 Learning and the Timing of Events
To make the model suitable for estimation, I make the following assumptions about information,
learning, and the timing of events. In the end of period t - 1, each member of the adult cohort has
one child, and outcome variables (pti, qti dt_1 ) are realized. Under no Prohibition there is no
learning taking place, whereas in a Prohibition year, children observe the vector of outcome variables
and update their beliefs about 6 according to Bayes' rule. This occurs as follows. First, each child
learns her parent's belief 0. In the first year under Prohibition (Tt_1 = 1), child i knows that
-' = B + ( (of course, she does not observe B or (* separately). and knows that (~ N(0, o2) is
the marginal distribution of biases in the population. As a result, child i's prior about 6 is given by
66 N(66, of).
From equation (12), after the child has observed dt_1 and pt_1, she can perfectly back-up the real-
ization of pk i. Thus, in the public signal qt_1 = Os + pt-ik(Tt_i)exp(-atpt_1) + Ok(Tt_1)pt_[1 -
exp(-atpt 1)] + Et_1, the only remaining uncertainty comprises the true value of 0 and the distri-
bution of Et-1. It follows that Bayesian individuals' posteriors about 6 will be normally distributed.
Normal updating will keep taking place cohort after cohort as long as the community is still un-
der Prohibition. Thus, iteratively using normal updating and exploiting linearity of conditional
distributions under normality, cohort tVs posterior (or t + 1's prior) will be given by
1-± 0 [q,~ - O~s - I18 k(Tt)xp(-tp,)]w,,1
(14)
where so is the first year in which community c is under Prohibition, and where wt - k(rt)pt[1 -
exp(-atpt)] is a measure of the degree of informativeness of the signal 31. This posterior will be the
relevant measure with respect to which individual i will evaluate her expected utility under different
law enforcement policy alternatives.
The stochastic process in (14) is a bounded martingale, and as such, the {0} converge almost surely
as t -- oo. Moreover, because the true distribution (a mass point of 1 at 6) is absolutely continuous
with respect to the prior (which is normal and hence has positive density everywhere), the process
will converge to the true 6 for any infinite sequence of positive {pt, et};"=so. How rapidly convergence
occurs will depend on the amount of law enforcement. As pt -> 0, the signal becomes uninformative
because individuals know the data generating process, and hence, realize that at zero enforcement
any observed crime rate must not come from Prohibition-related crime. Conversely, for a given
observed signal, a higher value of law enforcement reduces the variance of the signal's likelihood,
making its informational content much higher. Rational individuals should then put a higher weight
on such a signal. Interestingly, this implies that if a community reduces its enforcement levels, it
will also reduce the speed at which its members will be able to learn about the true state. Now I
define Y' as the posterior mean, and express it more compactly as
-i 10- 1 1 _COt =- 0 + Qt [q - - pek(Tt)cxp(-atp,)]w = Qt- + Qt5 (15)
where Qt t - is the posterior variance, and the common component of beliefs (shared
by all individuals in the community) is Oi - B+ 1 Z 1 u[qs-Os -- sk(t)exp(-aotps)]ws. The
posterior mean belief at any time t is a weighted average of the prior mean and the whole history of
crime realizations, weighted according to their relative precisions and by the informativeness of each
signal. The degree of informativeness depends, in turn, on the extent of law enforcement originating
the signal. Equation (15) shows that individual belief sequences can be analytically decomposed
into a common component, shared by all individuals in the community every period given the public
nature of the signal, and an individual-specific component, tied to the dynasty-specific bias. Of
course, individuals do not separately observe the public and the private components of their beliefs,
but the explicit distinction will be convenient. Equation (15) is readily interpretable. When the
precision of the distribution of prior biases is low (as measured by 1/o2), Bayesian individuals will
disregard the information in their prior and will rely more closely on the observed signal sequence.
A lower precision of the signal (1/or) induces a Bayesian individual to put more weight on her prior.
Moreover, since individuals know the DGP up to the uncertainty about 0, they optimally use the
information on law enforcement to decide how much weight to give to the crime signal.
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'Equation (14) above highlights the convenience of assuming normality for both the prior on 0 and the conditional
likelihood of the signal which, being an affine information structure, results in a very parsimonious learning process
where posterior conditional expectations are linear in the signal sequence, making estimation relatively straightfor-
ward. Although this seems to be a very restrictive set of assumptions about the information structure and of the
cognitive requirements of the learning process, these features of normal learning are actually fairly robust to alternative
specifications. For example, if agents are not fully Bayesians, and are limited to making the best linear predictions
based on the signal sequence {qj}'-_ . their prediction of the conditional mean will exactly match the posterior mean
under normal updating, no matter the true data generating process (See for example, Vives (2010, p. 379)).
5.5 Political Equilibrium and the Distribution of Preferences over Law Enforce-
ment
5.5.1 The Problem under no Prohibition
Replacing the probability of successful search, and equations (9), (10), and (13) into (7), indirect
preferences under no Prohibition can be obtained. The first order condition implies that The pre-
ferred police enforcement of individual i is given by (see Appendix 1),
p*((W) = l nat + n a (z + 1) + a ( -{iy] - 1} (16)
at - 1 a+ b a + b
If the expression inside ln[] is negative, p*(() = 0. This expression follows from the fact that pt
is distributed O(a, b), so its mean is given by a, and that the expected alcohol consumption for
a+b'
a wet individual is equal to the probability of successful search. When a community is not under
Prohibition, beliefs about 6 do not appear in the objective function of its members. The ideal choice
of police enforcement simply trades off the reduction in other public goods with the reduction in
moral externality from tightening the alcohol market, and the reduction in overall crime. Individuals
with higher zi will prefer higher levels of law enforcement.
Equation (16) illustrates clearly some of the interesting interactions in the context of moral conflict.
Wet individuals, who suffer a small moral externality from average alcohol consumption, prefer low
levels of policing to reduce the size of the market, but differentially higher the larger is the alcohol
market in their community (the larger is a/(a + b)). Interestingly, this interaction effect is not
present for dry individuals; for them, the marginal disutility of a larger alcohol market induced by
a reduction in policing is exactly offset by the marginal disutility of increased criminality brought
about by such a reduction in crime enforcement. The effect of tightening the legal standard on the
ideal choice of policing, on the other hand, is ambiguous, since it trades off the value of reducing
expenditure in police with the complementarity of police enforcement and the legal standard. For
large values of at though, ideal policing is falling in at.
5.5.2 The Problem under Prohibition
Taking a look at the problem under Prohibition by replacing the successful-search probability and
equations (9), (10)., (11) and (13) into (7), indirect preferences under Prohibition are obtained. From
the first order condition. the preferred police enforcement of individual i under Prohibition is given
by (See Appendix 1),
pt* In {[atk(rt)] + In a Z z Q C + 1) + a Q, {iEw } (17)at - 1 a+ b a + b or
where I have made use of equation (15). Once again, if the expression inside ln[] is negative,
p*(Z, gi) - 0 is the preferred police enforcement share. What matters for individual i is his mean
belief about 0. Under Prohibition, individuals must now include the increased criminality induced
by Prohibition enforcement in their optimal trade-off regarding police expenditure. Equation (17)
highlights that the introduction of Prohibition alters individuals' optimal degree of law enforcement,
which now becomes a function not only of their wet or dry identity and their dynasty-specific moral
shock (, but also of their dynasty-specific belief bias C. These are the three sources of unobserved
heterogeneity in the model.
The analysis above looked at the indirect preferences of individuals over law enforcement. Never-
theless, law enforcement is a collective decision, which is made through majority voting. Thus, I
define an equilibrium of this model as follows:
Definition. An equilibrium is a sequence of police expenditure shares {p*}*o such that for every
t, pt* wins any pairwise vote against any other p' when all adult citizens vote sincerely given their
current beliefs Fti(0), sequences of homicide and drunkenness arrest rates {qt}* 0 , {dt}gO given by
(11) and (12), and a sequence of belief distributions { Ft(0)}%O for each dynasty i, which are updated
every period according to Bayes' rule and given by (14).
To find the equilibrium path, it is necessary to look at the collective decision-making process, which
takes the form of simple majority voting. Although there are three sources of heterogeneity regarding
preferences over law enforcement across individuals in this model, below I show they can be reduced
to one dimension, over which a unique majority-voting equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1. For any t. a given distribution of beliefs Fti(0) Vi e [0,1], and a legal standard
vector (at- T, P t), there is a unique equilibrium level of law enforcement pi given by
1[ P P± d (18)
Pt = iln [atk(rt)]+In z - PtC +tt +(1 - P te
at -1 a + b NP
where Ped and gn d are random variables whose densities f0 med(ONmd a, b, 0vN) and f ged a, b, a pt)
are continuous and positive over the interval [-1.0].
Proof. See Appendix 2.
As the proof of Proposition 1 shows, ON and g' are one-dimensional sufficient statistics capturing
the three sources of heterogeneity in individual i's preferences, during no Prohibition and Prohi-
bition periods, respectively. Their conditional distribution across the population is a mixture of
two normal densities, weighted by the wet share pt. In Appendix 2 I show that the equilibrium
level of law enforcement is determined by the median voter's value of g. Because the wet share is
itself a beta-distributed random variable. gped is also a random variable whose equilibrium density
fmd (gd; a. b. o -) is continuous and takes positive values over the interval [- 1,0]. As pt - 1.
fmed -+ -1 and as pt -+ 0. ned - 0. When all the community is wet. for example, Pt =1 so
the median in the community corresponds to the median over the distribution of preferences of wet
individuals. These are normally distributed with mean and median at -1. given the preference for
private alcohol consumption of wets.
5.6 Predictions and Main Assumptions
5.6.1 Predictions
The model makes several predictions about the equilibirum dynamics of law enforcement during
Prohibition. First, observe the dynamic trade-off faced by a relatively liberal median voter living
in a relatively wet community. Her pessimism about Prohibition-related crime (0 > 0) makes her
prefer a low level of law enforcement. This reduces expected crime and increases the likelihood of
alcohol consumption. But over time, maintaining a weak law enforcement becomes costlier because
overall crime will be rising fast as the alcohol market catches up and its associated crime networks
develop over time (as captured by k(Tt)). This individual is constrained by a lack of independent
policy instruments; by maintaining a low level of Prohibition enforcement, she is at the same time
reducing overall crime enforcement. Moreover, the trade-off is more demanding the wetter the
community, because a median voter in a wet community is more likely to have a liberal stand on
Prohibition and be pessimistic about its effects, while facing a larger alcohol market.
On the other hand, the evolution of preferred law enforcement under Prohibition is determined by
-Cthe difference between moral views and beliefs, both in their common (z - Qt6t ) and individual
(9imed) components. From the martingale property of the stochastic updating process, tC -+a.s. 0.
Nevertheless, the informativeness of signals, as measured by wt, is increasing in law enforcement.
Thus, early law enforcement choices are likely to be low, making early signals uninformative. More-
over, wt is also increasing in k(Tt), so the relatively small alcohol market of early Prohibition years
also reduces the informativeness of signals for a given level of law enforcement. As a result, learning
should be slow during the first years under Prohibition, implying that the incentives to increase law
enforcement as the alcohol market catches up are likely to dominate the incentives to reduce law
enforcement due to changes in beliefs. As the market converges to its pre-Prohibition size (recall
k(Tt) -- > 1 as T increases), and the increased levels of law enforcement increase the precision of the
signals, learning will be faster and incentives to shrink law enforcement due to an increasing sequence
of beliefs 0 should dominate. After its initial fall, an invert U-shaped pattern of law enforcement
should be observed.
Now, notice the presence of the term k(rt) in equation (18). Ceteris paribus, law enforcement
should fall discretely right after Prohibition is introduced. This is the optimal response to the sharp
contraction of the alcohol supply when it is closed on impact. Not only is the potential for crime
small because the size of the alcohol market is smaller, but the marginal moral disutility of reducing
law enforcement is also low because the alcohol market has sharply contracted, making it optimal to
reduce policing. This increases the consumption of other public goods Gt and the private utility of
alcohol consumption for wet individuals. Moreover, if prior beliefs for the median individual are such
that 0' > 0, her ideal choice of law enforcement would fall even further because she is pessimistic
about the response of crime to Prohibition.
In addition to these time-series predictions, equation (18) also makes predictions about the cross-
sectional variation in law enforcement and learning. Specifically, variation in average moral views and
alcohol market sizes across cities should interact with the evolution of beliefs. From equation (18),
individuals in communities with higher average moral disutility (larger z) should be less sensitive
to changes in beliefs than individuals in communities where mean moral views are more favorable
to alcohol. Thus, morally drier communities should be more reluctant to change law enforcement
as learning takes place. This suggests a nuanced inverted U-shape pattern of ideal law enforcement
in relatively dry cities. Of course, such a pattern across cities could be alternatively interpreted as
arising from behavioral differences in the ability to learn, between individuals with differing moral
views. This model can accomodate equilibrium differences in response to learning while still fully
assuming rational individuals.
The correlation parameter p has interesting implications in the model. A high correlation between
individual moral views and prior biases implies that relative to no-Prohibition years, during Prohibi-
tion the decisive voter's preferences will be more extremist, so that an amplification in the difference
between the equilibrium choices of drier and wetter cities should be observed. Conversely, if this
correlation is low, the average draw of gmed will be very similar in Prohibition and no Prohibi-
tion periods, so that changes in law enforcement should not vary significantly between dry and wet
communities when the legal standard is reformed.
5.6.2 Crime
Equations (10) and (11) are intented to capture some key features of the relationship between crime
and the alcohol market. In the baseline equation for crime (10), I introduce Es, a scale parameter
at the state level, to capture the large differences in the homicide rate levels across states. Following
the claims of Prohibitionists, who argued that alcohol consumption was a source of criminality and
social disruptions, I also allow it to vary with the size of the alcohol market.
Regarding Prohibition-related crime, a main reason why large cities were forced to maintain high
police enforcement levels during Prohibition was their large potential for criminality, if policing were
to be weakened. This points to a central conflict that arises in the context of Prohibition. The
enforcement of a prohibitionist legal standard creates a non-separability between the objectives of
enforcing Prohibition and of controlling crime. The instruments for the enforcement of Prohibition.
mainly policing and judicial prosecution, are the same used to fight crime at the local level. If the
enforcement of Prohibition creates crime. a community that does not favor Prohibition is unable to
reduce law enforcement because it cannot be weakened without, at the same time, weakening overall
crime enforcement. This is an especially binding constraint in relatively wet communities where
criminality is more responsive to falls in crime enforcement, and motivates the functional form in
equation (11).
It is frequently argued that crime increases during Prohibition were due to a shift of resources
from crime protection to Prohibition enforcement. But this would predict exactly the opposite
patterns to those observed in the data. It cannot explain why the steepest increases in crime and
law enforcement were observed precisely in the wettest cities in the United States, since it would
imply that relatively wet communities, strongly opposed to Prohibition, should have kept their
Prohibition enforcement at very low levels and their crime enforcement resources high. This would
have avoided a rise in criminality, and would have allowed the black market to operate with relative
freedom. On the other hand, if the enforcement of Prohibition cannot be fully separated from overall
crime enforcement, then wet communities must have been unable to reduce Prohibition enforcement.
Although likely to have a median voter more willing to invest in Prohibition enforcement, relatively
dry communities faced smaller alcohol markets. Thus, they faced a lower potential for crime increases
if law enforcement were to be weakened. These predictions are consistent with the patterns in the
data.
Equation (11) also assumes that crime under Prohibition is a linear function of 6. This is a relatively
weak assumption, given that even if it is not linear, equation (11) could be seen as a first order
approximation to any other nonlinear structural relationship between q[ and the wedge in the
alcohol market arising from Prohibition enforcement. Under such an interpretation, the error term
would be capturing approximation error. Thus, any misspecification of this relationship should show
up in the standard errors of the parameter estimates of equation (11).
5.6.3 Drunkenness Arrests
The functional form specifying the relationship between the drunkenness arrest rate and law en-
forcement implicitly assumes that throughout the relevant range of law enforcement intensities, the
alcohol supply falls at a faster rate than that at which the arrest probability increases. It is adopted
for simplicity only, since it makes the derivation of the conditional likelihood more straightforward,
by allowing the mapping from unobserved variables to outcomes to be one-to-one for the whole range
of outcomes. Moreover, the data suggests this is a reasonable assumption. since variation in law
enforcement is only midly correlated with variation in the drunkenness arrest rate, while the timing
at which we know the market must have contracted is highly correlated with it across the sample.
5.6.4 Learning
In the model each dynasty gets a specific bias g, which is analogous to assuming heterogeneous
priors in the population. Following Sethi and Yildiz (2009), (* can represent all the information
which individual i finds relevant about 0, but is seen as irrelevant for everybody else. The historical
literature has emphasized that initial public opinion regarding the effects of Prohibition was ex-
tremely optimistic. These biases came from two main sources -some relatively successful experiences
of States that underwent Prohibition in the second half of the 19th century, and more importantly,
the massive wave of prohibitionist campaigning and lobbying of the ASL and the WCTU in the
decades prior to the adoption of nationwide Prohibition (See Asbury (1950); Blocker (1989): Foster
(2002); Okrent (2010); Szymansky (2003)). I also assume that both wets and drys get their draw
of (( ,(i) from same distribution. This is just a simplifying assumption since, for example, if wet
individuals were to get their draw from a mean-shifted distribution, it would be isomorphic to in-
creasing the difference in the marginal utility of private alcohol consumption between wet and dry
voters.
3 2 This is not to say that a crowding-out of crime enforcement did not take place as communities increased the
resources allocated to Prohibition enforcement. Indeed, the widely acknowledged congestion in judicial courts due
to Prohibition-related cases is a good example of how it did to some extent shift resources away from overall crime
enforcement. The argument here is just that the crowding-out had second order effects relative to the problem arising
from the inherent difficulty in separating the enforcement of overall crime and of alcohol Prohibition.
Individuals only learn based on local information. This is in opposition to the experimentation
literature where learning takes places from neighbors (for example, see Buera et al. (2010)). In the
context of Prohibition it is likely that individuals were observing the crime outcomes of other cities.
Nonetheless, it is very unlikely that they also observed the local law enforcement choices of other
communties. Even if individuals believed that the effects of Prohibition were homogeneous across
cities, a signal coming from a city from which law enforcement is not observed is void of informational
content. Thus, in this model learning relies on local information exclusively, not only because it is
likely that people recognized that Prohibition should have different effects in different communities,
but also because learning from signals emerging from unknown law enforcement decisions is not
possible without additional information. The endogenous nature of signals in this model justifies
that learning should take place based exclusively on local information.
5.6.5 Political Environment
The political equilibrium of this model relies on two main assumptions. First, on simple mayority
voting as the collective chioce mechanism. In the context of Prohibition in the United States,
bipartisan political competition and a strong involvement of citizens in local politics were prevalent
both at the local and federal levels. Indeed, political competition was much weaker in the South
during the 1910-1930s. where the Democratic Party had a. fairly generalized control of political
power. Nevertheless, alcohol Prohibition as a political issue actually increased party competition by
making dry voters, who were highly mobilized, involved in politics, and constantly motivated by dry
organizations, pivotal 33
Second, on the absence of any strategic experimentation considerations by voters. Because individu-
als live for only one period, they simply vote for the level of law enforcement which maximizes their
current payoff given their present belief. In a more complex model, one could imagine long-lived or
intergenerationally-altruistic voters making strategic voting decisions to induce experimentation in
the collective choice of law enforcement level. In the context of Prohibition this is highly unlikely
for several reasons. Foremost. local politicians' incentives to experiment with law enforcement were
very weak, since adverse criminality outcomes derived from "wrong choices" were likely to hurt their
political careers. Indeed, as in any other experimentation setting, experimenting creates positive
externalities since learning today benefits not only current, but also future constituencies, and thus,
will in general be undersupplied by current constituencies (or politicians). Moreover, in voting envi-
ronments, incentives to vote for experimentation (in the context of Prohibition higher levels of law
enforcement) are weakened by the fact that pivotal voters under the present distribution of beliefs
are likely to lose their decisive position after large changes in beliefs induced by experimentation
(Strulovici (2010)).
33 A good example of how competition for the dry vote in the South did increase the competitiveness of local politics
was the 1910 Tennessee gubernatorial election. The unwillingness of the incumbent Democratic governor Patterson to
enforce the 1909 State Constitutional Amendment introducing Prohibition (after vetoing the Amendment and having
his veto overridden by the legislature) alienated a dry fraction of the Democratic party, even after he stepped down for
reelection. After more than 30 years in which the Republican party had not occupied Tennessee's gubernatorial office,
Republican candidate Ben Hooper won the election on a prohibitionist platform (See Isaac (1965) for a historically
detailed account of Prohibition politics in Tennessee).
6 Structural Estimation
The equilibrium-political economy model developed in the previous section is characterized by three
equilibrium relationships and the dynamic path of beliefs implied by Bayesian updating, which
constitute the Data Generating Process (DGP) and can be directly used for estimation (recall that
k(0) = 1, and c indexes cities):
qct = Os + k(-rct)petexp(-actpe) + PetOck(-Tt)1ptu [1 - exp(-atpt)] + Et (19)
de = tk(-rt) (20)
x + exp(actpct)
1 a ___ me
Pct = - n [actk(ret)]+ 1n c zct - Ptocct + 1 + (1 - Pet)gYeN + Pctgmedl 1
act -a, 1 ac +b
(21)
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0 ct = Be + - Z [qcs - Os - pcsk(Tet)exp(-actpcs)]wcs (22)
where Ted, j N, P are distributed according to the densities derived in Appendix 2. In equations
(19) and (20) the sources of randomness are Ect and pct respectively; on the other hand, equilibrium
police enforcement (equation (21)) was derived as a deterministic function. While mean morality in
the community is part of each individual's moral view, as an econometrician I can only estimate it.
Thus, for estimation I will assume that zct is a normally distributed random variable with mean Zct
and variance of: zet ~ N(zet, o). Although at the individual level moral views are fixed over time
(in the model this is actually also true at the dynasty level), average moral views in the city will vary
as the demographic religious distribution of the population changes. This is particularly relevant
during the early decades of the Twentieth century, when both European immigration to the U.S.
and internal migration to the West and from the South to the North were very dynamic. Because I
will estimate mean moral views using observable heterogeneity (mainly the distribution of religious
ascriptions), the stochastic component of this variable can be thought of as capturing measurement
error, or any other sources of variation in average moral tastes for alcohol, which do not vary at the
individual level (recall that individual-level moral shocks are unobservable, and incorporated in pi).
Given that the parameters of the model are identified only up to scale, I will normalize the variance
of individual moral shocks ( to 1. Interpretation of all other parameters will thus be relative to C.
I am interested in obtaining estimates of the parameters of this model, which will also allow me
to directly compute estimates of the common component of belief sequences { {GeQ, }T}{_1 and
of the shape of the distribution of the median voter's unobserved preferred enforcement type gmed
Parameters to be estimated are listed below:
Parameters 
_
Effect of Prohibition on crime {9c}c=1
Alcohol market size ac, bc N
Law Enforcement act 1
Collective Prior Be}N
State-specific crime shifter {s vs
Alcohol supply catch-up K, A
Arrest probability x
Mean moral views {{C} }N 1
Variance of prior biases 2
Variance of moral externality o2
Correlation between moral views and prior biases p
6.1 The Likelihood Function
I estimate the equilibrium political-economy model developed above through Conditional Maximum
Likelihood (CMLE). Conditional on the decisive voter's g0 med, this economy is characterized by a
system of equilibrium structural equations for crime, drunkenness arrests and police enforcement,
plus an equation that pins down the learning dynamics of the common component of beliefs.
Individuals, who are assumed to know the model and its parameters, learn about 0c by observing
the realizations of the outcome vector yt = (pct, det qct). The system in (19)-(21) has a particularly
convenient "triangular" structure, which moreover, justifies the learning process implied by Bayesian
learning and specified in equation (14). Once pct is realized, conditional on 0,med individuals face
no uncertainty coining from equation (21) (recall that individuals observe zet). Then, after det is
realized, the realization of pct can be exactly backed-up from equation (20). As a result, in equation
(19) the only remaining uncertainty about crime comes from Ect and beliefs about Oc, which is
consistent with the conditional distribution of qct being normal, and hence, allowing the learning
process to be as specified in section 5.
In Appendix 3 I derive the conditional likelihood function for the observed realization of the vector
(pc, de, qct). It is given by
Cct (yct Os, Oc. Bc, ac, b, cct, x, .c k, A, o o gmed(pet) Pct, Tet) =
[g,(yet)]a,-1 - q,(yet)]b-1
f, z,- 1(1 - X)b- Idx
1 1 2
2 7rogoz 2o,2 eq
mdp _-t 2) ag9(yet) O9z (Yct)12 (g t; Y ( ct))-
(23)
where the expressions for gE (ct), p (yCt), and gz(yct; Qed(Pt)) are given in the appendix. It is
the product of a beta density coming from the distibution of the alcohol market size pIt, two normal
distributions coming from the shocks to the crime rate and the random variation in mean moral
views, and the relevant jacobian of the transformation. Central to identification, discussed further
below, the likelihood varies with Pt. Prohibition introduces a structural change in the DGP, since a
new nexus between law enforcement and criminality arises under Prohibition. A second key aspect
of the model is that the DGP is dynamic; the vector of endogenous outcomes yet depends upon
previous values of itself. In this model, the dynamic component comes, of course, from learning.
The equilibrium choice of law enforcement at time t, pet, is a function of the current updated
beliefs about 6c, which depend on the whole sequence of previous realizations of the crime rate
during Prohibition years {qc}jt-1. In the likelihood (equation (23)), the dynamic component enters
through gz(yct; gmed(Pct)) exclusively.
While o, 2  , X, ,. and A are assumed constant across cities, I allow the parameters in the likelihood
function above to vary with observable community characteristics as follows:
0 Os = x'E, where x9 includes state-level dummies.S
0 c x 'A, where x6 includes border cities, South, state-capitals indicators, average demo-
graphics, and a constant.
* Bc=xo', where x. is a vector containing the initial religious ascriptions distribution and
a constant.
e ac = x'a and b, where where j& includes average demographics, average religious ascriptions,
average population, and a constant, and b is constant across cities34.
* act = x"I, where x' is a vector of legal enforcement variables (and a constant) such as the
number of state-level dry laws in place (in years when the city is not under Prohibition these
are the only source of restrictions on the alcohol market), a dummy equal to one when a city's
state has a Prohibition enforcement law (during Prohibition), and other variables which might
be correlated with federal law enforcement (a border city dummy, a Bureau of Prohibition
period dummy, and dummies for the different Prohibition districts).
* l = x~f'H, where x-/ is a vector of containing the religious ascriptions distribution, and a
constant.
Let / 3 (E, A, E, r,. b, x , A, X, H, o , o ), and xct = (xe x, xIRa x , x x ). The condi-
tional likelihood can be more compactly written as Let (yct, xcti3'1 m ct , Tc), which makes
its dynamic nature explicit. Once the dynamic process is correctly specified (in this case the Bayesian
learning assumption) and incorporated into the likelihood function, the density of the outcome vec-
tor yet only depends on yt through the learning channel, and hence the DGP is dynamically
complete (See Wooldrige (2002, p. 412)). As a result, conditional on yet-]. the yet are indepen-
dently distributed. Thus, the conditional likelihood for a given observation ye = (yei, Yc2' --YcT)
is given by £c(yc/ Pmed cTc) =Ht et(yct; yct- .xct,3|ned(Pt),Pct.,et), where gmed is drawn
3 4While the first moment of the beta distribution is determined by the difference between a and b, its second moment
is symmetrically decreasing in the magnitude of both a and b. Thus, allowing one of the parameters to depend on
demographics and the religious distribution, while making the other one common across cities, allows this source of
variation to identify the first and second moments. Allowing b to vary across cities could only increase the fit of the
model. (This follows Coate and Conlin (2004)). Because I am assuming that o and b are constant across time for
each city, I use the time-averaged values of the demographic and religious variables.
from fped(gmed; ac, b, o , of , p) during Prohibition years, and from f ed(gmed; ac, b, of) during years
without Prohibition. Given that the gmed are unobserved, it is necessary to integrate them out from
the conditional likelihood, using their derived equilibrium densities. Estimates of (/3, o2, p) are
obtained from the following program:
maxz,,2 p in Let (yet; yt 1' xct, 31 gmed(Pet)) .f" (med. ac, be, o, p, Pct)dgmed (24)
As a final observation, dynamic models estimated by MLE usually face an "initial conditions" prob-
lem, arising from the fact that the observation for the first year in the sample depends upon an
unobserved realization of the endogenous variable (See Wooldrige (2005)). In this model such a
problem does not arise because for years under no Prohibition, the likelihood function does not
depend on previous realizations of y, and for the first period under Prohibition, the learning model
implies that beliefs are exclusively based on the prior Oco, which is not a function of yet- either.
For all subsequent years under Prohibition, the relevant lagged information is available. Of course,
this relies on having a sample covering for every observation, at least one year under no Prohibition.
Ideally, estimation of the model would cover the whole period; unfortunately, the drunkenness arrests
data is only available for the years 1911-1929. Because this variable is necessary in the estimation to
identify the alcohol market dynamics, I estimate the structural model for that period. Nevertheless,
this imposes some discipline since it allows performing an out of sample exercise with the model's
estimates to predict the observed data for the period 1930-1936. Thus, the sample used for the
structural estimation consists of a fully balanced panel of 66 cities from 31 different U.S. states,
for the nineteen year period 1911-1929. This makes a total of 1, 254 city-cross-year observations for
which the homicide rate, the drunkenness arrest rate, the police expenditure share, and all of the
demographic, religious and legal enforcement variables are available.
The only endogenous variable with a strong trend throughout the sample period, unaccounted for
in the model, is the police expenditure share. Closer examination of the raw data reveals that this
downwards trend is the result of a strongly increasing trend in total public spending across all cities
in the United States during those years. Thus, for estimation I use the de-trended police expenditure
share as the measure for pci3 5 . As the crime outcome measure, I use the natural logarithm of the
homicide rate, which standarizes the variance in homicide rates across cities. and is consistent with
the shocks in equation (19) being normally distributed, and drawn from the same distribution across
cities. Table A5-1 presents the list of cities included in the estimation and discusses the data further.
3 5 While the average annual growth rate of total public spending in the sample was 5.6% (s.e. = 2.2%), the same
number for police expenditure was only 3.7% (s.e.=2.5%). To obtain the detrended police share variable I ran a
regression of the raw police expenditure share p't for each city in the sample, on a city-specific linear time-trend and
city effects, and no constant: pc = ac + Oct + vet. I then compute the detrended police share as pct = 0 c + Pt. Of
course, this is equivant to running a separate regression for each city.
6.2 Moments Identifying the Parameters in the Model
In this subsection I briefly discuss the relevant moments identifying the different parameters of
the model. The structural elasticity of crime to the adoption of Prohibition, Oc, is a function of
city characteristics. Thus it is identified off the covariation in the homicide rate between cities with
similar characteristics, and from the time-series variation in the homicide rate between periods under
no Prohibition and periods under Prohibition. As previously noted, functional form is not key for the
identification of Oc, given that equation (19) can always be taken as a first order linear approximation
to any monotonic relationship between the homicide rate and Prohibition enforcement.
Parameters ac and b are identified off the residual variation in drunkenness arrests, once law en-
forcement and the catch-up of the alcohol supply have been accounted for. Since variation in law
enforcement is correlated with variation in the availability of alcohol, the "wet" share cannot be
identified from the drunkenness arrests data without additional information. This additional infor-
mation comes from two sources: the variation in the homicide rate, by exploiting the fact that in a
given city the drunkenness arrests and the homicide rate jointly covary with law enforcement, and
the dynamics of the supply of alcohol under Prohibition, which the model assumes takes a particular
functional form and is common across cities. It relies on two assumptions. First, that the baseline
arrest probability, determined by X, is constant over time, so that any changes in arrests between
no-Prohibition and Prohibition years come solely from changes in law enforcement intensity, and
not, for example, from changes in the "arrest technology". Second, that preferences over private
alcohol consumption are independent of Prohibition status. Although a strong assumption in the
context of Prohibition, a priori it is unclear in which direction tastes for alcohol might change when
the community is under Prohibition. On the one hand, citizens might derive utility from abiding
by the law, no matter what restrictions it imposes on their individual freedoms; on the other hand,
they also could be subject to a "forbidden fruit" effect, where utility derived from a prohibited ac-
tivity increases precisely because it is forbidden. Relatedly, since the baseline drunkenness arrest
probability x is assumed constant over time and across cities, x is identified from the variation in
arrest rates that is common across cities over time.
Regarding act, the model assumes that the dynamics of the legal standard are exogenous from the
point of view of the city. Although citizens were voting both for local law enforcement and for
the state and federal legal standards, the assumption is that within a state or the Country as a
whole, each city is too small to affect the equilibrium choice of legislation. This seems like a natural
assumption, given that citizens in more rural areas were more strongly in favor of Prohibition.
Indeed, many urban citizens of the United States saw the introduction of Prohibition as an intrusion
from rural interests. Even in a state like New York, the pressure from Upstate voters set restrictions
on the ability of New York City to dismantle Prohibition completely. At some level, this paper is
about the effects of the imposition of a legal standard over communities where a large fraction of
their members were in opposition to it. Thus, identification of act comes from the common variation
in drunkenness arrests and the homicide rate induced by changes in state-level legislation.
Identification of the city-specific collective prior, Bc, comes from early years under Prohibition, when
the community choice of police enforcement closely follows prior beliefs. The larger the initial biases,
the larger the gap between the observed police enforcement choice and what the optimal choice would
be under perfect information. Because the model estimates 0c, it implicitly provides a measure of how
"off" law enforcement decisions were during early Prohibition years. In the model, the correlation of
prior beliefs across cities depends on the distribution of religious ascriptions. Thus, the covariation
between the gap from "optimal" law enforcement and the distribution of initial religious ascriptions
identifies Be.
On the other hand, the r and A parameters are identified from the common time-series residual
variation in drunkenness arrests across cities, unaccounted for by changes in law enforcement or by
changes in the wet share. The identification of these parameters relies strongly on the functional
form I assume for the alcohol supply "catch-up" process, and the assumption that this catch-up is
common for all cities in the sample. Nevertheless, the functional form in equation (8) is very flexible
and can accommodate a wide variety of nonlinear trends.
Average moral views I, which are function of the religious ascription distribution in the community
are identified, from equation (21), from the variation in the police expenditure share which is un-
correlated with changes in beliefs, the alcohol market size, or dry legislation. Because the alcohol
supply and beliefs change over time only during Prohibition years, the identification of - comes from
the variation in law enforcement which is common for the city before and during Prohibition. On the
other hand o , the second moment of the distribution of zt, is identified directly from the sample
variation in police enforcement that is common across cities.
Finally, of and p are identified in the model from the change in the shape of the estimated density
of gmed between no-Prohibition and Prohibition years, as figure 12 illustrates. As the variance of
the distribution of biases decreases. the density of gQed shifts to the left relative to the density of
gmed. This is because the weight on the prior is larger, and as a result, law enforcement choices give
more weight, on average, to individuals' biases. The effect on the density of gmed is similar as p
increases in magnitude because a larger p (in absolute value) magnifies the differential law enforce-
ment decision of dry cities relative to wet communities, increasing the variance of the distribution
of yed relative to the distribution of gmed. The reason is that if moral views ( and belief biases e
are correlated, this should have no effect on the preferences of the median voter when the city is not
under Prohibition. During Prohibition, beliefs do shift the preferred police expenditure relative to no
Prohibition periods, and the larger the correlation is (in absolute value), the larger the difference in
the choice of optimal law enforcement between individuals with differing moral views. As p increases
in magnitude, the density under Prohibition shifts mass to the left, making lower values of police
expenditure more likely. Thus. p is of special interest in the estimation since it is identified off the
channel stressed the most in Section 4 (the differential law enforcement choices between communities
with varying moral views), highlighting the importance of the unobserved sources of heterogeneity
in preferences over law enforcement for their dynamics during Prohibition.
6.3 Fit and Results
This section presents the estimation results from the ClULE. I start discussing the overall fit of
the model's benchmark specification, and subsequently discuss the parameter estimates. To pro-
vide a general idea of the fit of the model across cities. panel A in figure 8 presents the city-level
scatterplots of the average (over time) observed and predicted outcome variables, together with the
45 degree lines over which a perfect fit would obtain. The predictions are computed directly from
equations (19)-(22), where I use the estimated expected value for the wet share pct for each city,
ac/(ac + b), in the computation of the belief sequences, the predicted drunkenness arrest rate, and
the predicted log homicide rate. For the predicted police shares, I use the mean value of the gmed,
which I calculate by integrating over the estimated equilibrium densities fend (gged; ac, b, ogt) and
f mcd(Q7ged; ac, b, o-N). The figures illustrate that the model does a fairly good job in fitting the
variation across cities in the sample, especially for the drunkenness arrest rate and the homicide
rate. The figure for the police share also shows a strong positive correlation (= 0.44), although the
model tends to over-predict the small observed values and to under-predict large ones. The equation
for the police share is no doubt the harder to fit, because preference heterogeneity, changes in the
alcohol market size, and changes in beliefs are all interacting.
Regarding the time-series dimension, panel B in figure 8 presents the average (across cities) observed
and predicted outcomes, for the sample years. For the three outcomes, the model is able to capture
the joint evolution quite accurately, albeit with some differences in magnitudes. For example, it
predicts a more pronounced fall in the police share than the one observed around the years 1920-
1923, when the majority of cities were experiencing their first years under Prohibition. The apparent
reason is that in the model, policing choices are quite sensitive to the size of the alcohol supply, and
the impact effect of beliefs when cities enter into Prohibition is not large enough to counter the
estimated fall in the alcohol supply. For the later years, the average predicted police share is
around 0.1 percentage points larger than the observed. On the other hand, the predicted magnitude
of the fall in the drunkenness arrest rate falls short from the one observed in the data between
1916 and 1920. The model is attributing a fraction of the fall in the drunkenness arrest rate to
sampling variation from the distribution of the wet share pctW. The model also predicts the fall
to begin somewhat later, around 1918. Finally, the last figure depicts the predicted log homicide
rate, showing that the model overpredicts the level of the homicide rate during the 1910s. and also
predicts a smoother increase in this variable, compared to the rapid rise in homicides observed in
the sample around 1920-1924. The reason for the overprediction of crime in early years is that I
allow the alcohol market to have an effect on crime during the period without Prohibition. This
suggests little or no room for an effect of the alcohol market on the homicide rate when Prohibition
is not in place.
In addition, a way to asses the fit of the model is to look at the variability in the average moral
views required to match the data. From equation (21), if the evolution of law enforcement, the
alcohol supply, beliefs, and the change in the distribution of 0 ped are able to match the police data
closely, variation in average moral views ze, over time should be small. In the model, the estimated
- 0.06 (s.e = 0.03), which relative to o, the variance of individual moral tastes j (normalized
to 1), is quite small. Overall, the estimates suggest that the mechanisms highlighted in the model
36 The reason why the model predicts larger drunkenness arrests in the years in which these fall sharply is that by
making the fall in the market supply larger, the fit of the police enforcement equation would be reduced because in the
data., policing is not as sensitive to the dynamics of the alcohol supply. The large variability in drunkenness arrests
could also be captured with a larger variance in the "wet share" distribution I. Nevertheless, because the distribution
of the data is positively skewed, an increase in the variance would require a larger estimate of ac, which would imply
a higher elasticity of the equilibrium police share to moral views and beliefs (see equation 21), reducing the ability of
the model to fit the observed police outcomes.
capture a significant fraction of the joint variation in the data, despite the relatively small sample
size.
6.3.1 Estimates
Estimates of the covariates from the model are presented in table 4, and table 5 presents the implied
average estimated values of the main parameters of the model, based on the coefficient estimates.
Standard errors for the coefficients are computed through a bootstrap. Among the covariates for
ac, the demographic variables all have positive and significant coefficients as expected; cities with
larger populations 15-44 years of age, larger foreign white populations, and larger black populations,
have larger "wet shares". On the other hand, most of the coefficients on the religious ascriptions
are unprecisely estimated, although the estimates for the religions traditionally considered as "wet"
(Orthodox, Lutheran, and Catholic) are significant and positive. Finally, population size does not
explain variation in the wet share. Together, the average estimate of ac across cities is 3.16 and is
8.66 for b, implying that the average "wet share" is around 0.267. Since ac varies little across cities
(its standard deviation is 0.055), the model predicts very similar sizes of the "drinking population"
across cities.
Looking at the covariates for average moral views z, Baptist, Evangelical and Methodist shares
do significantly increase average moral views. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the Catholic share is
large in magnitude (0.81), but imprecisely estimated. Looking at the covariates for Oa, the alcohol-
related laws variable is insignificant (point estimate = 0.11, s.e.= 0.25), suggesting that changes in
dry legislation had little effect in making policing more effective for Prohibition enforcement. On the
other hand, the coefficient on the Enforcement Law dummy is negative and quite significant (point
estimate = -0.89, s.e.= 0.21), suggesting that the repeal of state-level Prohibition enforcement laws
made policing more effective for crime enforcement. This might be driven by the unwillingness of
local authorities to enforce Prohibition laws which they oppose. Regarding the Prohibition Unit in-
dicators, out of which the New York Unit is omitted, all other Units except for the San Francisco and
Los Angeles ones have negative estimated coefficients. This is consistent with historical observation
that federal law enforcement was especially focused around the mid-Atlantic "wet" states, and with
a relatively dry coastal California, which likely made a given amount of policing more effective in
reducing the alcohol market.
Of central interest are the model's estimates of Oc, the structural "elasticity" of Prohibition enforce-
ment to crime. The average 0c is 1.37, and figure 9 presents the distribution of estimated Oc's
across cities. These range from around 0.8 to 1.6. At the means of the police share pd and the
estimated parameters, it implies that the average city saw an increase in the homicide rate of around
23% during Prohibition3 7 . Among the estimates for its covariates, the estimate for the border in-
dicator (Canadian, Mexican or coastal city) is negative and significant (point estimate = -0.302,
s.e.= 0.101). Given the accounts of huge amount of smuggling during the Prohibition years, this is
at first puzzling, but actually consistent with my discussion above, about borders having the effect
37The average (normalized) police share is 0.36. Assuming an 80% size of the alcohol supply (around the 9th year
under Prohibition using the estimated K and A), and using the mean estimate of ct = 3.43, ac/(ac + b) = 0.267 and
0c = 1.37, it follows that 0.23 = exp(1.37 x 0.8 x 0.267 x [1 - exp(-3.43 x 0.36)]) - 1.
of increasing the availability of alcohol for a given level of law enforcement, and thus, reducing the
incentives for Prohibition-related crime to arise.
Estimates for the covariates of the Prior Bc are also presented in table 4. Baptist and Methodist
shares have the largest (in magnitude) estimated significant coefficients, implying that cities with
larger fractions of members of these religions initially did have more optimistic Priors about the
effects Prohibition would bring. The Catholic share also has a coefficient of large magnitude, but
once again its standard error is quite large. On the other hand, the estimates for the second moments
of the joint distribution of individual biases and moral views (see equation (6)) also are of interest.
The variance of biases o is estimated to be 0.34, implying that the variation in individual moral
views (recall its variance a 2 was normalized to 1) was significantly larger than variation in biases. In
the model, the magnitude of of is a measure of how much weight people put on their prior beliefs, so
that smaller values of a directly imply slower learning. Finally, p, the estimated correlation between
prior biases (ii) and moral views (() is -0.49 (s.e.= 0.09), suggesting that cities with constituencies
more favorable to Prohibition did have much more optimistic beliefs about its effects.
An alternative way to see the correlation between moral views and beliefs from the model's estimates
is with a scatterplot of the estimated values of priors Bc and average moral views e, for the cities in
the sample. Figure 10 presents such a scatterplot, together with a simple regression line. Its slope is
-0.25 with a t-statistic of -6.36. Thus, even in this sample of relatively large cities, average prior
beliefs and moral views were negatively correlated. In particular, the model predicts negative values
of prior beliefs for all cities in the sample. This is because the cities observed a relative increase in
policing in the early years under Prohibition (see figure 8), which in the model is driven by optimistic
priors. Because early on during Prohibition learning is slow, the sharp fall in the alcohol supply
more than offsets the average increase in beliefs, explaining the subsequent fall in policing observed
in the data.
The parameter estimates from table 5 also allow a quantitative characterization of the structural
relationships specified in the model. In particular, the estimates for r and A from equation (8)
(0.26 and 0.25) imply that at its lowest point, the supply of alcohol was on average 68% its pre-
Prohibition level, and that this minimum was attained around 3.75 years after the introduction
of Prohibition38 . Together with this estimated function for the alcohol supply catch up, figure 11
presents the estimated drunkenness arrest conditional probability, and the estimated percent increase
in the homicide rate due to Prohibition, both as a function of police expenditure39 . The three graphs
in the figure present an illustrative picture of the costs and benefits of Prohibition. Prohibition was
able to shrink the alcohol supply by about 35%, but only for a relatively short period of time. While
increasing policing would increase arrests for drunkenness, the slope is not very steep. Considering
that the average standard deviation of (normalized) police shares in the sample is 0.044, a whole
standard deviation increase in the police share would at most increase the arrest probability by 3%.
In sharp contrast, the same increase in policing during Prohibition would imply that the homicide
rate would move from being 23 to 24.6% higher under Prohibition40.
3 8 The minumim of equation 8 is attained at T = 1/.
3 9 Thus, using the average parameter estimates from table 5, the estimated arrest probability is computed as
Pr(Arrestp) 8 ep(343p) and the estimated proportional increase in the homicide rate under Prohibition is894 -exp(3.43p)
computed as AQ(p) = exp(1.37 x 0.8 x 0.267 x [1 - exp(-3.43p))), for k(T) = 0.8.
4 0Average (normalized) police share is around p = 0.36. Thus, the increase in the arrest probability induced
Finally, the estimated shapes of the distributions of the unobserved PTed (the median voter's "type"
under no Prohibition and under Prohibition) can be directly derived from the parameter estimates
of the structural model, by plugging the estimates of ac, b, o,, o, and p in equation (32) from
Appendix 2. Figure 12 plots both densities, for the mean values of the parameter estimates, and for
the first year under Prohibition (when Q = a ) . The difference in skewness between the distribution
under Prohibition and under no Prohibition is what identifies p in the model. This is because the
larger (in magnitude) the correlation between moral views and belief biases, the larger the average
difference in policing choices that a median voter would make, when passing from no Prohibition to
Prohibition. Also, as t increases, Qt -+ 0, so that the density under Prohibition converges to the
density under no Prohibition.
6.3.2 Learning
In this subsection I discuss the estimation results related to learning. Recall the model estimates
a relatively low variance of individual belief biases a . This is the main exogenous parameter af-
fecting the speed of learning in the model, and is common across cities. Thus, differences across
cities in the estimated speeds of learning are due directly to the variation in enforcement choices
over time, which under normal updating, affect the informativeness of the signal. The reason for
the relatively low estimate of a2 is that the model is estimated over the years 1911-1929, thus, ex-
cluding precisely the later years under Prohibition (1930-1936), in which the largest adjustments in
law enforcement occured. Nevertheless, there is substantial learning over the nineteen year period.
Figure 13 graphs the evolution of the estimated empirical distribution of the common component of
beliefs {{Qt}c }1929 derived directly from applying equation (22) iteratively using the esti-
mated coefficients and the observed sequences of outcome variables. The outermost curves represent
the 10th and 90th percentiles, the curves in between represent the 25th and 75th percentiles, and
the middle curve represents the median of the estimated distribution. Of course, beliefs remain at
the prior until cities fall under Prohibition status. In several cities, for some of the early Prohibi-
tion years, beliefs about 6c actually fall slightly. After around 1923 though, the belief sequences
are monotonically increasing for all cities, but there is substantial variation in the speed of belief
updating. The figure also shows that despite the generalized increasing pessimism over the effects
of Prohibition, the dispersion of beliefs actually increases over time. Mean common beliefs increase
from the average prior Bc = -1.31 to a mean posterior of -0.57 in 1929, whereas the posterior
median is only around -0.75. While the standard deviation of priors is 0.26, it is 0.68 for the 1929
posteriors. At some level, this is a natural implication of the model, given that each city is learning
from its own experience exclusively, and that different cities had different structural values of Oc.
A key question is whether the differential evolution of beliefs across cities, is correlated with differ-
ences in their moral profiles. The reduced-form estimates already suggested that this is the case.
Recall from Section 4 that during the first years under Prohibition, wetter cities had differentially
lower levels of police enforcement. I argued there that this could be driven by the willingness of
from increasing policing to 0.4 = 0.36 + 0.04 would be exp(3.439X+0.4) exp(3.43x03> = 0.028. On the other8. 9 4-)-xp(3.43xO 1) 8.94-4 exp(3.43x0 36)
hand, the shift in the homicide rate goes from exp(1.37 x 0.8 x 0.267 x [1 - exp(-3.43 x 0.36)]) - 1 = 0.232 to
exp(1.37 x 0.8 x 0.267 x [1 - exp(-3.43 x 0.4)]) - 1 = 0.246 under Prohibition, by increasing policing by one standard
deviation around its average.
more optimistic "dry" cities to invest in law enforcement. In the context of a learning model, dry
cities should learn faster early on, given that their signals are more precise. The estimates here are
consistent with that view; running a regression of the estimated 1929 posteriors on the estimated
average moral views, and controlling for the estimated priors, the coefficient estimate on moral views
is positive and has a t-statistic of 2.2641. Thus, although the standard deviation of beliefs across
cities increased over time, the incentives for differentially higher initial law enforcement in drier
cities limited the extent of divergence in beliefs. This is also consistent with the fact that among
the subset of relatively "wetter" communities, dry ones saw larger shifts of public opinion against
Prohibition (see figure 7). Overall, the structural estimates of the evolution of beliefs are consistent
with the correlations from the reduced-form analysis.
At the heart of the model is the endogenous evolution of outcomes due to rational learning. Thus,
I end this subsection by estimating the model closing the learning channel, to assess the relative
performance of a model where no learning occurs compared to the benchmark specification (this
follows Buera et al. (2010)). Formally, this is equivalent to imposing the restriction o= 0, so that
individuals never update their priors. A simple Likelihood Ratio test can be performed comparing
the restricted No-Learning model with the benchmark model. The log-likelihood for the model
without learning is 5, 978.99, while the log-likelihood for the benchmark model is 6,560.77. Under
the null hypothesis that the restricted and unrestricted models are indistinguishable,
LR = 2[logL(Benchmark) - logL(NoLearning)] ~x_ (25)
Assuming o2 = 0 implies a restriction in the police equation for each city, in every year under
Prohibition except the first. There are 767 such observations, so the appropriate number of degrees
of freedom for the test's x2 distribution is 701. While LR = 1,163.55, the 99% critical value is
791.03. Thus, the null can be rejected at any significance level.
6.4 Counterfactuals
To conclude, I exploit the model's estimates to perform a series of counterfactual exercises. These
should allow a further assessment of the model's fit, and also provide general-equilibrium answers to
questions of interest, which would be impossible to make in a partial equilibrium or reduced-form
framework. First, I perform an "out of sample" prediction of the outcome variables for the years
1930-1936, using the parameter estimates. I then ask the following questions to the model: what
would the evolution of outcomes have been under Prohibition, if average prior beliefs had been
unbiased? How would Prohibition outcomes have evolved if society had been more radicalized?
More polarized? Finally, I assess the implications of alternative political environments.
4
'For the 66 cities in the sample. I run the regression Qc.19290C 19 29 -- 3 O+/1 32Qc.1911cigl1+Ec. The estimated
31 is 2.17 with a standard error of 0.96. 1 include the prior as a regressor to control for the fact that morally drier
cities had more negative priors.
6.4.1 Out of Sample Prediction
Because of the unavailability of drunkenness arrests data for years after 1929, I am unable to estimate
the model for the later Prohibition years. Thus, I make an out of sample prediction for the police
and homicide outcomes during the 1930-1936 years, by using the MLE estimates on equations (19)-
(22). This exercise is particularly meaningful because I do observe the police and homicide rate
outcomes in that period, so I directly can assess the extent to which the model is able to capture the
subsequent evolution of Prohibition during its final phase, and the first few years after its repeal.
For this purpose, I take the estimated 1929 posterior beliefs for each city, and use them as the 1930
priors. I then compute iteratively the predicted equilibrium values of pct from equation (21), and
with this predicted police enforcement value, I then predict qct from equation (19). To compute year
t's posterior from equation (22), I add a random shock drawn from a mean-zero normal distribution
with variance equal to 0.277 (the MLE estimate for the variance of E, a) to the predicted value
of qct and iteratively use this posterior to calculate year t + 1's police choice and homicide rate.
Constitutional Prohibition was repealed in the end of 1933, so belief updating actually stops after
this year. Figure 14 presents graphs analogous to those in figure 8, comparing the "out of sample"
average predicted values from the structural model, both in the time and city dimensions. Panel A
shows the scatterplots of the 1930-1936 averages for each city. The horizontal axis has the observed
values, while the vertical axis has the predicted values. The predictions for the homicide rate are
again fairly close to the observed. For the policing data, the slope is significantly positive, but as
in the predictions for the 1911-1929 period, the model is not able to capture all of the variablility
across cities. Looking at panel B, on the other hand, it captures the trend of both variables over
time remarkably well, in particular the fall in both policing and the homicide rate during the last
years of Prohibition, and the leveling off of both variables after repeal.
6.4.2 Changes in Prior Beliefs
The adoption of Prohibition in the U.S. would not have been possible based exclusively on moral
motivations, since radically dry sectors did not constitute a large enough majority of the population.
Its adoption required a large fraction of morally-indifferent voters to have optimistic beliefs about
the effects of the policy. Thus, a natural question arises: what was the cost of these biased prior
beliefs? The model can provide an answer to this question, by making the counterfactual exercise of
assuming that priors were unbiased. Specifically, I assume that prior common beliefs in 1911 were
unbiased, this is, that Bc = 0c. Using the estimated coefficients, I can then compute the predicted
evolution of outcomes over time, and compare them to the model's predicted outcomes under the
estimated biased priors.
The simulation results reveal several patterns. As expected, beliefs endogenously remain fairly
unchanged over time, since the realized homicide outcomes are always close to the expected ones
given the law enforcement choices. Police enforcement decisions, on the other hand, behave quite
differently. In particular, cities would have avoided the early-Prohibition increases in policing,
since in the absence of optimism about Prohibition's effects, there are no incentives to increase law
enforcement. Subsequently, policing decisions would have fallen sharply relative to the benchmark
case, following the early contraction of the alcohol supply, and would have bounced back at a
relatively faster pace. In contrast, when beliefs are biased, learning makes this effect nuanced as
the median voter finds it less attractive over time to maintain high levels of police enforcement.
The model predicts that the median city would have reduced law enforcement to almost half the
predicted law enforcement levels under biased beliefs. Thus, cities would have been much more
radical in offsetting Prohibition with their local law enforcement choices. Variation across cities in
law enforcement would have increased, on the other hand, because the variance in the distribution
of Prohibition-related crime potential 6c is larger than the variation in estimated priors. In addition,
the model also suggests that the differences in the homicide rate relative to the biased-beliefs case
would have been insignificant. This is because the inability to reduce Prohibition enforcement
without concomitantly reducing overall crime enforcement implies that the relatively large fall in
policing would allow for an increase in non-Prohibition related crime. Somewhat counterintuitively,
this suggests that conditional on Prohibition been imposed, more accurate initial beliefs about its
effects could have allowed the policy to remain in place longer, because large cities would have faced
relatively similar crime outcomes, but lower police enforcement expenditures. Since beliefs would
not have changed significantly. public opinion change would have been limited.
6.4.3 Radicalization and Polarization
The model also can address questions related to the distribution of preferences in society. I perform
two simple exercises. I start by asking what the evolution of outcomes under Prohibition would have
been. relative to the estimated benchmark model, under more radical moral views against alcohol
consumption. This implies a higher degree of alignment between the prohibitive legal standard
and preferences over its enforcement. Consequently, I increase each city's estimated average moral
view zet by one or two standard deviations (the estimated o, - 0.06), and compute the predicted
sequences of outcomes under these changes. The model predicts that these radicalized communities
would choose a constantly higher level of police enforcement (around 20% more for the one standard
deviation increase, and around 36% more for the two standard deviation increase), but variation in
police choices across cities would also be larger. Common beliefs would consequently be updated
faster relative to the benchmark model's predictions. Nevertheless, in this case it is unclear whether
public opinion would turn against Prohibition as fast as it in fact did, given that across cities the
decisive voter is more willing to restrict the alcohol market for a given belief profile.
Another exercise of interest is to increase the degree of polarization in society. By polarization here
I mean increasing the average willingness to enforce prohibition, by raising -ct, and at the same
time increasing the demand for alcohol, by raising the mean of the distribution of p. Thus, just as
in the counterfactual exercise above, I allow ,. but also E[p], to increase by one or two standard
deviations. The estimated standard deviation of the "wet share" p is 0.123, while its mean is 0.267,
so that a one standard deviation increase in the mean implies E[p) = 0.38. Holding a fixed, such
a shift in the distribution of the wet share can be achieved by reducing the value of b to 5. For
a two standard deviation increase in the mean of p, which implies E[p) = 0.5, a value of b = 3.1
achieves the same objective. The model predicts that the speed of learning during Prohibition
increases very fast on the degree of polarization in society. The benchmark model's estimated 1929
posterior common beliefs for the median city would have been reached by 1923 if both average
moral views and the average wet share were one standard deviation larger, and by 1921 if they were
two standard deviations larger. This outcome is the result of increased police enforcement levels
as the degree of polarization increases. Given the model's parameter estimates, this occurs for two
reasons. First, more radical moral views increase the ideal choice of Prohibition enforcement across
the population. Moreover, because prior beliefs were initially relatively optimistic, a larger wet share
also gives incentives for the median voter to prefer more law enforcement, since the perceived moral
externality is larger for a given moral view, while the expected cost of increased crime is low.
On the other hand, policing choices would have been much more stable over time because the in-
creased salience of the moral externality reduces the extent to which the police expenditure responds
to changes in the alcohol supply. Nevertheless, as an added equilibrium effect, the distribution of
police enforcement choices across cities spreads out considerably. The apparent reason is a political
economy effect; because a larger wet share shifts the median voter towards "wetness", there is a force
driving the equilibrium choice of law enforcement downwards. Finally, the model predicts that these
polarized communities would observe significantly higher levels of crime during Prohibition. For
instance, the median city would have on average 2.9 more homicides per hundred thousand on the
average Prohibition year in the two standard deviations higher polarization society, or 1.37 more in
the one standard deviation higher polarization case. Thus, although communities with more extreme
preference distributions do learn much faster about the structural relationship between Prohibition
and crime, they also face a constituency much more willing to endure the increased levels of crime.
6.4.4 Alternative Political Environments
In the setting of this model, it is natural to ask what would the equilibrium effects of changes in
the political environment be. This is important because, as I have shown, the equilibrium collective
law enforcement decisions play a central role in the success or failure of a given legal standard. In
particular,. I ask about the effect of interest groups in politics by assuming that some constituencies
have more political power than others, shifting the decisive voter away from the median. To make
the intuitions clear I look at the polar cases in which the decisive voter in the community is either
the median voter among the wets (the decisive voter's type is gj = -1), or the median voter among
the drys (the decisive voter's type is yj = 0). Under each conterfactual scenario I compute the
predicted outcome sequences, using the benchmark parameter estimates.
Results are closely related to the ones above. When drys have all the political power, law en-
forcement chioces are consistently larger in magnitude relative to the benchmark case. Because
alcohol demand remains unchanged, these enforcement choices increase the informativeness of the
crime signals, making beliefs evolve faster. Belief sequences across the distribution of cities under
this counterfactual scenario are on avergage two years ahead relative to the benchmark case. Con-
sistently, the predictions of the counterfactual simulation where wets have all the political power
deliver weaker law enforcement relative to the benchmark, which consequently translates into slower
learning. The benchmark estimated average beliefs in 1925 would only be reached in 1929 under
this counterfactual setting.
These results are driven by the increased divergence between the decisive voter over law enforcement
and average voters' preferences. They make the point that the effects of increased conflict also arise
when the identity of those deciding over law enforcement is further away from overall constituency
preferences. Increased conflict, in this setting due to a skewed collective decisionmaking process, is
a force driving changes in public opinion. When drys have all the politcal power at the local level,
their choices of law enforcement are too large relative to what the community's median voter would
prefer, and relative to the community's alcohol market size. As a result, crime outcomes are more
informative and communities learn faster. In the polar opposite case, when all political power is
allocated to the wets, learning is too slow relative to the benchmark because the very weak law
enforcement choices make crime realizations uninformative.
7 Conclusions
Many central political cleavages in contemporary societies revolve around ideological or moral issues,
over which people frequently have strong and polarized views. I have highlighted learning about
policies, and the endogenous dynamic feedback between enforcement choices and policy support,
as a driving force for changes in public opinion over moral issues, and more broadly for social
change, by looking at the U.S. Prohibition experience during the early decades of the Twentieth
century. The circumstances around Prohibition were very specific to that policy; in particular,
the potential effects that closing the alcohol market could have over crime are very specific to
prohibitions. Nevertheless, looking at the side-effects (or absence thereof) of policies, and at learning
about them, can allow a better understanding of the evolution of policy reform over social cleavages.
The extent to which people are informed is important, and of course, the political economy of the
extent of such information acquisition becomes key; this should be an area of future research.
I developed a model of endogenous learning and law enforcement in a political economy framework,
which has some success in replicating the patterns observed in the data. The paper suggests that
an important element to understand the effects and success of policies is the degree of alignment
of the legal standard and the law enforcement choices associated with it. This was particularly
relevant during Prohibition because most of the law enforcement was decided at the local level,
while the prohibitionist legal standard was chosen either at the state or nationwide levels. The
estimates suggests that prior beliefs about Prohibition's effect on crime were very optimistic and
highly correlated with moral views, that local policy responded closely to communities' preferences,
and that community preferences also were responsive to changes in beliefs. In the model, the
estimated speed of learning is relatively slow. This might be due to the assumption of exclusively
localized learning, whereas it is likely that individuals' opinions were also affected by outcomes across
the country. Learning from neighboring communities is likely to be important in societies where the
media plays a large role in shaping public opinion. This constitutes an avenue for improvement
of the structural model, and for understanding other instances of social change. This paper did
not exploit the judicial dimension of law enforcement either, although prohibition enforcement at
the local level was also implemented through judicial prosecution. Further research should look at
the evolution of judicial decision-making regarding Prohibition as an alternative law enforcement
mechanism, which was likely subject to different political economy incentives.
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Tables
Table 1: Prohibition Enforcement during the 1920s
Federal and State-Level Prohibition Enforcement
1923-1924 1925-1926 1927-1928 1929-1930 1931-1932
Midwest Seized Distilleries, Stills and Still Worms 8,098 9,171 10,207 11,369 5,095
Seized Fermenters 6,830 7,525 48,748 81,178 8,714
Seized Spirits* 1,050,017 610,440 472,922 475,840 505,713
Seized Malt, Wine, Cider, Mash and Pomace* 3,675,499 7,034,847 11,206,588 15,029,002 15,915,534
Seized Autos and Boats 1,095 1,873 2,949 3,069 4,154
Killed or Injured Officers 14 15 38 48 4
Federal Arrests - 24,150 28,185 31,755 25,528
State Arrests 8,335 7,500 6,227 7,460
Northeast Seized Distilleries, Stills and Still Worms 4,191 3,456 11,136 6,960 4,511
Seized Fermenters 2,506 3,411 50,079 53,973 9,264
Seized Spirits* 206,411 767,086 1,142,467 929,877 1,753,629
Seized Malt, Wine, Cider, Mash and Pomace* 1,143,955 6,334,026 11,811,643 13,930,121 21,233,629
Seized Autos and Boats 1,082 4,078 4,333 3,334 4,115
Killed or Injured Officers 4 24 26 40 3
Federal Arrests - 35,316 46,396 29,657 47,585
State Arrests - 3,610 3,828 3,708 2,848
South Seized Distilleries, Stills and Still Worms 34,087 48,038 43,327 43,273 31,671
Seized Fermenters 179,280 238,528 267,605 301,521 8,513
Seized Spirits* 284,888 732,713 647,875 799,950 842,375
Seized Malt, Wine, Cider, Mash and Pomace* 11,933,042 22,026,530 30,428,757 34,753,824 29,953,542
Seized Autos and Boats 2,703 4,979 5,290 7,058 9,054
Killed or Injured Officers 18 42 62 122 4
Federal Arrests - 42,673 49,498 53,300 51,976
State Arrests - 11,778 11,001 12,811 7,737
West Seized Distilleries, Stills and Still Worms 4,691 7,089 6,334 4,956 2,141
Seized Fermenters 4,855 14,463 21,291 18,711 1,745
Seized Spirits* 115,377 230,132 228,029 269,567 283,214
Seized Malt, Wine, Cider, Mash and Pomace* 1,171,349 3,019,286 3,952,164 7,374,756 5,242,851
Seized Autos and Boats 1,138 1,421 1,774 2,040 3,009
Killed or Injured Officers 18 20 31 17 3
Federal Arrests - 17,007 14,486 16,845 9,943
State Arrests 4,718 6,828 6,640 9,262
*Gallons
Northeast includes ME, NH, VT, MA RI, CT, NY, PA, and NJ
Midwest includes ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH
South includes DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, KY, NC, TN, SC, GA, AL, MS, FL, AR, LA, OK, and TX
West includes WA, OR, CA, ID, MT, WY, CO, UT, NV, AZ, NM
Source: U.S. Bureau of Prohibition, Statistics Concerning Intoxicating Liquors, and Wickersham Commission papers.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics
Dry Religions
% Baptist (1916)
% Evangelical (1916)
% Mormon (1916)
% Methodist/Episcopal (1916)
% Presbyterian (1916)
Wet Religions
% Eastern Orthodox (1916)
% Jewish (1916)
O/o Lutheran (1916)
% Catholic (1916)
Demographics
% Black (1910)
% Foreign White (1910)
% Native White (1910)
0/0 Ages 15-24 (1910)
0/ Ages 25-44 (1910)
Legislation
Number of Dry Laws (1919)
Number of Years Under Prohibition**
Outcomes
Per Capita Police Expenditure (1913 prices)
Midwest
12.066
(8.559)
2.623
(2.083)
0.298
(0.578)
11.666
(6.356)
4.779
(2.642)
1.139
(1.443)
1.741
(1.130)
7.677
(5.708)
55.798
(16.245)
3.104
(2.823)
24.573
(10.557)
72.220
(9.036)
20.840
(0.909)
34.258
(1.610)
6.709
(3.136)
15.925
(4.443)
Northeast
8.601
(5.901)
0.647
(1.393)
0.057
(0.140)
10.269
(4.740)
4.471
(3.521)
1.272
(1.461)
2.771
(2.515)
3.510
(3.678)
66.631
(12.568)
2.325
(2.057)
32.618
(8.664)
64.945
(8.170)
20.041
(1.010)
33.515
(1.204)
3.376
(2.014)
15.018
(0.169)
Region*
1910s 1920s 1910s 1920s
1.541 1.793 1.977 2.312
(0.726) (0.759) (0.732) (0.798)
South
29.660
(13.921)
0.986
(1.496)
0.160
(0.413)
24.825
(9.855)
6.060
(3.246)
0.437
(0.591)
1.716
(1.303)
2.521
(2.119)
31.496
(21.798)
26.525
(12.398)
7.928
(5.705)
65.412
(9.816)
21.050
(1.166)
34.159
(2.163)
5.999
(1.696)
18.035
(4.080)
West
16.149
(9.245)
0.852
(0.510)
5.198
(18.856)
13.740
(6.469)
8.068
(4.743)
1.890
(2.222)
1.887
(1.033)
3.181
(1.944)
47.494
(20.723)
1.336
(0.951)
23.083
(5.364)
73.210
(5.610)
18.970
(0.909)
38.519
(3.087)
9.303
(3.310)
15.844
(1.253)
1910s 1920s 1910s 1920s
1.376 1.716 1.511 1.796
(0.513) (0.800) (0.687) (0.699)
Police Expenditure Share
Drunkenness Arrest Rate (per 1,000)
Homicide Rate (per 100,000)
% Anti-Prohibition vote share***
0.108 0.092 0.112 0.096
(0.032) (0.026) (0.021) (0.020)
16.000 14.459
(11.191) (8.591)
16.653 12.132
(18.875) (13.081)
0.123 0.112
(0.024) (0.026)
18.273 18.606
(11.525) (10.786)
10.807 18.124 5.368 10.076 22.849 28.132
(5.730) (7.560) (1.776) (3.633) (18.085) (17.150)
0.518 0.723 0.523 0.826
(0.169) (0.168) (0.103) (0.129)
*Regions as as classified by the Bureau of the Census: North East includes ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY,
Midwest includes ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH
South includes DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, KY, NC, TN, SC, GA, AL, MS, FL, AR, LA, OK, and TX
West includes WA, OR, CA, ID, MT, WY, CO, UT, NV, AZ, and NM
** During the 1910-1933 period
***From state level referenda
Standard Deviations in parenthesis
All summary statistics are weighted by city population
0.467
(0.166)
PA, and NJ
0.577
(0.220)
0.087 0.081
(0.026) (0.017)
22.560 13.963
(14.801) (6.241)
9.897 11.620
(3.375) (3.379)
0.457 0.678
(0.138) (0.116)(0.220)
Table 3: Public Opinion Regressions
Electoral Support for Prohibition
Panel A
ndent Variable
Sample
All Counties
Post-Prohibition Indicator
"Wetness"
Baseline "Wetness" x Post-Prohibition Indicator
log of Population
Urban share of county
Number of Dry Laws
Referendum Year
Referendum Type:
Prohibition Law
Constitutional Convention Election
(I) (2) (3)
0.1373 -0.1099 0.0806
(0.004) (0.018) (0.022)
0.1201
(0.090)
0.6969
(0.045)
0.1422
(0.095)
0.5965
(0.042)
County Sample
(4) (5)
-0,0572 -0.1088
(0.035) (0.017)
0.1211 0.1073
(0.078) (0.096)
0.4808 0.7349
(0.044) (0.047)
0.0881 0.0671
(0.011) (0,008)
0.0213 0.0517
(0.039) (0.028)
Counties with Pop>30,000
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.1714 -0.2613 -0.0485 -0.1145 -0.2505
(0.009) (0.049) (0.062) (0.054) (0.051)
0.4879 0.5443
(0.310) (0.309)
1.0874 0.8798
(0.118) (0.121)
0.0821
(0.027)
-0.0815
(0.127)
0.0806
(0.011)
0.0572
(0.041)
-0.0109
(0.001)
-0.0048
(0.008)
0.0100
(0.010)
-0.0102
(0.002)
0.0072
(0.014)
0.0386
(0.016)
0.2058
(0.241)
0.5082
(0.112)
0.0751
(0.022)
0.0588
(0.086)
0.4484
(0,308)
1.1367
(0.129)
0.0392
(0.026)
0.0262
(0.128)
(11) (12)
0.2453 -0.0779
(0.013) (0.084)
0.2221
(0.363)
0,6643
(0.181)
Inverse Mills Ratio x Pre-prohibition Period 0.1577 0.1896 
-0.0546(0.031) (0.055) (0.075)State cross Post-Prohibition Effects No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes NoFixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesR squared 0.385 0.488 0.555 0.766 0.525 0.498 0.646 0.688 0.876 0.665 0.741 0.774 0.813 0.943 0.792No. of Cross Sections 1693 1693 1693 1693 1693 672 672 672 672 672 258 258 258 258 258No. of Observations 3386 3386 3386 3386 3386 337 337 337 337 337 129 129 129 129 129
Panel B
Probit Selection Equation
Share of Wet Religions 
-1.092 
-1.092 
-1.092(1.277) (1.277) (1.277)
Share of Non Native White 
-7.297 
-7.297 
-7.297(3.836) (3.836) (3.836)
Constant 3.630 3.630 3.630(1.605) (1.605) (1.605)
q 0. 173No. of Observations 31
Log Likelihood 
-11.32
Note: Constant for the Vote share equations not reported. Standard Errors are robust and clustered at the county or city level.
The Selection equation is a probit at the state level, of an Indicator for having had an Alcohol referendum in the Pre-Prohibition period,
on the state-level share of adherents to any "wet" religion (Orthodox, Jewish, Luthera, Catholic, Other) from the 1916 Census of Religions,
and the share of non-native white individuals in the population, from the 1910 Population Census.
0.173 0.173
31 31
-11.32 
-11.32
Depe
City Sample
(14)
0.1601
(0.097)
-0.7241
(0.495)
0.4258
(0.125)
0.0935
(0.062)
-0.1455
(0.120)
-0.0019
(0.035)
(15)
0.0215
(0.094)
-0.0004
(0.413)
0.4740
(0.213)
0.0111
(0.048)
-0.0921
(0.099)
-0.0222
(0.008)
(13)
-0,1307
(0.123)
-0.2573
(0.370)
0.5896
(0.158)
0.1606
(0.058)
-0.1834
(0.082)
-0.0342
(0.011)
0.0005
(0.005)
0.0024
(0.028)
0.1141
(0.045)
ndent Variable Wet Vote share
Table 4: Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimates
a
b
x
x
6
Conditional Maximum
Covariate Coefficients Covariate
% ages 15-44* 0.606 a Constant
(0.273)
% Foreign White* 0.519 Number of Alcohol-Rel
(0.198)
% Black* 0.199 Enforcement Law
(0.058)
% Baptist* 0.382 Prohibition Unit Seat
(0.281)
% Orthodox* 0.434 Prohibition Unit: Provi
(0.223)
% Evangelical* 0.589 Prohibition Unit: Wash
(0.498)
% Jewish* -0.447 Prohibition Unit: Jacks
(0.462)
% Mormon* 0.257 Prohibition Unit: Detro
(0.259)
% Lutheran* 0.767 Prohibition Unit: Chica
(0.295)
% Methodist* 0.746 Prohibition Unit: Kansa
(0.555)
% Catholic* 0.174 Prohibition Unit: San F
(0.041)
% Presbyterian* -0.255 Prohibition Unit: Los A
(0.016)
Log of Population* 0.001 Prohibition Unit: Seatt
(0.034)
Constant 2.477 z % Baptist
(0.088)
8.666 % Orthodox
(2.773)
8.948 % Evangelical
(3.454)
0.266 % Jewish
(0.071)
0.259 % Mormon
(0.108)
Border -0.302 /o Lutheran
(0.101)
South -0.652 % Methodist
(0.193)
State Capital -0.248 % Catholic
(0.173)
Share Ages 15-44* 0.188 % Presbyterian
(0.498)
Share Foreign White* 0.073 Constant
(0.059)
Share Black* 0.231
(0.088)
Constant 1.504
(0.713)
Log-likelihood: 6560.774
Observations: 1254
*1911-1929 averages
Note: Standard Errors are computed through a bootstrap of size 100.
Estimates of the State Effects are omitted from the table.
Covariate
B % Baptist in 1911
% Orthodox in 1911
% Evangelical in 1911
% Jewish in 1911
% Mormon in 1911
% Lutheran in 1911
% Methodist in 1911
% Catholic in 1911
% Presbyterian in 1911
Constant
Likelihood Estimates
Coefficients
2.758
(0.762)
ated Laws 0.117
(0.248)
-0.895
(0.206)
-0.227
(0.153)
dence -0.281
(0.201)
ington -0.909
(0.496)
onville -1.090
(1.432)
it -0.851
(0.326)
go -2.065
(1.392)
as City -1.166
(0.725)
rancisco 2.125
(1.217)
ngeles 0.004
(0.603)
le 1.669
(0.659)
0.890
(0.395)
-0.223
(0.076)
0.187
(0.082)
0.728
(0.650)
0.172
(0.212)
0.071
(0.296)
1.186
(0.438)
0.819
(0.669)
-0.772
(1.370)
0.024
(0.015)
Coefficients
-0.237
(0.071)
0.022
(0.020)
-0.034
(0.008)
-0.021
(0.031)
-0.019
(0.677)
-0.116
(0.078)
-0.289
(0.161)
-0.738
(0.619)
-0.034
(0.011)
-2.231
(0.612)
0.277
(0.084)
0.061
(0.028)
0.348
(0.135)
1.000
(0.000)
-0.495
(0.089)
Table 5: Mean Parameter estimates
Average Estimated Values of Parameter Estimates
Model Parameters Mean Estimate
a 3.167
(0.055)
b 8.666
(0.000)
8.948
(0.000)
0.266
(0.000)
0.259
(0.000)
a 3.437
(1.010)
z 0.687
(0.108)
0 1.377
(0.258)
B -1.311
(0.265)
Note: Standard Deviations in parenthesis
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Figure 1: The Homicide Rate in U.S. Cities, 1911-1936 (per 100,000)42
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Figure 2: The Drunkenness Arrest Rate in U.S. Cities, 1911-1929 (per capita)
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Figure 3: Timing of State Adoption of Prohibition
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Figure 4: 6,'s from equation (1):
Panel A: Homicide Rate (per 100, 000) (left) and Drunkenness Arrest Rate (per 1, 000) (right)
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Figure 5: 0,'s from Equation (3):
Panel A: Homicide Rate (per 100,000) (left) and Drunkenness Arrest Rate (per 1,000) (right)
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Figure 6: Alcohol Referenda and Public Opinion shift
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Figure 7: Moral Views and Changes in Public Opinion (U.S. counties)
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Figure 8: Fit of the Model
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Figure 13: Estimated Belief Sequences: Empirical Distribution
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Figure 14: "Out of Sample" predictions for the years 1930-1936
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Ideal Law Enforcement Choice
Indirect utility under no Prohibition is given by
EtU(pt|Pt = 0) ={1iw,}exp(-atpt)
a bexP( atPt) + exp(1 - pt) Os a bexP(-atpt)a +b
The first order condition with respect to pet from equation (26) is
-{iswa}aCtexp(--ctpet) + act aca bz4exp(- octpct) - exp(l - Pct)+ act aabexp( actpct) < 0
Solving for pct, equation (16) directly follows. The second order condition for this problem is given
by
1{iwVV} ctexp(- actpct) a2 ac z exp(cac 4- bc P act pct) + exp(1 - Pet) 2 a-a ±-eXP( OctPCt) < 0
2lnact + in a b(zi + 1) 1{iewt}I -
I verify this condition is satisfied for the parameter estimates.
Indirect utility under Prohibition is given by
EtU'(pt|P = 1) = 1{isV} k(Tt)exp(-atpt) - z a k(stexp(-atpt)
a + b
+ exp(1 - pt) - )s a k(Tt)exp(-atpt) - Oik(rt ) a [1 - exp(aT+b f a + b
The first order condition with respect to Pet from equation (28) is
-1{iwt} k(ret ct exp(--actpct) + act ac k (Ttc)z exp(-actpet)
ac + b
a- ac
+act k(T )exp(-actpct) - act6 1 ac +k(Tct)exp(-a
ac + b cac + b
-otpt)] (28)
exp(1 - pet)
tPct) < 0
Solving for pct, equation (17) directly follows. The second-order condition for the solution in equation
(17) to be a maximum is
0++ 1) - 1(2
ac+ b (zi
(27)
(26)
1 > (act - 1)pet
, 21nact + In 1 > (act - 1)pct (29)
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In this community there are three sources of heterogeneity in preferences over law enforce-
ment: the distribution of moral views, the distribution of belief biases, and the distribution of types
(wet and dry). First, observe that conditional on ((,(), the preferred level of law enforcement
of a wet voter is shifted down by a constant factor relative to the optimal choice of a dry indi-
vidual. Thus, for periods under Prohibition define gt - 0 ((Q - QtJ2() (DP for Dry under
Prohibition), and gI, a b(( - 0t ( ) - 1 (WP for Wet under Prohibition). These are normal
random variables distributed according to p4  ~ N(0, of,) and g,~ N(-, o ,t) respectively,
where o a (,2 +Q2 - 20tpfi 43. Now define p' 1{iEDp}P {iEve}gly,. The
conditional density of o' is given by
fpp(o' lpt) = (1 - pt )N(0, , + pr2N(-1, o pt)
since with probability tt a wet individual is sampled, and with probability 1 - t a dry individual
is sampled. Thus, the distribution of g' in the population is a mixture of two normal random
variables with a common variance, one of which is shifted to the left by 1 relative to the other.
Given the normality of ghp and g'P, as pt, -* 0, the median voter's type gped - 0, and as
pt - 1, pe - -1, so that gped E (-1.0). For periods under no Prohibition, analogously define
gQDN -a 0 (DN for dry under no Prohibition) and g'VN = _ 1 (WN for wet under
no Prohibition), which are distributed according to g DN N(0, o2 ) and pWN N(-1, oN)
respectively, with o ( o . Now define g' 1 {iEDt}gDN + 1{iEW}jWN which is a random
variable whose conditional density is given by
fgN(9' I pt) = (1 -pt)N(0, (2N) + ptN(-1. oN)
Indirect preferences over law enforcement in (16) and (17) can be expressed in terms of gV' and
g'e. It follows that this is a purely private-values election because individuals realize that differences
in beliefs are due to individual-specific biases. For a given individual, the voting decisions of the
members of his community do not convey any additional information. Moreover, indirect preferences
over law enforcement are single-peaked in gi, so the Median Voter Theorem holds, and the unique
political equilibrium value of pt is given by the preferred choice of law enforcement of the median
over the distribution of 4, conditional on It.
The (conditional) median for Prohibition years will be given by the value of g~ed which solves the
following equation
( -lt) cexp -2o ,') do + pt j 2 exp ( 22 (+1)2 d= - (30)
where I have made explicit the dependence of gped on the wet share in the community. Because the
realization of pt is unobserved, the median gped in the population as defined in (30) is a random
4 This variance is time-varying. As learning takes place and Qt -4 0. or 2 -o
variable whose density is derived below. The equation analogous to (30) implicitly defining ged (the
conditional median of the distribution of g) ) and its corresponding density are found analogously 44 .
Derivation of the density of ged:
First, recall that f,(p; a, b), the density of pct, is beta with parameters (ac, b). From (30), pt can
be directly expressed as a function of Ped:
pct =- h,( g7ed)
1- <DP1" 12
m("edP
OePt
( med\UP
- 4P t] (31)med
Ypt
If this is a one-to-one mapping, the density of ged will be given by
T i o(bmefmed (Pgmed ; ac, bc, o-1e = ,h(gd) ac bc)
The derivative of hf, is given by
1 (- 1
Qh(ged
mged
(D ied1 -+ 1 ) [
ped+ 2
Crp J - ppt gt
S&h, (0 rned)To see that md < 0 notice that the first term in square brackets is always smaller than the
second term in square brackets. For gmed > 0, # 'e > # "" , and the first term in brackets
is more negative than the second term in brackets, so the numerator is negative.
mernd \ (med4
__ < 0 ( the second term in brackets is strictly positive, and the first
/s t e t s 
l t
is also positive (but sinaller thlan the second termn in brackets), so tile umlerator
med E ( r0)
in brackets is posi
(
For grned< _
term in brackets
is negative. For
_ 0 ed ) > g the first term in brackets is negative. and the second termCr ' t - (70 )
tive. so the numerator is negative.
Thus, h,, is a one-to-one mapping, and the likelihood for gmed is
f med (Pmed; ac. b, o )
- (md ac F n/ed+1 b1 (ac-1 [ Omed+1)
( ted+)
Cr\ypt J
(med)ac+b
Orapt
1 0). and where oo,aL = a.+b + Q - 2Qepr.
"Notice that o, 1,j - o as Qt -> 0, which implies that -oed - 4 d g"ed
Or n~rd)
< 0
1 1
x
ojt fe vo-(1 - v)b-ldo
for gmed E (
b
(32)
med+1 2
Replacing a(N og for oppt everywhere in (32), the density of unobserved heterogeneity in
preferred law enforcement during periods under no Prohibition is obtained:frned (ed; ac, bc, 0QN)'
N A 7 C C7ON)
Appendix 3: Derivation of the Conditional Likelihood
The joint density function of (ze, ict, Ect) is given by
1 /fze (zct, pct, Ect; ac, b, zt, k, A., oq. - 270z exp 12 (zet
pa,-(1 
- ct)b 1 (
f Xal (1- X)b- d d o-T2 7 
-
2
2ct
2a 2
From (19), (20), and (21). (zet Pct, Ect) can be expressed as a function of the observables (pct, det, qct):
From (21),
ze 9: gz(pct, det, qct; m"ed, r"))
ac+b 1 a+ b
t exp((act-1)pet+1)- [PetQP + (1
ac aectk(et ) ac N~)7 d ± 1
From (20),
et = gi(pct, det. qct ) =k(Tt) (x + exp(actpct))
Finally from (19), and replacing for pe from above,
Ect -9e(pct, dct, qct) = qct - OS - dct(x + exp(actpct)) (exp(-actpct) + Pt0c [1 - exp( acipet)] I
Now, iff g(pct, det, qct) = ( gy1, ge) is a one-to-one mapping from (pct, det, qct) to (zct, Pct, Ect). the
density function for (pct, det, qct) will be given by
fpdq (pct. dqct) - fzpe (gz (pct, dct, qct, qct), gE p 2e,) jctI
where |Jcj| is the absolute value of the determinant of the jacobian of g:
a9z
0 et
9e
i9pct
|Jct I
i9gz
Odct
g2
aqct
agi,
aq~t
Dqgt
Given the structure of the model, conveniently f9z 09z =g = 0, and 09 = 1. To show that
g(pct, det, qct) is a one-to-one mapping, it is sufficient that - -O, and afg do not change
sign. Solving for these derivatives,
-
23 )
gz ac + b at - I
Op ac act k(Tct) - )Pct + 1)
which is always positive.
agy _ X + exp(actpct)
ad k(Tet)
which is always positive.
agi det
=p kTacdexP( act Pct )8p k(Tet) "X~'pt
which is always positive.
g -(x + exp(actpet)) {exp(-actpet) + Pcaoc [1 - exp(-cctpct)]}ad
which is always negative. Finally,
-g, detact [PeOc [exp( actpct) + Xexp(-actpct)] 
- Xexp(-actpet)|
ap
Notice that under no Prohibition, a > 0 for any value of pct. Under Prohibition, a sufficient
condition for < 0 (so that total crime is increasing in law enforcement) is that Oc > -4---cInOP ~X+ec~tc Pct
this case, g(pct, det, qct) is one-to-one, and IJI reduces to IJ = z g &this ase, p ad Dq
agz 0g1t
Op 0d
Appendix 4: Additional Reduced Form Results
In this Appendix I discuss some additional reduced form results. First I present the results of the
models whose coefficients are depicted in figures 4 and 5. Then I document the evolution of crime
after Prohibition repeal, and look at neighboring alcohol markets and at the effect of pre-Prohibition
Dry legislation and Women's suffrage, as alternative explanations for the main patterns described
in section 4. Finally discuss the selection problem in the public opinion models.
Time-Varying Effects of Prohibition
Table A4-1 presents the main regression results from estimating equation (1). The tables present
estimates of the specification including year effects for each outcome variable. As a benchmark for
comparison, the first two columns for each outcome only include an indicator variable for years
under Constitutional Prohibition (1920-1933). The next two columns then include the DTs instead
of the Constitutional Prohibition indicator as a way of disaggregating the time-varying effects of
Prohibition and allowing for pre-nationwide Prohibition effects 4 5
Table A4-1: Long and Short-Run effects of Prohibition
Dependent variable
1st Year under Prohibition
2nd Year under Prohibition
3rd Year under Prohibition
4th Year under Prohibition
5th Year under Prohibition
6th Year under Prohibition
7th Year under Prohibition
8th Year under Prohibition
9th Year under Prohibition
10th Year under Prohibition
11th Year under Prohibition
12th Year under Prohibition
13th Year under Prohibition
14th Year under Prohibition
15th Year under Prohibition
16th Year under Prohibition
17th Year under Prohibition
18th Year under Prohibition
19th Year under Prohibition
Homicide Rate per 100,000
B C
(3)
-2.290
(1.417)
-1.649
(1.840)
-1.369
(1.958)
-3.123
(3.071)
-0.072
(2.439)
0.330
(2.818)
0.117
(2.820)
2.381
(2.331)
2.320
(2.628)
1.528
(2.417)
0.841
(2.323)
-0.488
(1.800)
1.454
(1.700)
0.834
(1.377)
-2.906
(1.443)
-3.146
(1.675)
-4.601
(1.605)
-4.409
(1.691)
-7.033
(2.290)
(4)
-2.104
(1.389)
-1.252
(1.848)
-1.482
(1.876)
-2.647
(2.978)
0.281
(2.459)
0.738
(2.785)
0.731
(2.746)
2.937
(2.395)
3.163
(2.709)
2.397
(2.553)
1.853
(2.505)
0.904
(2.005)
2.663
(1.812)
2.597
(1.679)
-0.381
(1.789)
-2.034
(1.730)
-2.282
(1.655)
-3.033
(2.128)
-8.162
(2.682)
Short and long-run effects of Prohibition
Drunkenness Arrest Rate per 1,000 Police Expenditure Share Per Capita Police Expenditure
B C B C B C
(7) (8) (11) (12)
-7.765 -5.593 -0.0017 -0.0017
(2.146)
-10.838
(2.538)
-10.947
(2.995)
-11.721
(3.609)
-9.095
(3.844)
-8.527
(4.216)
-9.241
(4.676)
-9.238
(4.676)
-9.432
(4.996)
-9.478
(5.574)
-8.045
(5.644)
-5.891
(6.168)
-4.241
(6.495)
-1.574
(7.353)
-6.240
(5.800)
-2.467
(6.333)
3.591
(6.486)
1.493
(6.955)
2.012
(7.097)
(1.287)
-9.737
(1.432)
-9.467
(1.716)
-8.892
(2.008)
-7.859
(2.310)
-7.422
(2.623)
-7.777
(2.601)
-8.326
(2.720)
-8.083
(2.801)
-7.908
(2.963)
-7.698
(2.995)
-7.889
(3.349)
-6.195
(3.980)
-2.151
(3.880)
-2.561
(4.904)
-6.930
(2.853)
-10.118
(3.336)
-12.096
(2.976)
-8.127
(3.293)
(0.003)
-0.0025
(0.003)
-0.0046
(0.004)
-0.0007
(0.005)
0.0025
(0.005)
0.0043
(0.005)
0.0064
(0.006)
0.0090
(0.005)
0.0125
(0.006)
0.0122
(0.006)
0.0130
(0.005)
0.0164
(0.005)
0.0158
(0.004)
0.0123
(0.004)
0.0083
(0.003)
0.0064
(0.003)
0.0046
(0.004)
0.0008
(0.004)
0.0011
(0.009)
(0.001)
-0.0017
(0.002)
-0.0024
(0.002)
-0.0007
(0.002)
0.0002
(0.003)
0.0024
(0.003)
0.0046
(0.003)
0.0058
(0.003)
0.0070
(0.003)
0.0072
(0.003)
0.0074
(0.002)
0.0091
(0.002)
0.0075
(0.002)
0.0053
(0.002)
0.0034
(0.002)
0.0037
(0.002)
0.0025
(0.003)
-0.0004
(0.004)
0.0039
(0.004)
Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.311 0.299 0.320 0.266 0.313 0.253
No. of Cities 66 90 66 237 66 239
No. of Observations 1716 1921 1254 4083 1650 4718
Notes: Constant included in all regressions is not reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the city level.
Time varying controls include log population, a Border indicator and a State-capital indicator.
Sample B is the balanced sample used for Structural estimation. Sample C includes all cities for which at least 8 years of data are available.
Effects of Heterogeneity in Moral Views during Prohibition
Table A4-2 now presents the estimated models from equation (3). Results are presented following
the same structure as those in table A4-1, reporting the interaction terms only.
4 5 For the police share and per capita police expenditure regressions, I also ran regressions including city-specific
trends, which do not show any significative differences to the ones presented in table A4-1.
(15) (16)
-0.032 -0.014
(0.060) (0.027)
0.014 0.003
(0.083) (0.037)
0.027 0.006
(0.096) (0.046)
0.094 0.043
(0.101) (0.052)
0.149 0.075
(0.101) (0.055)
0.213 0.122
(0.129) (0.058)
0.243 0.155
(0.163) (0.062)
0.351 0.181
(0.177) (0.074)
0.422 0.213
(0.196) (0.081)
0.412 0.262
(0.189) (0.063)
0.456 0.269
(0.181) (0.059)
0.438 0.275
(0.177) (0.060)
0.436 0.309
(0.151) (0.071)
0.319 0.150
(0.147) (0.065)
0.253 0.124
(0.113) (0.057)
-0.016 -0.053
(0.120) (0.067)
-0.187 -0.137
(0.100) (0.088)
-0.237 0.016
(0.117) (0.084)
-0.197 0.110
(0.223) (0.097)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.664 0.565
66 239
1650 4718
Table A4-2: Moral Heterogeneity: Long-and Short Run Differences
Dependent variable
1st Year under Prohibition x Wetness
2nd Year under Prohibition x Wetness
3rd Year under Prohibition x Wetness
4th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
5th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
6th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
7th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
8th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
9th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
10th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
11th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
12th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
13th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
14th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
15th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
16th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
17th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
18th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
19th Year under Prohibition x Wetness
Homicide Rate per 100,000
B
(3)
-13.584
(14.735)
C
(4)
-13.161
(14.296)
-2.103 1.406
(11.105) (9.480)
-5.829 -3.868
(9.234) (8.489)
9.867 8.950
(8.692) (8.489)
8.545 11.051
(7.449) (7.657)
17.975 21.918
(9.142) (9.429)
28.179 26.301
(11.930) (7.865)
20.584 23.788
(7.737) (7.566)
32.922 32.455
(11.015) (9.942)
22.065 22.236
(9.146) (8.214)
29.034 29.361
(10.497) (9.270)
27.208 28.249
(7.488) (6.853)
17.276 15.742
(7.821) (6.388)
19.820 15.645
(6.940) (6.432)
-1.986 0.901
(9.616) (7.330)
17.982 6.842
(15.128) (13.627)
-4.708 4.993
(8.743) (7.385)
8.580 11.885
(7.886) (7.348)
7.646 14.108
(9.716) (10.669)
Differences in Moral Views
Drunkenness Arrest Rate per 1,000
B C
(7) (8)
-10.986 7.387
(21.368) (8.716)
-13.652
(22.109)
-5.762
(23.055)
3.567
(20.371)
-0.761
(20.323)
6.486
(20.533)
0.257
(21.481)
-7.061
(22.304)
-11.510
(22.904)
-3.044
(22.696)
-4.601
(23.652)
28.040
(28.151)
18.806
(39.119)
28.856
(83.417)
-110.498
(74.038)
-4.001
(66.963)
12.240
(11.701)
19.051
(12.403)
23.345
(11.902)
25.510
(11.646)
14.687
(12.512)
9.445
(11.561)
3.815
(11.489)
0.992
(11.363)
1.578
(11.146)
2.361
(13.084)
-1.229
(22.000)
-21.000
(28.344)
6.424
(43.458)
-214.430
(47.447)
-46.925
(46.322)
172.815
(135.191)
-22.205
(72.675)
-64.025
(50.044)
Police Expenditure Share Per Capita Police Expenditure
B C B C
Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.337 0.326 0.323 0.273 0.358 0.262 0.690 0.574
No. of Cities 66 90 66 237 66 239 66 239
No. of Observations 1716 1921 1254 4083 1650 4718 1650 4718
Notes: Constant included in all regressions is not reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the city level.
Time varying controls include log population, a Border indicator and a State-capital indicator.
Sample B is the balanced sample used for Structural estimation. Sample C includes all cities for which at least 8 years of data are available.
(11) (12)
-0.097 -0.036
(0.028) (0.012)
-0.100 -0.032
(0.032) (0.014)
-0.103 -0.016
(0.037) (0.016)
-0.106 -0.011
(0.035) (0.015)
-0.107 -0.004
(0.034) (0.016)
-0.097 -0.006
(0.028) (0.015)
-0.093 -0.003
(0.030) (0.015)
-0.071 0.004
(0.026) (0.016)
-0.055 0.003
(0.024) (0.015)
-0.059 0.005
(0.022) (0.016)
-0.036 0.014
(0.020) (0.016)
0.036 0.024
(0.020) (0.014)
0.014 0.023
(0.018) (0.014)
0.009 0.033
(0.018) (0.016)
0.003 0.020
(0.023) (0.017)
0.008 0.034
(0.039) (0.024)
0.027 0.005
(0.019) (0.032)
0.011 0.116
(0.025) (0.093)
-0.014 -0.044
(0.040) (0.068)
(15) (16)
-3.304 -1.178
(0.855) (0.315)
-3.478 -0.943
(0.943) (0.318)
-3.400 -0.635
(1.068) (0.340)
-3.237 -0.520
(1.027) (0.351)
-3.158 -0.388
(1.023) (0.392)
-2.775 -0.349
(0.923) (0.430)
-2.144 -0.072
(0.961) (0.458)
-2.143 -0.118
(0.827) (0.519)
-1.240 -0.385
(0.879) (0.642)
-1.520 -0.008
(0.795) (0.567)
-0.843 0.201
(0.780) (0.580)
1.273 0.908
(0.759) (0.511)
1.741 1.625
(0.929) (0.519)
2.353 1.590
(0.985) (0.629)
2.622 1.753
(1.022) (0.728)
1.382 -0.374
(1.597) (0.859)
0.217 -0.734
(0.401) (1.046)
0.295 0.232
(0.538) (1.126)
0.296 -1.724
(1.003) (1.692)
Prohibition Repeal
The repeal of the 18th Amendment itself also allows for the exploration of differential trends in crim-
inality between cities with varying moral profiles. Here I exploit the repeal of nationwide Prohibition
in December 1933 with the ratification of the 21st Amendment, to provide some additional evidence
of the response of crime to Prohibition, and its stronger effects in communities with larger alcohol
markets. I take advantage of the availability of more detailed crime data for the 1930-1936 period,
taken from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) complied by the FBI starting in 1930. The UCR
reports for a large number of cities, the total number of offences known to the authorities (which
include any of the following: murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft), and
an independent measure of reported murders. Thus, I compare crime outcomes in the 1930-1933
period with the 1934-1936 period, allowing for differential behavior after repeal, as cities vary in
their moral preference distribution, as proxied by p-. Indeed, simple summary statistics show that
offences and murders were both lower in the post-18th Amendment years 46.
Thus, I look exclusively at the period 1930-1936, and run regressions for UCR offences and murders,
and for the homicide rate.
yct - ac + 13t + SCP + #CPpc + -yXct + Ect (33)
where CPt is an indicator variable for Constitutional Prohibition. Regression results are reported in
table A4-3. Columns (1) - (4) look at the homicide rate. The coefficient on the interaction is always
large, highly significant, and robust to the introduction of state-cross-year effects, suggesting that
the fall in crime was larger in wetter cities. Take for example column (2). The estimates imply that
for the city with mean "wetness" of 0.49, repeal was associated with a fall in the annual homicide
rate of 4.6 = (0.49 x 23.28) - 6.76. Even in the driest city, with pi = 0.3, the estimated fall in the
homicide rate is 0.21 = (0.3 x 23.28) - 6.76. Columns (5) - (8) then present analogous results for the
UCR number of murders per 100, 000. The pattern is very similar to the one for the homicide rate,
although standard errors increase somewhat, and the magnitude of the effect is smaller for the larger
sample of cities covered. Nonetheless, for the sample for which homicide rates are available, results
are very similar. The large standard errors for the sample in Columns (6) and (8) is due to the
larger number of smaller cities included, in which reported murders were very small or close to zero.
and present very little variation. Finally, Columns (9) - (12) present results for offences per 1, 000.
Interestingly, a pattern very similar to the one for homicides and arrests emerges, but this time, the
effect is statistically significant especially in the larger sample including cities of smaller sizes. From
Column (12), for example, it follows that repeal in the city with average "wetness" implied a fall in
total offences of 3.85 = (0.49 x 6.53) + 0.669 per 1, 000 population, which is 43% of this variable's
standard deviation of 8.65. As the results suggest, while the reduction in criminality in larger cities
was associated especially with a lower homicide rate, looking at a larger sample including smaller
cities, repeal was associated with lower levels of other types of crime.
Table A4-3: Crime Fall after Repeal
4 6Average murders per 100,000 are 8.57 (s.e. = 10.3) in the 1930-1933 period, and 6.53 (s.e. = 8.8) in 1934-1936,
with a t-statistic for the difference in means of 4.62. For offences per 1, 000, the 1930-1933 mean is 16.26 (s.e. = 8.6),
while the 1934-1936 mean is 15.6 (s.e. = 8.6), with a t-statistic of 1.64, significant at the 5% level.
Repeal of the 18th Amendment
Dependent variable Homicide Rate per 100,000 Murders per 100,000 All Offences per 100,000
B C B C B C B C B C B C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constitutional Prohibition (1930-1933) -5.91 -6.77 -6.01 -4.35 1.27 -0.44 9.14 3.23 -0.46 -3.95 -4.12 0.67
(4.18) (3.74) (5.39) (3.53) (5.79) (2.00) (10.49) (9.06) (4.88) (1.84) (7.45) (2.53)
Constitutional Prohibition x Wetness 20.12 23.28 22.13 18.47 4.04 3.88 15.55 3.37 3.04 5.32 12.22 6.53
(7.42) (6.65) (11.93) (7.80) (10.93) (3.64) (23.20) (5.48) (8.53) (3.21) (16.48) (3.88)
Time-varying Controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Year Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State x Year Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.450 0.353 0.713 0.622 0.349 0.085 0.609 0.249 0.121 0.067 0.476 0.2307
No. of Cities 66 93 66 93 66 324 66 324 66 324 66 324
No. of Observations 462 651 462 651 417 1938 417 1938 414 1943 414 1943
Notes: Constant included in all regressions is not reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the city level.
Time varying controls include log population, a Border indicator and a State-capital indicator. Each specification is estimated for three samples:
Sample A includes all city-x-year observations for which data is available. Sample B is the balanced sample used for Structural estimation.
Sample C includes all cities for which at least 10 years of data are available.
Neighboring Markets
If individuals' preferences are affected by the legal standard in place, say because they derive utility
from abiding to the law, or, on the other hand, if individuals' utility from taking an action increases
when it is proscribed (a "forbidden fruit effect"), observed changes in the drunkenness arrest rate
could be driven by these shocks in preferences. A way to isolate any taste shocks introduced by
Prohibition is to look at the response of the alcohol market in a city which is already under Prohibi-
tion, when neighboring states' prohibitionist status changes. If drinkers in a city under Prohibition
have access to neighboring markets, which is very consistent with the concern of Prohibitionists of
the time, and which motivated the passage of the Webb-Kenyon act, then the closure of neighboring
markets should reduce the availability of liquor in the city, without having an effect on preferences 4 7.
Thus, I collected information on the lengths of all state boundaries4 8 , and computed for each state,
the share of state border in states under Prohibition at each point in time49:
SBP ZEjENC Pj x BorderLengthej
ct ZjCNe Border Lengthej
where Pjt is an indicator variable for state j being under Prohibition at time t. Nc is the set of
states neighboring city c's state (e.g. NSanFrancisco = {Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, Mexico}), and
BorderLengthej is the length in miles of the state boundary between city c's state and state j.
4 7 The importance of cross-state-boundaries alcohol trade after Prohibition was enacted in some states but not in
neighboring ones is probably best exemplified by Daniel Okrent's discussion of the huge traffic lanes along interstate
25, connecting Toledo, OH with Detroit, NI, after Michigan was covered by state-wide Prohibition in 1918. The
highway was nicknamed "Avenue de Booze". (See Okrent (2010, p. 107))
Isaac also highlights the importance of cross-state smuggling of alcohol after Tennessee started enforcing its Prohi-
bition legislation: "The State bone-dry law, even when supplemented by the Reed amendment, or "national bone-dry
law", which made it a federal crime to transport intoxicants into a dry state, did not actually stop the flow of liquor
into Tennessee. During 1917 and 1918, bootleggers where adequately supplied with whiskey brought from Kentucky
to Nashville and Memphis by train, automobile, farm wagon, and river boat." Isaac (1965. p. 254)4 The information on state boundary lengths was taken from Holmes (1996). There are a total of 109 boundaries
between U.S. states, and 16 international boundaries.
49I include any international borders in the denominator, which amounts to considering Mexico and Canada as
never being under Prohibition.
For the pre-Constitutional Prohibition period (1911-1919), when there is variation across states in
Prohibition status, I estimate models of the form
det = ac + ,3 + 6Pct + 71SBPet + #PetSBPt + -y'Xet + Ect (34)
Table A4-4 presents the estimates of equation (34), for different specifications, and for samples A,
B, and C. First, the fraction of border under Prohibition should have an effect on the drunkenness
arrest rate only when the city itself is under Prohibition; otherwise the city's neighbors' Prohibition
status should be irrelevant, since a free alcohol market is available. Thus, columns (1) - (3) in table
A4-4 start presenting the estimates of a model where I include the share of border under Prohibition
without an interaction with own Prohibition status. The share of state boundary under Prohibition
is insignificant in the three specifications. Then columns (4) - (6) introduce the interaction term,
and columns (7) - (9) additionally include time-varying controls (log of population, and time-varying
state capital and South effects). The coefficient for the # is negative and large in magnitude, and
always highly significant, except for column (8) when looking at the smaller B sample. The coefficient
for # on column (6), for example, implies that a one pre-1920 standard deviation (0.29) increase in
the fraction of state border under Prohibition implied a reduction in the drunkenness arrest rate of
1.93, which is 10% of the average pre-1920 drunkenness arrest rate in the sample. These estimates
are very consistent with the idea that the sharp falls in drunkenness arrests observed were caused
by a contraction in the alcohol supply available, and not due to preference shocks correlated with
the introduction of Prohibition.
Table A4-4: Neighboring Prohibition
Effect of Neighboring Prohibition
Dependent variable Drunkenness Arrests Rate per 1,000
A B C A B C A B C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)Prohibition Indicator -6.123 -6.072 -6.415 -3.427 -5.464 -3.745 -3.511 -5.750 -3.932(1.376) (1.927) (1.359) (1.864) (2.182) (1.859) (2.165) (2.652) (2.149)
Share of Border under Prohibition -2.128 -6.257 -2.102 1.455 -5.504 1.425 0.351 -6.144 0.300(2.138) (3.095) (2.139) (2.562) (3.338) (2.562) (2.440) (3.167) (2.441)
Prohibition X Share of Border under Prohibition 
-6.778 -1.348 -6.681 -5.112 -0.046 -4.976
(2.650) (3.018) (2.656) (2.819) (3.685) (2.830)
Time-varying Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCity Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.226 0.319 0.228 0.234 0.320 0.236 0.248 0.353 0.251
No. of Cities 245 66 236 245 66 236 245 66 236
No. of Observations 1876 594 1861 1876 594 1861 1876 594 1861
Notes: Constant included in all regressions is not reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the city level. Time varying controls include log population,
a Border indicator and a State-capital indicator. Each specification is estimated for three samples: Sample A includes all city-x-year observations for which data
is available. Sample B is the balanced sample used for Structural estimation. Sample C includes all cities for which at least 10 years of data are available.
Coefficients for years under Prohibition and for the interactions between "wetness" and years under Prohibition not reported.
Dry Legislation
Can differences in pre-Prohibition alcohol-related legislation explain the trends in crime, arrests for
drunkenness, and police enforcement? Prior to the adoption of state-level and nationwide Prohi-
bition, different states had different types and numbers of dry laws. In fact, regulations over the
alcohol market were in place almost everywhere. These included restrictions on selling hours, on
the kinds of alcoholic beverages permitted, on the types of selling establishments allowed, and on
taxation. There are two channels through which pre-Prohibition alcohol legislation might affect the
evolution of outcomes during Prohibition. First, given that early on during Prohibition collective
law enforcement decisions were likely to be closely related to initial "prior" beliefs about the policy's
effects, variation in the short-run effects of Prohibition might be partly explained by variation in
pre-Prohibition dry legislation. The direction of an effect is not obvious a priori. On the one hand,
if these laws were being successful in shrinking the alcohol market and were not affecting crime,
people's priors about the introduction of federal-level Prohibition could be very optimistic on the
other hand, if the introduction of these laws was correlated with more crime, individuals might have
used this information to form negative priors about nationwide Prohibition. Second, differences in
dry laws could have created different initial conditions for the alcohol market at the time of Pro-
hibition adoption. For example, heavily regulated markets might have already developed a parallel
black market which could have eased the expansion of the illegal liquor trade during Prohibition.
To take a look at this question I reviewed the available information on state-level dry legislation
in the pre-18th Amendment period and constructed a variable counting the number of regulations
on the alcohol market at each point in time for each state. Interestingly, although the relationship
between average "wetness" of a state, as measured by p, and the number of dry laws in place is
not very strong, it is actually positive. This is likely to be the result of the equilibrium political
strategies used by dry lobbies during the 1900s and 1910s. Because relatively "wet" regions were
unlikely to pass Prohibition laws, the lobbies focused their efforts on passing regulatory legislation
instead, which was politically feasible 0 . States like Michigan or Minnessota (both heavily "wet"),
passed, especially during the 1910s, significant amounts of regulatory legislation related to alcohol.
In the other extreme, radically "dry" states such as Utah and Oklahoma did not need to pass this
kind of legislation because they were already under Prohibition in the first place.
Pre-Prohibiton legislation is, of course, endogenous to outcomes over that period. Given that I want
to explore the effects of pre-Prohibition dry legislation on outcomes during Prohibition, which might
have an effect through initial beliefs (and hence, initial law enforcement choices during Prohibition),
or in how they shaped the local alcohol markets (and hence, in the subsequent response of alcohol
supply during Prohibition), below I briefly investigate the effect of pre-Prohibition legislation on
Prohibition outcomes, conditional on local preferences, by estimating models only for Prohibition
years, in which I allow for a differential effect of the number of pre-Prohibition dry laws over time
under Prohibition, controlling by a time-varying effect of baseline "wetness":
k k
Yct = ac + +t  E DCT + I: 1TDCTLe + -'Xet + Ect (35)
T=1 T=1
where Le is the number of dry laws in place right before the city is under Prohibition, and Xct
includes interactions of peo with year indicators. Because these models only look at years under
Prohibition, I omit the indicator for T = 1, so the interpretation of the "years under Prohibition"
indicator variables is different; coefficients must now be interpreted as relative to having experienced
Prohibition for one year. The YT's should capture any time-varying differential effects of an extra
piece of dry pre-Prohibition legislation on Prohibition outcomes. Flexibly controlling for the moral
5 0 The data on dry legislation was mostly taken from Cherrington (1920)and League (1932). Both sources have a
detailed and comprehensive compilation of dry legislation during these decades.
profile of the city as proxied by I is important given that pre-Prohibition dry legislation is likely
to be correlated with preferences in the city. To save space, in table A4-5 I only present results for
the coefficient estimates for the m's of the benchmark fixed effects specifications. Regression results
do not show any significant relationship between the amount of pre-Prohibition dry legislation and
the homicide rate or the arrest rate at any time during Prohibition. There also appears to be no
relation between these laws and the behavior of per capita expenditure in policing during Prohibition
years. For the expenditure share, on the other hand, the interaction terms are small in magnitude
but significant, suggesting up to a 1% higher police share per pre-Prohibition piece of legislation
around the 10th year under Prohibition, relative to the first one (See column (6)). This result is not
robust to the introduction of city-specific trends, though. Overall there seems to be no evidence that
dry laws prior to Prohibition had any economically important effects on the evolution of outcomes
during Prohibition years.
Table A4-5: Effects of pre-Prohibition Dry Legislation
Dry .aws
Dependent variable Homicide Rate per 100,000 Drunkenness Arrests Rate per 1,000 Police Expenditure Share Per Capita Police Expenditure
B C B C B C B C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2nd Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws 0.098 0.166 -0.334 -0.189 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.004 -0.004
3rd Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
4th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
5th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
6th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
7th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
8th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
9th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
10th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
11th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
12th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
13th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
14th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
15th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
16th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
17th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
18th Year under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws
(0.208)
0.247
(0.200)
0.452
(0.229)
0.183
(0289)
0.319
(0.262)
0.334
(0.312)
0.375
(0.307)
0.353
(0.327)
0.298
(0.249)
0.094
(0.251)
0.194
(0.253)
0.133
(0.236)
0.149
(0.263)
-0.019
(0.242)
-0.143
(0.440)
0.913
(1.304)
1.369
(1.404)
(0.202)
0.218
(0.195)
0.469
(0.229)
0.174
(0.286)
0.289
(0.262)
0.315
(0.304)
0.363
(0.299)
0.369
(0.318)
0.321
(0.243)
0.125
(0.245)
0.149
(0.240)
0094
(0.227)
0.196
(0.250)
0.157
(0.245)
0.051
(0.367)
-0.737
(1.035)
1.121
(1.492)
(0.398)
-0.237
(0.409)
-0.316
(0.407)
-0.427
(0.435)
-0.503
(0.427)
-0.431
(0.451)
-0.486
(0.413)
-0.672
(0428)
-0.559
(0.431)
0.540
(0.418)
-0.394
(0.480)
-0.079
(0878)
-1212
(1.081)
-16.505
(3514)
-12.068
(1764)
5239
(1039)
4.310
(1077)
(0.291)
0.120
(0.285)
0.163
(0.282)
0.122
(0.280)
-0.139
(0.290)
-0.129
(0.296)
-0.010
(0.290)
-0.054
(0.306)
-0056
(0.312)
-0.188
(0.294)
-0.031
(0340)
0.188
(0.661)
0.606
(1.197)
1.956
(2.523)
2.232
(1.429)
-1.343
(5556)
0.270
(4.264)
(0.0003)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
-0.0004
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0006)
0.0005
(0.0007)
0.0004
(0.0007)
0.00009
(0.0007)
0.0012
(0.0008)
0.0009
(0.0007)
0.0011
(0.0007)
0.0008
(00008)
0.0010
(00009)
0.0012
(0.0009)
0.0015
(0.0010)
0.0021
(0.0011)
0.0020
(0.0041)
0.0008
(0.0037)
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0005
(0.0003)
0.0008
(00003)
0.0009
(0.0003)
0.0011
(0.0003)
0.0012
(0.0003)
0.0011
(0.0004)
0.0011
(0.0004)
0.0012
(0.0004)
0.0011
(0.0004)
0.0014
(0.0004)
0.0015
(0.0005)
0.0006
(0.0009)
-0.0003
(0.0022)
-0.0025
(0.0030)
(0.006)
-0.008
(0.009)
-0.013
(0.011)
-0.018
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.019)
-0008
(0.021)
-0.003
(0.022)
0.005
(0.025)
-0.009
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.024)
-0022
(0.030)
-0.034
(0035)
-0025
(0.037)
-0.024
(0.038)
0.017
(0038)
0004
(0.078)
-0.027
(0.072)
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.007)
-0.010
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.009)
-0.003
(0010)
-0.001
(0010)
0.001
(0-012)
0.001
(0.013)
-0.013
(0.019)
0.001
(0014)
-0.012
(0.019)
0005
(0.018)
0.004
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.025)
-0053
(0.046)
-0.056
(0053)
19th and more Years under Prohibition x Pre Prohibition Dry Laws -4.095 -3.993 6214 0.041 -0.0085 -0.0029 -0.465 -0080
(1.812) (1.605) (1.225) (4.071) (0.0053) (0.0022) (0.146) (0.070)
Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.465 0.399 0.502 0.345 0.393 0.212 0.746 0.607
No. of Cities 66 90 66 237 66 239 66 239
No. of Observations 1066 1210 1066 2655 1066 3477 1066 3477
Notes: Constant included in all regressions is not reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the city level. Time varying controls include log population, a Border indicator and a State-capital indicator.
Sample B is the balanced sample used for Structural estimation. Sample C includes all cities for which at least 8 years of data are available.
Coefficients for years under Prohibition and for the interactions between "wetness" and years under Prohibition not reported.
Women's suffrage
Several historians have attributed some of the success of Prohibition in the United States to the
significant role that the Women's Suffrage Movement played. It is undeniable that women played
a prominent role in the conflict over alcohol consumption, and were of importance at least since
the 1870s, when a group of Ohio women began the "Temperance Crusade" that spread throughout
all of the Midwest. A group of women would visit the area's saloons one by one, and protest and
pray for days until the owners decided to close. The long-term effects of the crusade are likely to
have been minimal, but it was the first major women-specific social mobilization, and was the origin
of the WCTU some years later. In the Twentieth century, both the Women's Suffrage Movement
and the Temperance Movement were part of the Progressive-era reforms, and organizations such as
the WCTU were involved in the political struggle around both issues. Although U.S.-wide women's
suffrage (19th Amendment) was ratified into the Constitution in 1920, after the adoption of na-
tionwide Prohibition (18th Amendment), authors such as Okrent (2010) argue that the Women's
Suffrage Movement gave a major impulse to the Prohibition movement. The almost simultaneous
ratification of the 18th and 19th Amendments makes it impossible to identify any specific effects that
women's suffrage might have had during federal Prohibition years. Nonetheless, prior to the 19th
Amendment several states had already extended the franchise to women 51. As a way to explore the
importance of women's enfranchisement on Prohibition-related outcomes, I exploit the variation in
women's suffrage enfranchisement prior to 1920, when both the 18th and 19th Amendments were
ratified, to see if Prohibition had differential effects in cities with and without women's suffrage. If
the distribution of women's preferences over Prohibition enforcement was different than men's, cities
allowing women's suffrage could be under a differential trend. Thus, for the 1910-1919 period, I run
regressions of the form
k k
yet = ac + 13t + yWet + (: orDT + ( #,DJVCt + -Y'Xet + Ect (36)
T=l r=1
In equation (36), Wet is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if city c has women's suffrage in
year t. Table A4-6 presents results of the estimates of the #,'s from equation (36) for the different
outcome variables, in the specifications including city fixed effects, time-varying controls, and year
effects. The regressions include only up to #5, because before 1919 no city with women's suffrage
in the sample had experienced more than 5 years under Prohibition. There is no evidence of a
differential trend in the homicide rate in cities with women's suffrage. This is unsurprising given that
the short-run effects of Prohibition on the homicide rate were very small. For the outcomes which
did have large short-run changes after the introduction of Prohibition, if anything, Columns (2) - (3)
in table A4-6 show that the introduction of women's suffrage is correlated with more drunkenness
arrests in the short run (after two to three years under Prohibiton), but the net effect is small and
insignificant quickly thereafter. This result is also not robust to the restricted B sample (column (2)).
When looking at police enforcement in Columns (4) - (7), the results are also very inconclusive.
5
1 XWonens Suffrage prior to the 19th Amendment was adopted by the states as follows: Wyoming in 1869, Colorado
in 1893, Utah and Idaho in 1896, Washington in 1910, California in 1911., Arizona, Kansas and Oregon in 1912,
Montana and Nevada in 1914, New York in 1917, and Michigan, Oklahoma and South Dakota in 1918.
During years with women's suffrage, cities have slightly lower but insignificant policing, which is
actually inconsistent with the idea that women's anti-Prohibitionism should translate to higher law
enforcement and a smaller alcohol market after their enfranchisement. Overall, the available evidence
does not suggest that alternative legislation, such as dry laws or women's suffrage, might have been
driving the trends in law enforcement, crime and arrests presented in Section 4.1.
Table A4-6: Effect of Women's Suffrage
Women's Suffrage
Dependent variable Homicide Rate per 100,000 Drunkenness Arrests Rate per 1,000 Police Expenditure Share Per Capita Police Expenditure
B B C B C B C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Women's Suffrage Indicator 0.1171 -1.080 -2.183 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.051
(1.024) (1.696) (1.132) (0.003) (0.002) (0.072) (0.046)
1st Year under Prohibition x Women's Suffrage -0.7345 1.410 1.311 -0.007 -0.003 -0.178 -0.085
(1.502) (2.812) (1.623) (0.003) (0.002) (0.092) (0.040)
2nd Year under Prohibition x Women's Suffrage -2.3699 -5.484 5.409 -0.017 -0.002 -0.124 0.002
(4.357) (3.447) (2.645) (0.006) (0.004) (0.110) (0.054)
3rd Year under Prohibition x Women's Suffrage -1.3185 -4.172 5.616 -0.021 -0.002 -0.151 -0.024
(4.537) (3.969) (3.655) (0.009) (0.005) (0.111) (0.062)
4th Year under Prohibition x Women's Suffrage 5.5515 -0.017 4.276 -0.036 -0.003 -0.223 -0.051
(6.904) (6.215) (3.767) (0.010) (0.005) (0.095) (0.051)
5th Year under Prohibition x Women's Suffrage 3.329
(4.841)
Time-varying Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.108 0.344 0.291 0.330 0.195 0.649 0.606
No. of Cities 66 66 236 66 217 66 217
No. of Observations 594 594 1861 528 1427 528 1427
Notes: Constant included in all regressions is not reported. Years Under Prohibition Indicators not reported.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the city level. Time varying controls include log population, a Border indicator and a State-capital indicator.
Sample B is the balanced sample used for Structural estimation. Sample C includes all cities for which at least 10 years of data are available.
Selection in the Public Opinion data
A caveat in the elections data is that several states including Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania, did not hold any liquor-related referendum in a pre-Prohibition year. This induces a
potential selection bias in the estimates of equation (4) because these states never held a referendum
regarding liquor precisely due to the highly anti-Prohibitionist preferences of their citizens. As a
robustness check I also estimate a selection model, by specifying a selection equation for holding a
referendum (at the state level). More especifically, I assume that
TSt =
if t = 0 and 'Zso +vso > 0
if t = 1
where rst is an indicator variable for state S holding a liquor referendum, Zso includes the state's
share of adherants to a wet religion and the share of native white individuals in 1910, and vso ~
N(0, 1), with E[Eco vso] = piso and E[EcdIvso] = 0. This implies that
E[wctpct.poXerst = ac + t + pct + <ppcot + 'Xe + (q'Zso)1{t=}
where A() is the inverse Mills ratio. Results are reported in columns (6), (12), and (18) of table 3.
Appendix 5: Data Sources
Most of the information available for the study of Prohibition is available at the city level, so I
focused on constructing a yearly panel dataset of cities, covering the 1910s, '20s and early '30s.
The data collected comes from a wide array of sources. The first source of information is the
collection of original documents from the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
most commonly known as the Wickersham Commission after the name of its Chair Commissioner,
Attorney General George Wickersham. It was appointed in the Spring of 1929 by President Hoover,
with the specific purpose of "studying exhaustively the entire problem of the enforcement of our
laws and the improvement of our judicial system, including the special problem and abuses growing
out of the Prohibition laws" (Wickersham-Commission (1928-1931b)). It was, of course, appointed
as a response to the growing concerns about the effects Prohibition was having throughout the
country, and the public discontent over the policy's effects. The Commission produced a series of
reports on the different aspects of Prohibition, after directly collecting data and evidence across
the country, and issued its main findings in 1931. Harvard's Law School Library curretly holds the
collection of documents from the Commission, including the originals of much of the summarized
data in the published reports, in addition to several other unpublished information. The detailed
city-by-city "Prohibition Survey" reports, compiled directly by commissioners traveling to the cities
and collecting information about the recent evolution of criminality, and the "Cost of Crime" state-
level folders, providing detailed data on local law enforcement activity, contain the most valuable
information from the Wickersham papers.
Law Enforcement Data
Other than the data mentioned in section 3, the Wickersham Commission papers also contain other
data on total arrests, unfortunately, available only during the 1910s and in 1929. Data on a set of
other Prohibition enforcement outcomes is available only at the state level from the U.S. Bureau
of Prohibition for the years 1923-1932, such as the number of still and liquor seizures, arrests of
alcohol producers, and casualties caused by Prohibition enforcement agencies (see table 1). This
information aggregates Prohibition enforcement operations from both federal and local authorities
in most cases. I collected data on criminal judicial prosecutions from the Attorney General Annual
reports, which are available at the Judicial District level only, for the years 1915-1936.
Demographic and Religious Data
For the first four decades of the Twentieth century, data on the distribution of religious ascriptions
is available from the 1906. 1916, 1926, and 1936 decennial Censuses of Religions. The Censuses have
comprehensive information about the number of adherents to each of the different faiths or churches
in the United States.
Public Opinion Data
Most of the data comes from the state official rosters or "blue books", which states publish on an
annual or biannual basis. The information for some of the states was found in the state archives,
and for a few other referenda not reported in official sources, I took the data from local newspapers.
A second major source of electoral data on the Prohibition issue are the election returns for the
21st Amendment Constitutional Convention elections, also found in the state rosters and some state
archives.
Structural Estimation Data
The sample includes cities from all over the United States, and although the range of population
sizes in this sample of cities goes from 51, 000 to 5.6 million (1920 numbers), admittedly this is a
sample of urban communities. Of course, this is mainly due to the availability for the homicide rate
data, which was reported on a population basis and for cities only. It is important to stress that
the results should be seen as the effects of Prohibition in the most urbanized parts of the American
society.
Table A5-1: Sample of Cities in the Structural Estimation
city
Akron
Albany
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Bridgeport
Buffalo
Cambridge
Camden
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbus
Dallas
Dayton
Denver
Detroit
Fall River
Grand Rapids
Hartford
Houston
state
OH
NY
GA
MD
AL
MA
CT
NY
MA
NJ
IL
OH
OH
OH
TX
OH
CO
MI
MA
MI
CT
TX
city
Indianapolis
Jersey City
Kansas City
Kansas City
Los Angeles
Louisville
Lowell
Memphis
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Nashville
New Bedford
New Haven
New Orleans
New York
Newark
Norfolk
Oakland
Omaha
Paterson
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
state
IN
NJ
KS
MO
CA
KY
MA
TN
WI
MN
TN
MA
CT
LA
NY
NJ
VA
CA
NE
NJ
PA
PA
city
Portland
Providence
Reading
Richmond
Rochester
Saint Louis
Saint Paul
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Francisco
Scranton
Seattle
Spokane
Springfield
Syracuse
Toledo
Trenton
Washington
Wilmington
Worcester
Yonkers
Youngstown
Section 6.1 mentioned that in spite of being a dynamic model, Maximum Likelihood estimation was
not subject to an initial conditions problem. The careful reader might have noticed that this requires
the sample to cover years under no Prohibition and under Prohibition, while a few states were already
state
OR
RI
PA
VA
NY
MO
MN
UT
TX
CA
PA
WA
WA
MA
NY
OH
NJ
DC
DE
MA
NY
OH
under Prohibition before 1911. Given the timing of the adoption of Prohibition across States (see
figure 3), and the data availability, for Nashville and Memphis in Tennessee, Atlanta in Georgia, and
Kansas City in Kansas, the sample covers Prohibition years exclusively. These three states officially
adopted Prohibition in 1909, 1908 and 1880, respectively. Nevertheless, following the historical
account on Prohibition in Tennessee, I code the cities in this state as being under Prohibition only
starting in 1914. As mentioned in footnote 5.6.5, the governor of Tennessee decided not to enforce
the constitutional amendment enacted in 1909, and Prohibiton only was enforced after the new
Republican governor took office5 .
Although for Altanta, GA, and Kansas City, KS, the drunkenness arrests data also shows a fall only
in 1917 (when War-time prohibition was adopted), suggesting little actual law enforcement of the
state Prohibition laws (Atlanta's arrests fall from 18.4 to 12.2 between 1916 and 1917), there is no
clear evidence that the laws were actually not being enforced. Instead of specifying a distribution
for the unobserved homicide rate prior to 1911 for these three cities, I estimate the structural model
assuming they enter Prohibition in 1917, and check the robustness of the model to excluding them
from the estimation altoghether.
5 2 The fact that Prohibition did not take place in Tennessee before 1914 can be corroborated directly by looking at
the drunkenness arrests data. For example, this variable falls from 17.5 to 8.9 per 1,000 people between 1913 and
1914 in Knoxville. Hilary House, Nashville's mayor at the time, even explicitly "acknowledged before the world that
the state-wide Prohibition law is violated in Nashville... with knowledge and consent of the great majority of the
people". Isaac (1965, p. 174)
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This paper studies the strategic interaction between competition and ratchet effect incentives in the
context of a dynamic coalition formation game of incomplete information. When the support decisions of
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information, but that ratchet effect incentives do limit the extent to which he can do it. I show that the
overall dynamics are strongly shaped by an informational commitment problem that arises when a ruler's
beliefs are "too optimistic". A ruler that is tempted to make risky offers in the future will find it harder
to extract information in the present because the likelihood of a future political transition increases the
value of denying support for potential coalition members. Counterintuitively, this implies that power
transitions are likely to happen when public beliefs are relatively optimistic. Moreover, the amount of
information that can be extracted does not vary monotonically with the degree of optimism of public
beliefs.
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1 Introduction
In any political environment, from weakly to highly institutionalized, individuals or groups in
power are constantly engaged in the business of maintaining the political support that allows
them to remain in power. At the same time, holding office becomes a source of benefits
for those who hold it. A natural tension arises between remaining in power and perceiving
its benefits, since gathering political support requires distributing some of the benefits from
holding office among heterogeneous groups. On the other hand, politically powerful groups
who trade benefits for political support face the opportunity cost of forgoing the possibility
of becoming the ones in power. As a result, such an environment naturally gives incentives
for groups with political power to be reluctant in supporting incumbent groups, and suggests
that we should observe either a high degree of churning or a very equitable distribution of
benefits across the politically powerful groups that constitute a given polity.
In sharp contrast, many historic and contemporary societies are characterized by quite the
opposite: specific groups or individuals remaining in power for extended periods of time
(this I will call a high degree of entrenchment), and a highly unequal distribution of benefits
across groups (this I will call a high degree of encroachment). The nature of this problem is
not exclusively a feature of societies with a low degree of political development; in fact, one
possible way of rationalizing formal officeholding tenure limits frequently observed in more
developed polities, is as an explicit way to address the problem of political entrenchment.
Particularly puzzling is the fact that those groups granting political support to an incumbent
could potentially achieve office for themselves by denying it to the current ruler. This is
especially striking in light of the fact that entrenchment and encroachment often evolve in
tandem. Some regimes manage to increasingly encroach over time (for example, through
the undermining of the separation of powers, the centralization of decision-making, or even
through outright theft) under the consent of their political support bases, and sustained in
power precisely by those same groups who would benefit from replacing them. If an incumbent
is becoming increasingly encroached, why do politically powerful non-incumbent groups not
oust him? How is it that potential replacements do not take their political support away from
the ruler as they see their own gains from giving such support fall over time? What strategies
do groups in power use to achieve this result? What are the limits on these dynamics? When
are political transitions more likely to take place?
Evidence of the lack of a sound theoretical understanding of this problem is Myerson's claim
that "... a leader who was expected to subsequently rule as an arbitrary tyrant would be
unable to recruit supporters for his original rise to power... our analysis offers a reason
to view such tyrannies as exceptional cases that necessarily involve a failure of rational
expectations by early supporters of the regime" (Nyerson (2008, p. 136)). Nevertheless.
the political economy literature has offered several rational choice-based explanations for
the stability of undelivering political regimes, to which this paper relates. In earlier work
discussing why "empirically the Junta characteristically shrinks to one man", Tullock (1987)
proposes a process of rounds in which the victorious politician at each round accumulates
more power than his fellows and is then able to exclude them from the ruling coalition in
future rounds. The process then leads to one-person rule and a high degree of concentration
of political power. On the other hand, Egorov and Sonin (2005) argue that dictators choose
incompetent subordinates to reduce the probability of betrayal, because more competent
viziers have more incentives to replace the ruler. Dictators, thus, must trade-off loyalty for
competence to remain in power. In Svolik (2008), a leader can take hidden actions to weaken
his ruling coalition, which can respond by staging a costly coup. The unobservability of
the action together with the costliness of setting up a coup create the possibility that in
equilibrium, the ruler succesfully gets entrenched (becomes an autocrat).
The theories above have one element in common: entrenchment requires rulers to success-
fully alter the balance of political power by weakening their opponents. This is a natural
first approach to think about entrenchment, but at some level it begs the more difficult
question of how an incumbent might be able to entrench and encroach in spite of other
groups holding enough political power to oust him. Some recent work has tackled this ques-
tion. PadroiMiquel (2007) argues that the paradox of strong and stable autocratic regimes
in African ethnically divided societies can be explained by a strategy of "politics of fear".
In a society consisting of two groups, one of which holds power, coethnics of the current
ruler fear doing much worse under the competing ethnic group, and as a result are willing
to support him despite his predatory behavior. In a similar vein, Acemoglu et al. (2004)
suggest that the stability of kleptocratic regimes might be explained by the ability of rulers
to undermine the collective action of groups who could potentially contest them through
credible punishments to opponents and prizes to supporters. Finally, in their "selectorate"
model Bueno-De-Mezquita et al. (2005) emnphazise the importance of the size of the winning
coalition relative to the set of potential coalition members to understand the incentives for
supporting rulers and the strategies that rulers might adotp. These models do not incor-
porate very rich dynamics, in part, because of Myerson's concern above. In a setting where
the source of political power of competing groups is independent from the ruler's actions, a
history in which political opponents initially grant their support to a ruler and subsequently
get expropriated, while their chances to gain office shrink, cannot be subgame perfect; the
ruler would never achieve the political support to remain in power in the first place. As a
result, these models do not feature trajectories of increasing entrenchment or encroachment
over time. Since the beginning of the game, incumbents are fully entrenched and encroached.
There is, nevertheless, some recent literature in dynamic legislative bargaining in which an
increasingly uneven distribution of resources can obtain as bargainning goes on over time (see
in particular Kalandrakis (2004) and Kalandrakis (2009)). This result relies on the restrictive
assumption of a state-dependent process for the status quo distribution. Moreover, these
models do not allow for the possibility of political transitions, so that players in those games
are effectively unable to react to unfavorable offers.
This paper suggests an alternative view by proposing a specific theoretical framework to an-
alyze the dynamics of political entrenchment and encroachment, which intends to fill in the
previously highlighted gaps in the literature. The analysis is rooted on several ingredients
which I believe are key for the understanding of this set of issues. First, I argue that it is
important to make an explicit distinction between political power as an asset (the capacity
of political players to threaten the stability of the ruler's incumbency, for example due to
charisma or the ability to deliver patronage or exercise violence), and the resulting distri-
bution of benefits from the political game. Benefits and political power might be highly
correlated, but are conceptually distinct. To make such distinction explicit, I will hold fixed
the distribution of political power and will study how it might map into the distribution of
benefits, across groups and over time, while abstracting from the effect that the distribution
of benefits might have on the subsequent distribution of political power. Using the previous
language, this paper will look at how entrenchment leads to encroachment, but not, the other
way around, precisely to study a scenario where the ability of competing groups to oust an
incumbent is not falling over time. The premise is that there is no such thing as an almighty
ruler.
Second, that any political coalition formation game is in essence, a bargaining game. Fol-
lowing the huge literature on bargaining and reputations (see for example Fudenberg et
al. (1985), Hart and Tirole (1988), Sobel and Takahashi (1983), Bar-Isaac (2003), Schmidt
(1993)), I argue that a key interaction between incumbents and potential supporters in a
coalition formation game is the constant effort of incumbents to learn how cheaply they can
buy the political support needed to remain in power. Because a coalition formation game is,
by its very nature, a non-anonymous interaction, potential supporters. on the other hand,
are constantly trying to look expensive. Thus, learning might be important in the evolution
of political interactions within coalition formation games.
This, in fact, is based on a third tenet of this paper: that providing political support is
costly. Depending on the sources of political power in a specific context, this could be, for
example, because leaders have to mobilize armies, or to pander their constituencies through
clientelistic exchanges. But while the amount of political power held by different groups in
society is easily observable, for example because it is closely related to population size or
other resources, the cost of providing political support is hard to observe for outsiders, since
it is likely to vary across groups and depend on their local characteristics. Some evidence of
across-groups variation in the cost of providing political support comes from McMillan and
Zoido (2004). They document the episode of rampant corruption in Peru during the Fujimori
administration in the 1990s, when the President's main advisor and Cheif of Intelligence
systematically engaged in the trade of money for political support to the regime. The data
reveals that support from three groups was highly valued by the government: the courts,
the military, and the media. Interestingly, the bribes paid to media owners were orders of
magnitude higher than those paid to judges or generals. Of course, it is likely that these
groups varied in the amount of political power they could sell to the Fujimori regime, but the
authors highlight that media outlets faced high reputational costs of engaging in the corrupt
deals, and hence, required larger bribes.
The main mechanism I investigate in this paper is the interplay between political competition
within a coalition formation game, and the ratchet effect incentives that arise as a result of
the possible exploitation of valuable information revealed over time. I address the question
of the extent to which an incumbent ruler can exploit the competitive nature of the coalition
formation game to undermine the ratchet effect incentives of potential coalition members.
Learning about a given group's cost of providing political support has two direct benefits for
the ruler. If the information revealed is that the group has a low cost, this will allow him to
make lower offers in the future, and hence, increase the extent of his encroachment. Moreover,
by increasing the precision of his beliefs about this cost, he will be able to make offers
that imply a lower risk of being rejected, an hence increase the extent of his entrenchment.
Of course, any given group should be reluctant to accept a low offer, both because it is
unattractive relative to the possibility of ousting the ruler and triggering a political transition,
but moreover, because low offers are likely to be informative, leading to low offers in the future
and hence, implying a ratchet effect.
When unanimity is not necessary for the ruler to remain in power, an incumbent ruler might
try to exploit competition within the coalition formation game to play potential coalition
members against each other, giving them incentives to reveal information. Competition might
be able to undermine the ratchet effect, and if this is so, a ruler will be able to entrench and
encroach over time, as information becomes more precise. The model will be informative
about the conditions under which exploiting competition can be used as an information
extraction mechanism, and the endogenous limits that arise on the use and effectiveness of
this strategy. Notice that a group is willing to deny support to the incumbent if it expects
the competing group to do so too. Otherwise, a political transition will not ensue, while
the transfer will have been forgone. As a result, beliefs are of strategic importance not only
for the ruler, but also for other competing groups. In the absence of competition, a given
group should prefer the ruler to be very pessimistic about his cost. Under competition,
if the competing group is more likely to be included in a coalition when the ruler is more
optimistic about him, the group might actually prefer to reveal his private information. Thus,
as information is acquired it becomes more risky to play a non-supporting strategy. At the
same time, if the ruler wants to increase his probability of remaining in power, he will have to
make larger offers which, by the fact of being higher, are also less informative. The ruler has
to trade-off rents for risk and learning. The possibility of learning in this context introduces
interesting entrenchment and encroachment dynamics, absent in the models discussed above,
where outcomes are stationary.
The importance of the ratchet effect as a source of inefficiency has been highlighted in the
industrial organization literature, and its main results are well known (see for example Freixas
et al. (1985) and Laffont and Tirole (1988), or Choi and Thum (2003) for a more recent
application to corruption). Moreover, the strategic interaction between competition and the
ratchet effect also has been studied. In recent research on the subject, Charness et al. (2010)
argue that workers face ratchet effect incentives on the job, when managers raise performance
standards as they learn about worker productivity, leading to underprovision of effort in the
first place. They argue that competition between workers in the labor market can eliminate
the ratchet effect, and show experimental results consistent with this idea. To my knowledge,
the theoretical relationship between competition and the ratchet effect has not been explored
in the political economy literature.
The model I propose is intended to capture this strategic environment in the simplest and
more "institutions-free" possible way. Each period, a ruler faces two groups, each with private
information about their cost of providing political support, and needs the support of at least
one of them to remain in power until the next period. The ruler makes public sequential
offers, which are then accepted or rejected, and beliefs about the cost of political support
are updated rationally as a function of the informational content of the ruler's offers and
the support decisions of the potential coalition members. If the ruler does not achieve the
support of at least one group, he is ousted and a political transition takes place. The fact
that beliefs about the groups' cost types evolve over time as a function of players' actions
makes this not a repeated, but rather a dynamic game, where the state variable is the vector
of public beliefs. Equilibrium will require that posterior beliefs are consistent with players'
strategies.
The model delivers several predictions and suggests some non-trivial intuitions. In the first
place, in opposition to the regulation literature where the ratchet effect appears as a source
of inefficiency, in a political economy context it might actually be desirable, to the extent
that it is capable of limiting entrenchment and encroachment of incumbents. The overall
equilibrium dynamics of the model are strongly shaped by an informational commitment
problem faced by the ruler, which has both static and dynamic implications on his ability
to extract information. A naive intuition would suggest that a ruler with more optimistic
beliefs (a high probability that a given potential coalition member is low cost) should be able
to make more precise offers, and thus, be entrenched more easily. In contrast, when beliefs
are very optimismtic, the ruler is willing to make highly-informative offers and incur the risk
of being ousted, because the likelihood of a rejection will be low. But the sequential nature
of the offers implies that whomever is made a first offer, knowing the ruler will be tempted
to extract information from the competing group, will find the value of rejecting support to
be higher. As a result, the ruler will only be able to get the support of this group by making
a high and uninformative offer, which reduces encroachment. This is a commitment problem
for the ruler, because he would actually benefit if he could commit not to learn about the
second group's cost after a rejection by the first group. On the other hand, this commitment
problem has different static and dynamic implications. Although it implies that a ruler will
either have to forgo learning or risk being ousted, effectively leaving rents for the competing
groups, it also implies that the ruler will be able to extract information very effectively if in
the future he will face such a commitment problem, as the competing groups will be very
motivated to accept offers that subsequently make beliefs so optimistic that the ruler will
face the commitment problem.
For pessimistic enough beliefs, on the other hand, naive intuition would suggest little en-
trenchment, since the probability of rejection of an informative offer is large. Nevertheless,
in such case the ruler is unwilling to incur such high risk, and prefers to remain in power for
sure at the expense of information extraction. As a result, incumbents face no commitment
problem in this case, since the first group to be offered knows that following a rejection, the
ruler will credibly make a high enough offer to the competing group as to remain in power.
This will allow the ruler to exploit competition to extract a limited amount of information.
Pessimistic rulers, being more conservative, manage to remain in power but only at the ex-
pense of reduced encroachment. Thus, a prediction of the model is that power transitions
are more likely when public beliefs are more optimistic.
The model also suggests that competition cannot fully undermine the reluctance of competing
groups to reveal their private information. The reason is that the ruler is willing to make
offers to a high-cost group if this allows him to extract information from his opponent. As
a result, for low-cost groups the future value of being believed high-cost is high despite
competition. In turn, this implies that to be willing to reveal information in the present, a
low-cost group requires a sufficiently high transfer that even a high-cost group is ready to
accept, undermining the possibility of learning in the first place. This is, of course, close to
the "too much pooling result" from Laffont and Tirole (1988). In this context, it is the ability
to exploit competition to undermine the ratchet effect in the future what limits the ability
of the incumbent to do in the present.
The model also offers some insights about the question of which groups should be included
more often in ruling coalitions, and about the nature of coalitions themselves. For example,
the simple intuition that the "cheapest" groups should always be included over the "expensive"
ones proves to be wrong under some circumstances. In particular, when a ruler is unwilling to
incur any risk of getting ousted, including expensive groups first is an effective way to exploit
competition and force competing groups to reveal information. Supermajority coalitions
are thus possible in equilibrium, but the rationale for them is not as in Groseclose and
Snyder (1996), where non-minimum winning coalitions arise to make unilateral defections
unprofitable. The model suggests that we should see supermajority coalitions as information
extraction devices.
On the other hand, when a ruler is willing to incur some risk of being ousted, making initial
offers to the group over which he is more pessimistic, turns out to be optimal too. The
reason is that in case of a rejection by the first group being offered, facing a group which
is ex-ante more likely to accept is cheaper when the ruler has to offer pivotality rents; this
is, rents to compensate a group for not triggering a political transition. In fact, most of the
strategic interaction between the incumbent and the potential coalition members is driven
by the tension between what I call privotality rents and informational rents. These will
determine the relative cost of extracting information for the ruler, and the attractiveness
of revealing information fo the potential coalition members. Nevertheless, although it is
attractive to make first offers to the relatively "more expensive" groups, in equilibrium this
cannot be achieved for a large range of beliefs. The reason is an open set problem: if the
ruler makes high offers to the group that looks expensive, this gives current incentives to
the group looking less expensive to make support decisions such that in the future public
beliefs about itself are as close as possible, but slightly more pessimistic, than beliefs about
the competing politician.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark model's
environment and introduces notation. For comparative purposes and to make intuitions about
the different components of the model clear, the characterization of equilibrium behavior
begins in section 3, looking at a model under incomplete information but in the absence
of political competition. It shows the resilence of the ratchet effect, in that the incumbent
can learn only if he is willing to incur the risk of losing power. Section 4 then looks at the
model under political competition but with complete information. It shows that political
competition is a powerful tool allowing a ruler to fully entrench and encroach by playing the
different potential coalition members against each other. Section 5 subsequently develops the
full model and presents the main results of the paper, and section 6 makes some concluding
observations. The main proofs and mathematical derivations are left to the Appendices.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
Consider a discrete time, infinite-horizon, three player game. The set of players is {r, a, b},
representing the ruler and two potential coalition members which I will henceforth call politi-
cian a and politician b, respctively. Each politician is endowed with political power, meaning
the ruler needs the political support of at least one politician to remain in power onto the
next period. The ruler uses state resources, of which there is yi available, to pay for political
support, and is the residual claimant after paying for support. Every period the ruler pub-
licly announces a politician he will make a first offer ml, such that ml < P. This politician
must decide whether to support the ruler and take the transfer, or not to support him and
expect a political transition. I denote D' E S = {A, R} to be the observable Acceptance or
Rejection decision of politician i, and let ot E [0,1] be his chosen probability of acceptance.
After observing the decision of the first politician being offered, the ruler decides which offer
mt to make (if any) to the remaining politician, who must also decide whether to accept it or
reject it. If neither politician accepts, the ruler is ousted from office, and a payoff < is divided
among them1 . The assumption that offers are made sequentially has the purpose of abstract-
ing from any coordination issues, which would, of course, give rise to multiple equilibria,
and are not at the heart of the main mechanism the model intends to highlight. Moreover,
assuming the uninformed ruler is the one making the offers to the informed politician lim-
its the signaling incentives of politicians by restricting information transmission to depend
upon their acceptance or rejection decision exclusively. This limits the impact that specific
assumptions about beliefs following probability-zero events have on the set of equilibria (see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 404)).
There is heterogeneity in the cost of supplying political support; each politician i E I - {a, b}
has a privately known type 0' E = {O, 6}, which measures how dependent upon State
resources he is to mobilize political support. A politician type Qi requires at least 0' worth
of transfers from public resources to be able to mobilize his political base to support the
ruler. This is a dynamic incomplete-information game, where a state can be identified by
the current public beliefs about types, Q = (w", oj) E [0, 1]2. I define o as the posterior
probability that politician i is type 0. This is, the information of player i $' r at time t is
i =- Qt U {'}, while the ruler's information is just Qt. The state-space is thus [0, 1]2.
An (ex ante) public history hIt ({{D,rn i,=b, tk, Q} t, GQ) can be defined as the vector
of action profiles of all players up to time t, plus the sequence of states up to t. tt E I denotes
the identity of the politician to whom the first offer is made in period t. Let H' be the set
ic can be thought of as the present value of state resources left after the (possibly costly) power transition has taken place.
of possible time-t histories, and H = Ut'.OH' be the set of all possible histories. I define the
initial history as the prior at t = 0, H0 - Qo. A (possibly) mixed strategy for the ruler will
be a triple of mappings T : H -> [0, 1], m' : H -> [0, p], and m- t : H x S - [0, p] where
T(h) denotes the probability that the ruler makes the first offer to a after history h, mt (h)
denotes the offer to the politician being made a first offer, and mt(h, D) denotes the offer
to the politician being made a second offer, which might depend on the support decision
of the first offered politician. A (possibly) mixed stategy for politician i will be a mapping
ar : H x [0, p] x I x S x 0 -> [0,1], where ou(h, m', t, D'i;0) = Pr(D = Alh, m, t, D-';0)
denotes the probability that politician i type 9 accepts an offer m after public history h,
when the first politician being made an offer in the current period is t, and D' is i's support
decision (of course, if i t, the strategy does not depend on D-).
2.1.1 Timing and Definition of Equilibrium:
The specific timing of events is as follows:
1. The ruler chooses a politician (possibly with a mixed strategy T) to make a first offer
(label this politician pl E {a, b}), and the amount of such offer m.1.
2. If ml > 91, p1 decides whether to accept or reject (possibly with a mixed strategy) 91 , his
decision D1 E {A, R} is publicly observed, and the transfer is made.
3. Beliefs about p1 are updated according to Bayes' rule. The ruler decides the amount m 2
to offer to the remaining politician p2
4. If m 2 > 02, p 2 decides whether to accept or reject (possibly with a mixed strategy) ( 2 , his
decision D2 e {A. R} is publicly observed, and the transfer is made.
5. Beliefs about p2 are updated according to Bayes' rule.
6. If at least one politician accepts ((D', D2 ) C {(A, R), (R, A), (A, A)}), the ruler remains in
power onto the next period. If no politician accepts ((D', D2 ) = (R, R)), the ruler is ousted,
and a rent # is divided evenly among them.
The analysis will restrict attention to Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (MPBE) of the
game, where at any stage, strategies are dependent only upon the current state of the game
and possibly any actions taken during the stage game (i.e., only on payoff-relevant variables),
and beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. In this model, all previous
distributions of State rents ({m.}t), all previous decisions of politicians ({ok}, 10)all
previous beliefs about politicians' types ({Q}Q1), and all previous identities of the first
politician being offered ({tk- ) are irrelevant to current payoffs. The only payoff-relevant
variables are current beliefs, current offers, and current support decisions. Thus, a Markov
strategy for the ruler will be a triple of mappings T : [0, 1]2 -+ [0, 1], m. : [0, 1]2 -> R2
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and m- t : [0, 1]2 x {A, R} -+ R2 +. A Markov strategy for politician i will be a mapping
o& : [0, 1]2 x [0, p] x I x S X C - [0, 1]. More formally,
Definition. An equilibrium of this game consists of functions T(Q), mt (Q), m- t (Q, Dt ),
a(Qma, t, D; ), ob(Q,mb, t, D ; ), specifying the ruler's and politicians' actions under
any beliefs Q (the current state), such that neither has a profitable deviation at any (, and
beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule whenever possible, evolving according to equa-
tion (1). Off-the-equilibrium-path actions are assumed to be uninformative, this is, when
Bayes' rule cannot be applied, public beliefs are assumed to remain unchanged2 .
2.1.2 Learning, Beliefs and the state-space:
Beliefs are rationally updated according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. Equilibrium beliefs
evolve as a function of the observed decisions and equilibrium strategies of politicians, and
of the offer vector chosen by the ruler. To simplify notation, I will denote the low-cost and
high-cost type politicians' strategies by o- and 5 respectively, and will ommit the identity of
the first politician being offered from the arguments, unless it is unclear from the context.
By definition, politician i's strategy is the conditional probability of acceptance given his
type: Pr(AiIQ, m, Di, 6 ) - o"(Q, m, D-'). Hence, from Bayes' rule the transition kernel for
equilibrium beliefs can be expressed as a function of the politicians' strategies:
17i (Qm,Di )wf
wi 1(D'; Q,m) = (],m,D )wj+&(QmD-')1-o i
_1 o(DM im.)]o if D = R
As a remark, notice that offers over which both types of politician pool will leave beliefs
unchanged. As a result, if the ruler wants to make an informative offer (an offer that induces
some extent of separation), he has to make offers that are in principle risky, since they must
allow for a positive probability of being rejected. As noted above, the state-space of this
game is the set [0, 1]2, depicted below. As a convention, throughout the paper beliefs about
a will be plotted in the x-axis, and beliefs about b will be plotted in the y-axis. In Figure 1
below I have plotted a 45 degree line on the state-space. This is because the dynamics of the
game will depend closely on relative beliefs, this is, on which politician is deemed more likely
to be low cost at any point in time. Under beliefs Q below the 45 degree line, ," < o , so
politician a is deemed more likely to be low cost. Moreover, the Markov restriction implies
that, equilibrium strategies must be symmetric around the 45 degree line.
21 believe this is the most parsimonious assumption to make about off-path beliefs. since. as it will become clear below. for different
strategy profiles and beliefs. upwards or downwards incentive constraints might bind. As a result, other assumptions about off-path
believes might imply "punishments" for a given type tinder certain strategies and states but not tinder others.
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Figure 1: The State Space
m02
I proceed below with a general recursive characterization of the problem, which will be used
throughout the paper.
2.2 Analysis
2.2.1 The Ruler's problem:
Define W (Q) to be the ex-ante equilibrium value for an incumbent ruler under beliefs Q.
Define V'(Q, t) to be the interim equilibrium value for the ruler when the state is Q and he
decided to make a first offer to politician t, and v"(Q, D1 ) to be the interim equilibrium value
for the incumbent ruler after observing p1 's decision D'. At this stage the ruler must decide
which offer to make to p2 . The problem is
V'(n, Di)= p - m1J{D1=A} + MaXm2-M2Pr(D2 = AID, 7m2, n)
+oI{DI=A} Pr(D2 = jlA, n 2 , )Wr(!(j, M2 ; Q))+61{D1=R}Pr((D2  AIR, m2. ) Wr (n'(A, M2 :))
j -{ AR}
(2)
where of course Pr(D2 = AID, Q rm2) w 2 u 2 (n. m 2 , Di) + (1 - w2 )7 2 (n, M 2 , Di), and
Pr(D 2 = RID, Q, Mi2) W2 (I _ a 2(n m D1 )) + (1 - (1 _ g 2(n, m2 D1 )). Equation
(2) takes into account that the ruler looses power if p2 rejects after pl rejected. Of course,
Q =DQ'(D', m: Q) denotes interim posterior beliefs after p has made his decision. Here
I make explicit that the evolution of beliefs depends not only on the support decision of
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politicians, but also on the offer made and on prior beliefs. The interim value for the ruler
when making the first offer can be expressed recursively as
V'(Q, t) = maxl { -ml Pr(D1 = Alm', Q)
+6 Pr(D1 = jImI, Q)vr(Q'(j, mI; Q),j)} (3)
jE{AR}
with Pr(D1 = Alm', Q) = w'cr(m', Q) + (1 - w1)&(m 1 ,Q). Finally, the ex-ante value for
the ruler is given by
Wr(Q) = maxrE[o,1ITV'(Q, a) + (1 - T)V'(Q, b) (4)
Of course, this trivially implies that the ruler will chose T =1 if V'(Q, a) > V'(Q, b), T = 0
if Vr(Q, a) < Vr(Q, b). I will assume the ruler sets T = 1/2 if indifferent.
2.2.2 The Politician's Problem:
Define Vg(D', mi, Q) to be the interim value for politician i type 0 when the state is Q
(WaWb) and he is offered m. Of course, if i is offered first, his strategy does not depend on
D1 . The politician must decide a probability of accepting a given offer, by trading-off the
current payoff he might get, the informational consequences his decision might have on future
beliefs, the possibility of ousting the ruler, and the expected response from the competing
politician. If politician i accepts the offer today, he gets the current payoff n1 - 0W. and
there is no political transition. Otherwise he gets no rents in the present. The ruler might
be retained or not depending on the support decision of his competing politician ~ i. In
the latter case, if ~ i also rejects the offer, the ruler is ousted and each politician gets half
of an exogenous payoff from having the ruler ousted. It is also important to notice that i's
strategy is a function not only of his beliefs about politician ~i, but also of the public beliefs
about his own type. This is due to the competition among political entrepreneurs. A low
cost politician i benefits from diffuse public beliefs about his type, but to the extent that he
might look "expensive" relative to ~ i, such difuse beliefs about his own type might hurt.
Thus, optimal behavior should also take into account public information about one's own
type. Finally, the politician also must take into account that his current decision, through
the impact it will have on posterior beliefs, will affect the likelihood that he is offered first
or second in the future. The analysis will rely heavily on studying the incentive constraints
faced by politicians at any point in time, so here I state the most. general for that such an
incentive constraint will have. A type-0 politician a will be willing to accept a first offer ml
only if
mil - 0 + Pr(Db = AIA, n, m 2 )3Vfa (w"(A), ob(A)) + Pr(D = RIA, n, m 2 )V 0 (w"(A), wb(R))
Pr(D = AIR, n m2 ),V"(w"(R), wa(A)) + Pr(Db = RIR, n, m2)6-g (5)
2
where m 2 depends on interim beliefs Q and D'. Equation (5) above highlights that in a
IIPBE the support decision of a politician will depend on the ruler's subsequent offer, on
the supporting strategy of the competing politician, and on the evolution of public beliefs
following acceptance or rejection decisions. An analogous expression can be obtained for the
second politician to be offered, which I omit here to save on space.
3 No Competition under Incomplete Information
I begin by studying a simplified environment in the absence of political competition, which
helps to highlight the role that incomplete information alone plays in the entrenchment and
encroachment dynamics. Thus, assume for now there is a ruler r and only one other politician
p with private information about his cost type 0 E {0, 0}, q < 0 . There is a prior w about
p's type, where w is the probability that p is low-cost. The ruler needs the support of this
politician to remain in power unto the following period. If p does not support, the ruler is
ousted from power, and p takes his place as ruler. I assume in such case p gets an exogenous
payment # and the game ends.
Let a(w, m) be the probability that a low-cost type politician supports the ruler when public
beliefs are w and the ruler has offered him m, and J(w, m) be the corresponding probability
for a high-cost type. Given that = 0 and w 1 are absorbing states, I first start by
characterizing the equilibrium values for the ruler and the politician under each of them.
Throughout I will assume the discount factor is large3.
Proposition 1. Let # < , and assume w = 1 (it is common knowledge that the politician
is low-cost). The unique MPE takes following form: Every period, the ruler offers in
0 + 6(1 - 6)# to the politician, and the politician supports with probability 1.
3The results for the full model developed below will require that 6 > 0/0, so that the larger
the gains from information extraction, the larger the range of discount factors that will be
able to support the equilibria characterized in the paper.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.
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The equilibrium for w = 0 is of course identical to the above, replacing 0 for 6 everywhere.
The parameter restriction in Proposition 1 is the necessary and sufficient condition for the
ruler to prefer remaining in power than taking all state resources and being ousted when
w = 0. It sets an upper bound on # which depends non-trivially on the discount factor.
A higher 6 makes the ruler more willing to remain in power in the future, but also makes
the politician's value of ousting the ruler higher. I will maintain this parameter restriction
throughout. Notice that if we think of state resouces y as large relative to the cost of providing
political support, this restriction on discount factors is a weak one. The equilibrium values
for the ruler are W'(0) = ___ - 6# and W'(1) = _j - 6#, and the equilibrium values for
the politician are Vo(1) = V(0) = 6#.
Under complete information and no political competition, the dynamics are straightforward.
The ruler is willing to remain in power, and he offers a transfer to the politician just high
enough to make him willing to support every period. This transfer consists of the politician's
type, plus a pivotality rent that compensates him for not triggering a political transition.
The ruler remains in power with probability 1, so he is fully entrenched, but his encroachment
is limited by the pivotal power of the supporter. To characterize the equilibrium for interior
W, I make use of the following key result which will be used throughout the paper.
Lemma 2. The politician's equilibrium strategies must be decreasing in type: J(m, w) <
c(m, w). Moreover, a(m, w) c (0, 1) implies 0(m, w) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
F1
The intuition for Lemma 2 is straightforward. In equilibrium, any given offer that a high-cost
politician can accept, must also be feasible for a low-cost politician, and must leave him a
strictly larger surplus. Thus, if the incentive constraint for acceptance is satisfied for the
high-cost type, it must be slack for the low-cost type. The Lemma provides an even stronger
result; if a low-cost politician is mixing, the high-cost politician must be rejecting. The reason
is that for the low-cost politician to mix, he must be exactly indifferent between acceptance
and rejection, which means his incentive constraint will be binding. If the low-cost type's
incentive constraint is binding for a given offer n, the high-cost type's incentive constraint
for must not be satisfied. Lemma 2 restricts the possible types of continuation equilibria
(after the ruler has made an offer m), which must take one of the following forms:
1. Pooling on rejection (PR): u(m, w) = w(m, ) = 0.
2. Low-cost type semi-separating(LSS): c(m, w) e (0, 1) and 6(m, w) = 0. Such an
equilibrium implies posterior beliefs must be w(A) = 1, w(R) < w.
3. Separating(S): a(m, w) = 1, -(m, w) = 0. Such an equilibrium implies posterior beliefs
must be w(A) = 1, w(R) = 0.
4. Pooling on acceptance(PA): a(m, w) = U(m, w) = 1. Such an equilibrium implies
posterior beliefs must be w(A) = w(R) = w.
5. High-cost semi-separating(HSS): u(m, w) = 1, U(m, w) C (0, 1). Such an equilibrium
implies posterior beliefs must be w(A) > w, w(R) = 0.
The nature of belief updating implied by rationality together with the fact that politician's
strategies are decreasing in type, and moreover, that a mixing strategy for a low-cost type im-
plies a high-cost type must be rejecting, imposes strong restrictions on the possible evolution
of beliefs in a Bayesian equilibrium and on the possible continuation equilibria of the game.
Figure 2 graphically depicts the possible continuation equilibria (these results are proven in
Lemmas Al-1, A1-2, A1-3 and A1-4 in Appendix 1). Both types pool on acceptance when
the offer is m, > 0 + 6(1 - 6)#, high-cost types reject any offer below 0, and low-cost types
reject any offer below 0. For offers m C [0,0+ 6(1 - 6)#), both types of politician must pool
on rejecting. Finally, for offers n [q + 6(1 - 6)#, # + 6(1 - 6)#), types fully separate, so
that a low-cost politician accepts with probability 1, while a high-cost politician rejects.
Figure 2: Continuation equilibria under no competition
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In an environment without politicial competition, a ruler who requires the acquiesence of a
politician to remain in power, and who has the possibility of extracting information about his
cost of providing support. has three options; he might make a high enough offer which both
low and high cost politicians accept (but which will not allow him to learn about his type),
he might make a low offer which both politicians reject and which triggers a power transition,
or he might make an intermediate offer which separates the behavior of low and high-cost
politicians (but which implies there will be a positive probability that he is ousted from
power). The value of the latter strategy depends on what the beliefs about the politician's
type are, and will play a central role for the equilibrium dynamics. More pessimistic beleifs
imply a higher likelihood that a given separating offer will be rejected. For # < (_3) we
already know that the ruler prefers making a large offer and forgo learning over being ousted
from power for sure. It remains to study the range of beliefs for which he might be willing
to incur risk of a power transition, hoping to learn he faces a low-cost politician.
First, observe that for any offer m E [0 + 6(1 - 6)#, 0 + 6(1 - 6)#) the low-cost politician
supports with probability 1 while the high-cost politician rejects with probability 1. Thus,
if the ruler wants to induce separation he will always offer m 0 + 6(1 - 6)#. The value of
pursuing this strategy under belief w is
W'(W) = p - W[# + 6(1 - 6)#] + oW'(1) = p [ + - - (6)
which is a linear and increasing function of w. The value of pursuing the safe no-learning
strategy is just Wr(0), which implies the ruler prefers to incur positive risk of being ousted
iff p + W 6- 0 - 3# > /- - 6#. Solving for w,
op- - 6 - 6(1 - 6)#
> --60 D(6) E (0, 1) (7)
The cutoff value of beliefs at which the ruler starts incurring risk is an increasing function of
6 as long as o >i( ). If # < [, the cuttof is increasing in 3 for any 6. As the ruler becomes
more patient, the region of beliefs where he cannot learn widens, because it becomes more
costly to incur the risk of not being the ruler in the future. Nonetheless, if # > p. there is a
region of small values of 3 for which higher discount factors can reduce the cuttof. The reason
is that when # is large it is too attractive for a politician to trigger a power transition. As 3
increases starting from a low level, the ousting option value for the politician also increases,
making the value of learning for the ruler increase, and thus making him more willing to
incur risk. Also, observe that the value for either type of politician is Vo(W) = 3#. Having
characterized the continuation equilibria for given offer m, the following proposition follows:
Proposition 3. Let w E (0, 1). The unique MPBE takes following form: For w < c(6) the
ruler makes an offer n. - 0 + 6(1 - 6)# which both types of politician accept with probability
4 Notice that the assumption 6p - 0 > 6(1 - 6)6 implies the term in square brackets is positive
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1. For w > cD(6) the ruler makes a separating offer m = 0 + J(1 - 6)#, which a low-cost
politician accepts with probability 1 and a high-cost politician rejects with probability 1.
Proof. See Lemma 2 above and Appendix 1.
Figure 3 below presents the equilibrium value function for the ruler. It illustrates the ratchet-
effect dynamics of the no-competition game. For a large range of beliefs, the ruler is unable
to extract any information, and is only capable of doing so at the expense of incurring the
risk of losing power with positive probability. Observe that in the pooling region (W < w)
the ruler is offering m = 0 + 6(1 - 6)# and there is no learning, so that a both types are
receiving a pivotality rent equal to 6(1- 6), to compensate them for not triggering a political
transition, while the low-cost type is also receiving an informational rent worth 0 - 0. In the
separating region, the low-cost politician loses the ability to extract an informational rent,
but only because the ruler is willing to put at stake his permanence in power. A pessimistic
enough ruler will not be able to undermine the ratchet effect, while in the learning region
he is ousted with probability 1 - w. Interestingly, a power transition only happens for high
values of w, this is, when the ruler is relatively optimistic about the politician's type.
Figure 3: Ruler's Equilibrium Value under no competition
Wr(w,)
4 Competition under Complete Information
Now I look at an environment with political competition in the coalition formation game,
but where politicians' types are common knowledge. In this context. trivially the ruler fully
takes advantage of the competitive nature of the game to take politicians down to their
participation constraints. Hence, encroachment and entrenchment are complete. Because
the complete information game is subsumed in the incomplete information game for Q E
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, and revelation of types will take beliefs to one of these states
(which are absorbing), I start by characterizing the MPE under them.
Proposition 4. The complete information game when Q = (1, 1) has a unique MPE of the
following form: Every period the ruler picks one politician at random (p') to make him a
first offer ml = 0, which p1 accepts. Then the ruler makes no second offer to the remaining
politician p2 . Off-the equilibrium path if p1 rejects, the ruler makes a second offer m2 = 0+16#
to p2 which p2 accepts (the complete formal description of equilibrium strategies can be found
in Appendix 2).
Of course, the unique equilibrium for Q = (0, 0) is identical just replacing 0 for 0 above.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
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The ruler is completely entrenched (remains in power with probability 1) and fully encroached
(leaves no rents in any period on the equilibrium path). Proposition 4 highlights that the
ruler's ability to make an offer which leaves no positive rents to any of his supporters relies
on the fact that he can credibly threaten the first politician he makes an offer to, that after
a rejection decision, an offer will be made to the remaining politician, which he will accept
for sure. Thus, although the equilibrium coallition is minimum winning, pl is not pivotal in
equilibrium; the threat of competition makes his pivotality worthless. The equilibrium value
for the ruler is W"7((1, 1)) = , and for both politicians it is V4((1, 1)) = Vb((1, 1)) = 0.
Under Q (0,0) the value for the ruler is Wr((0, 0)) = and for both politicians it is
V0 ((0, 0)) Vb ((0, 0)) = 0. Of course, the ruler does strictly better when facing two low-
cost, instead of two high-cost politicians. Now I look at the equilibrium under assymetric
types:
Proposition 5. The complete information game when Q = (0, 1) has a unique MPE of the
following form: Every period, the ruler makes a first offer m1 = 0 to b (the politician whose
cost is known to be low), which b accepts. Then the ruler makes no second offer to a (the
politician whose cost is known to be high). Off-the-equilibrium-path if b rejects, the ruler
makes a second offer m.2  0+ 16# to a which a accepts.
Of course, the unique equilibrium for Q = (1,0) is identical just changing a for b above.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
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The ruler is completely entrenched and fully encroached on the equilibrium path. Again, the
ability to make a minimum winning coalition which drives the included politician down to
his cost relies on the ruler's ability to credibly threaten making an acceptable offer to the
competing politician in case the politician who is offered first does not accept. The credibility
of this threat is based on the fact that types are common knowledge. For the ruler, political
competition is a much better environment compared to the situation without political com-
petition and complete information. Recall that when facing a high-cost politician, the ruler
had to offer m = 0 + 6(1 - 6)# > . Compared to the no-competition case, here competition
makes both politicians effectively non-pivotal, and the ruler never has to give pivotality rents.
The second politician being offered is not pivotal because the first one has already accepted,
and the first politician is not pivotal either because he knows that after rejecting, the second
politician to be offered will accept for sure. Key for the ability of the ruler to make the first
politician offered non-pivotal is, thus, the belief that he can effectively make a second offer
that will be accepted for sure after a rejection.
The equilibrium value for the ruler is W'((0,1)) - , and for both politicians it is
Va((0, 1)) = Vb((0, 1)) = 0. Of course, the equilibrium is symmetric for Q = (1, 0). The
results of Propositions 4 and 5 show that the ruler is actually indifferent between states
Q (0, 1), Q = (1, 0), and Q = (1, 1), whereas lie strictly prefers any of those states to state
Q (0, 0).
5 Competition under Incomplete Information
5.1 One low-cost Politician
Now I proceed to study the coalition-formation game under both competition and incomplete
information. In the complete-information game analysis of section 4, the equilibrium value for
the ruler at Q = (1, 0) and at = (1, 1) was the same, namely W ((1, 0)) =1W7((1 1)) = _-
The ruler does as well when he knows both politicians are low-cost than when he knows
one of them is low-cost and the other is high-cost. Given that the ruler only needs the
support of one other politician to remain in power, does this imply that for any beliefs
Q E {(1, w) : w c (0, 1)}, where the ruler knows one of the politicians is low-cost, his value
is independent of beliefs about the competing politician? The analysis of section 3 already
suggests this will not be the case, because encroachment incentives create a commitment
problem for the ruler. Given beliefs w about b (the politician whose type is not common
knowledge), a ruler would benefit from being capable of conimiting to learn nothing about b
with a pooling offer after a has rejected. just as it happens when types are common knowledge.
In that setting, a knows that off path after a rejection, the ruler will credibly make an offer
to b high enough that b will accept with probability 1. But when beliefs about b's type are
interior, after a has rejected the ruler might still want to make a low enough, separating offer
to b that is informationally valuable. The incentives to pursue this strategy will depend on
how large informational rents are relative to pivotality rents. This possibility would actually
give a incentives to reject, in the hope that b is a high-cost type who will reject the offer
made by the ruler (or even a low-cost type who is not accepting with probability 1).
The ruler's temptation for infomation extraction forllowing a rejection gives a an option value
of rejecting, making him, in equilibrium, more expensive. The no-competition game already
illustrated that for high values of w the ruler will indeed be willing to incur in equilibrium
risk of being ousted from power. Of course, such a lack of commitment capacity by the ruler,
by making a's outside value higher, implies that the ruler's value need not be the same at
Q = (1, w) than at Q = (1, 0) or Q = (1, 1). Indeed, the ruler's equilibrium value will fall
discretely at the value of beliefs where the commitment problem arises.
The inability to commit will only be binding for large enough values of w, where it is likely
enough that b is a low-cost politician. As a result, the ruler will find it attractive to induce
a non-pooling equilibrium through a relatively low offer, just as in the no-competition case.
This cutoff will be given by the value of beliefs for which, at the interim stage following a
rejection, the ruler is indifferent between making a pooling offer and the one-shot deviation
consiting of a separating offer to the remaining politician:
p-0 1 - 1 -
Vr(QSeparate = + Wd - - 6 ____+ Q)Po
1-6 2 2 1-
_ o~ - 6 - ( -6)0 - 6(1 - 6) j#
S= E(0, 1) (8)6(p1 - ) -(1 -6)0 - 6(1 - 6)j#
At the interim stage following a rejection, a separating offer is accepted with probability
w, in which case the ruler learns he is facing a low-cost type and gets fully entrenched and
encroached. It is rejected with the complementary probability, in which case the ruler is
ousted. On the other hand, by making a pooling offer the ruler forgoes any learning. This
lack of commitment is purely driven by encroachment incentives, because a non-pooling offer
is attractive only because it implies a lower transfer has to be made in the event that b
accepts. Throughout I will focus on the equilibrium dynamics for large 3. This is the case
for which the ratchet effect is more likely to limit entrenchment, given that for low discount
factors politicians are trivially willing to reveal their type for any current positive transfer.
Notice that D is lower the larger is 0 relative to 0, so that when the value of learning is very
high, the range of beliefs for which the ruler faces a commitment problem widens. Proposition
6 below states the MPBE (I will also assume that for any two strategies giving the same ex-
ante expected payoff to the ruler, one which has no learning and one which has learning on
the equilibrium path, the ruler will choose the one with learning).
Proposition 6. Assume Q E {(Wa ) W a ..) : E (0, 1)}. The MPBE can be characterized
as follows. For w < a the ruler makes a first offer m1 = 0 to a (the politician whose type is
known to be low) which a accepts, and then the ruler makes no second offer to b (the politician
whose type is not common knowledge). Off-the-equilibrium-path if a rejects, the ruler makes
a pooling second offer m 2 =0 ± 6 to b, which both types of b accept. For w > D the ruler
makes a first separating offer m' = 6 to b which a low-cost b accepts with probability 1 and a
high-cost b rejects with probability 1. After a support decision is observed the ruler makes no
offer to a, and if a rejection decision is observed the ruler makes a second offer m 2  0+ 16#
to a, which a accepts. The cutoff value D is given by D =
6(p-q)- (1 2) 61 6
Of course, the equilibrium is symmetric for Q E {( Wb) Wb 1 a E (0, 1)}.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Figure 3 below depicts the dynamics implied by proposition 6 for states Q (1, w) or
Q = (w, 1).
Figure 3: Equilibrium Dynamics at Q (1, w) and Q = (w, 1) boundaries:
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The ruler's ability of threatening with inducing b to pool off-the-equilibrium path undermines
any incentives for a not to support the ruler in the first place. Nevertheless, recall from
section 3 that when facing one politician (analogous to the off-path subgaine after which a
has rejected), the ruler might have incentives to test a politician whose type is not known,
when beliefs are sufficiently high. If off the equilibrium path the ruler cannot commit to
induce a pooling equilibrium, his ability to drive a down to his cost will be undermined. In
this sense, having sure information, even if it is negative (as knowing that b is high-cost) is
better for the ruler than having uncertain information (as believing that b is low cost with
high probability), because uncertain information creates a commitment problem.
For relatively low values of w there is no commitment problem. When deciding which politi-
cian to make a first offer when one of them is known to be low-cost, the choice is unam-
biguously clear; by making an offer to the known-type politician the ruler is able to buy his
support with an offer of only his (low) cost. Moreover, he does not need to give any rents
because the credible threat of a pooling offer to his competitor after a rejection, makes re-
jecting worthless. In contrast, making an offer first to the imperfectly known-type politician
either requires a high offer on which both types pool, or a low offer which a high-cost politi-
cian rejects. This makes the known-cost-type politician pivotal on the equilibrium path, and
hence requires a larger transfer to achieve his support. As long as the ruler can commit to
offering a pooling transfer after a rejection, it is always strictly better to make a first offer to
the low-cost known-type politician.
For high enough w the ruler loses his ability to commit not to learn. He can still make first
an offer to the known low-cost type politician which includes an off-path pivotality rent,
or he can first make a separating offer to the unknown type politician, and only after a
rejection, make an offer to the known-cost type politician to gather his support for sure. It
turns out these two strategies are payoff equivalent to the ruler. The assumption that the
ruler prefers learning when indifferent implies he induces separation. Finally observe that
for this set of beliefs there is never, on or off the equilibrium path, a supermajority coalition
(a situation where both a and b support). This is because in the range for which the ruler
has no commitment problem the ruler can achieve the maximum payoff without having to
learn b's type. For the range where he faces a commitment problem separation obtains, but
after a type-revealing support decision by b, there is no value in including a in the coalition.
The ruler is already sure he will remain in power, and more importantly, a's type is already
known.
The ruler's equilibrium expected value is constant for w E [0,0), falls discretely at W, and
then increases linearly with beliefs. For w > D the known-cost politician a has a strictly
positive value V, (1, w) = (1 - # because with probability 1 - w b will be high-cost, in
which case the separating offer will be rejected. The ruler will have to give rents to a with
positive probability to remain in power.
5.2 One high-cost politician
The strategic environment both for the ruler and the politicians changes significantly when
it is common knowledge that one of them is high-cost. Even if the ruler can credibly commit
to make a pooling offer after a rejection by the known-cost politician, gainning his support
requires a high offer of 0, and this is only if the ruler is sure he would not be tempted to try
to learn after a rejection. Facing a high-cost politician makes the commitment problem for
the ruler worse, because the value of having the opponent politician reveal his type is higher.
If after the known-cost politician has supported the ruler does not want to make an offer to
the politician whose type is imperfectly known, then there is no learning just as in section
5.1. Now consider the alternative strategy in which the ruler makes first a pooling offer
to the imperfectly-known-type politician. This offer is accepted with probability 1 and the
ruler does not learn, just as when offering to the known-type politician first. And by leaving
a known-cost politician to be offered second, the ruler is implicitly commiting to make an
offer which is accepted for sure in the event the imperfectly-known type of politician were
to reject, so that no pivotality rents are required to achieve pooling by the politician whose
type is not known in the first place. Now it is the politician with private information the
one who "looks cheaper". The analysis above implies that if after the acceptance of an offer
by a known-to-be high-cost politician the ruler would not want to make an offer to the other
politician (whose type is unknown), such a strategy can never do better for the ruler than
the strategy of making first a pooling offer to the unknown-type politician.
Proposition 7. Assume Q E {(a, Wb) Wa E (0, 1), wb = 0}. The MPBE can be characterized
as follows: For oa < CD the ruler makes a first offer nm  = to b (the- politician whose
type is known to be high cost), which b accepts with probability 1 on the equilibrium path.
Then the ruler makes a low-type-semi separating (LSS) second offer m2  0  to a, which
a high-cost a rejects and a low-cost a accepts with interior probability. Off-the-equilibrium
path if b rejects, the ruler makes a pooling second offer m2 = + 1o0 to a which both types
of a accept. For oa > cL' the ruler makes a low-type semi separating first offer in = 0 to
a, which a high-cost type rejects and a low-cost type accepts with interior probability. After
an acceptance decision is observed the ruler makes no second offer to b, and if a rejection
decision is observed the ruler makes a second offer m 2 = 0 + ' to b, which b accepts. The
cutoff value c satisfies c E -1 2 4<z). Of course. the equilibrium is symmetric
for E {(wab) Wb E (0, 1), a = 0}.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
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The dynamics under beliefs (w, 1) implied by Proposition 6 are quite different to those implied
by Proposition 7 under beliefs (w, 0). Although along the equilibrium path the ruler remains
in power under both kinds of beliefs, in the former case there is either no learning at all, or
full learning in the first period (because the ruler makes a separating offer when W is large).
Under a state (w,0), if the unknown-type politician is high-cost, beliefs will gradually fall, but
only asymptotically will reach 0. If he is low-cost, beliefs might fall for some finite time but
eventually the politician's type will be revealed. The ruler will be "stubbornly" making a low
offer to extract information, even for arbitrarily pessimistic beliefs (as long as the discount
factor is large enough). Although the value of beliefs will not change the ruler's willingness
to test the unknown-type politician, it will determine the identity of the politician being
made a first offer. Equilibrium supermajority coalitions can arise for exactly one period, for
relatively pessimistic beliefs.
Figure 4 below depicts the dynamics for states Q = (w, 0) or Q (0, w).
Figure 4: Equilibrium Dynamics at Q = (0, w) and Q (w. 0) boundaries:
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The intuition driving these dynamics highlights the trade-offs introduced by the strategic
interaction between information extraction incentives and the threat of competition. With
this purpose I will introduce some notation. Because the problem for the ruler is to choose a
politician to make a first offer, and to chose the type of offer to the politician whose type is
imperfectly known (the offer to a known-type politician is either 0 or such that he accepts it
for sure), the strategy profiles can be written in the form y = (t, Q), where t is the politician
who is offered first, and Q E {PR, LSS, S, HSS, PA} is the type of offer to the unknown-
type politician. For illustrative purpose, assume a is the politician whose type is imperfectly
known. Compare strategies (a., Q) with strategies (b, Q). Under (a, Q) (when a is made a
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first offer), no matter beliefs, a knows he cannot be pivotal, because if he rejects, the ruler
will always be able to make an offer to b which is accepted, because b's type is common
knowledge. Also observe that if a is made the first offer, there will not be a supermajority
coalition in equilibrium. This is because if a supports, the ruler will remain in power, and
there is no incentive to make an offer to b given that his type is known. If a rejects, of course
an offer to b will be made, but then the equilibrium coalition will only have b in it. The cost
of making a the first offer, on the other hand, is that if a rejects it, then b becomes pivotal
and the ruler will have to make him a large offer to dissuade him from triggering a power
transition.
Compare this to a strategy (b, Q) (where the first offer is made to b). After b has accepted,
the ruler might still want to make an offer to a, hoping to make a reveal his type. This can be
done cheaply because b has already accepted, so a is not pivotal. As a result, a supermajority
coalition is possible. Of course, this has a cost because with positive probability the ruler
will have given rents to two politicians despite requiring the support of only one to remain in
power, but is potentially valuable if it achieves information extraction. On the other hand, a
strategy which makes a first offer to b is also prone to creating a commitment problem for the
ruler (which does not arise if a is offered first), for exactly the same reason the commitment
problem arises when the known-type politician is low cost: If beliefs are optimistic enough,
the ruler will be tempted, even off-path after a rejection by b, to make an informationally
valuable offer to a. Knowing this, b will only be willing to support in the first place if given
a pivotality rent.
The ruler has two possible no-learning strategies: (b, PR) and (a, PA) under which beliefs
are absorbing5 . In the former the ruler first makes an offer to b that b accepts, and then
makes no offer to a on the equilibrium path. In the latter the ruler first makes a pooling
offer to a that both types of a accept, and then makes no offer to b on the equilibrium path.
Why the ruler might choose one over the other will depend on the behavior than can be
sustained off-the-equilibrium path. Especifically, (a, PA) is a "commitment" strategy. By
leaving the known-cost type politician b to be offered last, the ruler is commiting to making
an offer which will be accepted for sure in case a rejects, no matter what beliefs might be.
This makes a not-pivotal, and allows making the lowest possible pooling offer to a in the first
place. The cost of following this strategy is, of course, that the ruler cannot learn a's type.
As noted Appendix 3, under (a, PA) the ruler would offer n = 0 every period to a, which
both types of a accept with probability 1. The value for the ruler is W1 ()=- .bot tIpe of aa acetwt rbblty1 h au o h ues PA) (Q)
Just as under beliefs of the form Q = (1, w), if the ruler pursues the strategy (b, PR) he will
face a commitment problem for large values of w. Off-the-equilibrium-path after a rejection
by b, the ruler has incentives to make an offer that reveals some information about a's type,
5 The strategv (a. PR) is of course dominated by the strategy (b, PR).
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but which also implies the possibility of a power transition, increasing the ex-ante value of
rejection for b. This strategy is too risky for small values of w, in which case the ruler prefers
to make a pooling offer off-path. Under such range of beliefs strategies (b, PR) and (a, PA)
are payoff-equivalent. For large enough w, buying the support of b will require an offer larger
than 0, so the ruler would do strictly better by making first a pooling offer to a. The ruler
can never do better by using a (b, PR) strategy over a (a, PA) strategy.
Why would the ruler ever want to follow a strategy under which the first offer is made to
b? Assume that beliefs are low enough that off-path after a rejection by b, the ruler will
make a pooling offer to a. Then, on the equilibrium path the ruler can try to learn a's type
cheaply, by making a low offer to a, after b has supported (a strategy of the form (b, Q) with
Q $ PA). Forging a supermajority coalition becomes an information extraction instrument.
Commitment makes b not pivotal, and once b has accepted, a is not pivotal either, so both
politicians will be willing to accept offers equal to their cost. When the ruler can commit to
pool off the equilibrium path, this strategy can deliver a higher value for the ruler than a
strategy in which he first makes an informationally valuable offer to a, because an offer which
has the potential to extract information must also imply a positive probability of rejection,
which will make b pivotal on the equilibrium path. The ruler will then have to make a high
offer to b to remain in power.
The proof of Proposition 7 (see Appendix 3) starts by showing that a strategy (b, PA) cannot
be part of an equilibrium: If it is optimal for the ruler to make a first offer to b, it is never
profitable to then induce pooling in support by a. Because a first offer to b requires that
the offer be accepted for sure, the ruler is already guaranteed to remain in power, while the
subsequent offer to a is informationally worthless and requires a positive transfer.
Then it states that on the equilibrium path full separation is infeasible when the competing
politician is known to be high-cost (for large enough 6) (See Appendix 3). The reason is that
under a separating equilibrium it is very attractive for a low-cost politician to reject and be
believed to be high-cost, because from then on he will get an informational rent 0 - 0 half
of the time. As a result, inducing separation requires making a very high offer, but such an
offer makes the high-cost politician to also want to accept. The upwards incentive constraint
cannot be satisfied. To see this, observe that a separating offer must satisfy the following
incentive constraint for a low-cost type:
M- + 6Va ((1, 0)) ;> 6Va ((0, 0)) (9)
which follows because if a low-cost a accepts, he reveals he is low cost, and beliefs are driven
to Q = (1,0), where his value is zero. If instead he rejects, in a separating equilibrium he
will be believed to be high-cost, and beliefs are driven to Q = (0, 0). The low-cost politician
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will then collect an informational rent half of the time, so Voa((0, 0)) = Thus, an offer
that satisfies the low-cost incentive constraint must be at least m = 0 + 61 . Now look at
the incentive constraint for a high-cost politician under a separating equilibrium:
6V"((O, 0)) > m2 -- +Va"((1, 0)) (10)
which follows because a high-cost type should prefer to reject. The value for a high-cost
politician is zero at Q = (0, 0) and at Q = (1, 0), so that he will be willing to reject the
minimum offer that satisfies the low-cost incentive constraint iff 0 + o- - < 0, which
requires 6 < 2/3. Thus, for a high 6 separation is infeasible. Notice that the infeasibility of
separation in the current period is due to the very effective way in which the ruler can exploit
competition in the future, once types have been revealed, effectively making the future under
revelation to look bleak for a high-cost type.
Compare this situation to the one where the politician whose type is known happens to
be low-cost. Separation was feasible then because a low-cost politician had little incentive
to reject and be believed to be high cost, since he would be facing a low-cost politician
and would get excluded from any coalition in the future. Being believed to be expensive
is attractive only when the competing politician is expensive too, but in equilibrium this
restricts the ability of the ruler to induce full separation. Conversly, the ruler has a harder
time undermining the ratchet effect when a politician is known to be high cost.
The next step shows that a HSS offer cannot be part of an equilibrium path. To show this
I argue that transitioning from a LSS strategy to a HSS strategy is infeasible because the
continuation value for a low-cost politician would be too high not to make him support with
probability 1. Thus, HSS offers can only follow HSS offers. Then I show it is as costly
to induce HSS than to induce PS, but under HSS the ruler also faces the risk of having
to give pivotality rents. The intuition is that an offer that induces HSS is very costly to
implement, and at the same time is not very attractive because it is likely to reveal negative
information (after a rejection posterior beliefs must be o(R) = 0).
Finally I show that the ruler prefers to induce LSS over a no learning pooling strategy, even
as beliefs become arbitrarily pessimistic (very likely that the politician is high-cost). The
reason why as w -- 0 the ruler never prefers to stop testing a is that although by making a
LSS offer the ruler might incur the cost of a supermajority coalition, as w falls, the likelihood
of actually having to make the transfer also falls as fast, so the expected payment falls as fast
as the expected gain from achieving revelation. This predicts that even as a ruler becomes
more and more pessimistic over time, he will stubbornly keep testing the politician with
private information. To see this, observe that the ruler's value of pursing a LSS strategy is
given by
W'(Q)|LSS = [ - 0 ± w a6oW'(1, 0) - +] ± (1 - og")6Wr((w"(R), 0)) (11)
while [ is the ruler's value under a pooling offer. Equation (11) follows from the fact that
with probabilitywa" the LSS offer will be accepted, revealing that a is low-cost, and driving
posterior beliefs to Q = (1, 0), while with probability 1 - oga the offer will be rejected,
driving posterior beliefs about a down. While Wr(1, 0) = Wr((wa(R), 0)) > 1- so that
WT(Q)ILSS > " for large enough 6, for any interior mixing strategy oa.
The decision of making a first offer to b for a range of low values of w, but a first offer to a for
high values of w, is driven by when the commitment problem becomes binding. For small W
it is very risky to make a separating offer off the path because it is unlikely the politician will
be low-cost, and the ruler might get ousted with high probability. Thus, when W is small the
ruler can credibly threat a pooling offer in case b rejects, making both politicians non-pivotal
in equilibrium. For large values of w the ruler cannot commit not to make a separating offer
after b has rejected, but he can instead make his first offer to a, implicitly commiting to
remain in power, although at the cost of having to give pivotality rents to b with positive
probability.
5.2.1 Constant Mixing Strategy
Recall from Proposition 7 and our discussion above, that equilibrium behavior at beliefs
Q E {(w, 0), (0, w)}, prescribe the politician with private information to be made LSS offers
of exactly m.(Q) = 0 for any w, where a low-cost type accepts with probability o, and a high-
cost type always rejects. We did not have to specify the mixing probability of the low-cost
type to characterize equilibrium behavior; any interior mixing probability is consistent with
the ruler always wanting to induce LSS behavior. Interestingly, this leaway in specifying
the speed with which a low type will reveal his type over time is a result of the nature of
the strategic interaction: The ruler's ability to exploit competition to undermine the ratchet
effect incentives of the politician with private information implies that the value of both types
of politician is driven down to zero. At the same time, for any interior mixing probability
(which bayesian equilibrium requires to be correctly forecasted by all players), the competing
politician will always strictly prefer to accept the equilibrium offer, so that the equilibrium
strategy can be sustained for any probability of acceptance by the low-cost type.
The specific mixing probability by a low-cost politician will determine the cutoff value J^', and
the equilibrium value for the ruler. A constant mixing probability allows a straigthforward
analytic derivation of the players' equilibrium values. Appendix 3 derives the equilibrium
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cutoff vaue for o(0, Q) = 1/2, which takes the following value:
6(p- - 0) - (1 - 6)0 - 6(1 - 6) j
__= (12)6(p -0) -(1 -6)0 -6(1 -6)1# -0 2
Moreover, for w < c, the ruler's equilibrium value is given by
pF - 0  w '____-__Wr((Ow)) = + ~--J (13)
1-6 2 -6 1- -
Equation (13) intuitively shows that when the ruler can credibly make a pooling offer follow-
ing a rejection, his equilibrium value is increasing in his optimism about the politician with
private information. The higher the beliefs, the more likely he will be able to avoid giving
informational rents in the future.
5.3 Both Politicians' costs imperfectly known
I now turn to the the characterization of equilbrium behavior for the more general case in
which both politicians' types are private information. A first key difference relative to when
one of the politicians' type is common knowledge, is that in such case the ruler can always
make an offer that will be accepted for sure, precisely to the politician whose type is known.
This allowed me to refer to strategy profiles simply with the identity of the first politician
being offered, and the type of offer made to the imperfectly-known cost type politician (the
offer to the known-cost type politician, and any off-the-equilibrium path offers, would follow
trivially). When both politicians' types are imperfectly known, the description of a strategy
profile will require specifying the identity of the politician being offered first, the type of first
offer, and the type of offers for the politician offered last, both after acceptance and rejection
decisions are observed. Thus I will refer to strategy profiles in the form ' (t, Qt, Qi, QR),
where the first element denotes the identity of the first politician being made an offer, the
second element denotes the type of offer to politician t, and the third and fourth elements
denote the type of offers to politician ~ t, after an acceptance and after a rejection decision
by t, respectively. Again, Q E {PR, LSS, S, HSS, P4}.
Proposition 8 below states the main result of the paper, and Figure 5 depicts it graphically.
Proposition 8. Assume Q C (0, 1) x (0, 1). There exists a MPBE of the following form: For
Q E {(wa ,o) . wa J'6 <;Q}, :y = (a, HSS, LSS, PA). ForQ E {(wQ : .a > bwb
Wb K (W (a)}, y = (a, PS, PR, PS). For Q E {(wa, Wb) : Wa > Wb.Wb > C(_a)},
(b. S, S, PR). Symmetrically, for Q e {(wa. Wb) : ,,a <Wb a <} = (b, HSS, LSS, PA).
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For Q C {(w",w) W a < ba - 1(b} = (bPSPR,PS). For Q E
{(W, aWb) W "< oba > 1 (Wb)}, y = (a, S, S, PR).
,(a) is given by equation (14).
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Figure 5: Equilibrium Dynamics at Q = (wa, b)
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Key for the characterization of equilibrium for interior beliefs is the optimal behavior of the
ruler at the interim stage after t's action has been realized. Because full revelation takes beliefs
to the boundary of the state-space, the detailed exposition of equilibrium behavior at the
boundaries in section 4 and subsections 5.2 and 5.1 was necessary. This is because the cutoffs
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D and cD, which establish the limits at which the ruler starts facing a commitment problem,
by leading to changes in equilibrium behavior at boundary beliefs, induce a partition of the
state-space. Within different regions of the partition, different strategies can be sustained.
From the proof of Proposition 6 it follows that if t accepts an offer that reveals he is low
cost at beliefs Q. for w' < D the ruler will prefer to make no second offer to ~ t at the
interim stage. This follows directly from the fact that the ruler will remain in power for sure,
and next period, under beliefs at (1, w) or (w, 1), he is fully entrenched and encroached. But
moreover, Appendix 4 shows that for w~' > D, the ruler will also make no second offer after an
acceptance that reveals t is low cost. On the other hand, following a revealing rejection that
drives posterior beliefs about the first politician being made an offer to 0, the ruler will find it
optimal to make a fully separating offer (and thus risk being ousted) for sufficiently optimistic
beliefs, while he will prefer to make a pooling offer if not optimistic enough. Recall that & is
precisely the value of beliefs at which the commitment constraint binds at the interim stage,
and thus where the ruler switches his offering strategy (See Lemmas A4-2, A4-3 in Appendix
4).
Interim behavior at the boundary of the state-space is one key driver of equilibrium for
interior beliefs. A second key element is the symmetric nature of Markov strategies, which
imply that if at beliefs (w, 2') the ruler is following a strategy (t, q, qA, qR), then at (w', w)
he must be following strategy (~ t, q, q^, qR). The symmetry of Markov strategies will put
further restrictions on the equilibria that can be sustained at interior beliefs. In particular,
the ruler will not be able to implement the type of strategy that can be sustained at beliefs
of the form Q = (w, 0), where the known-to-be high-cost politician b was made a first offer
that forced a low-cost a to accept and reveal his type with positive probability. In that case,
no matter how low beliefs about politician b might fall, they would never be more pessimistic
that beliefs about politician a. In contrast, suppose that beliefs (W", Wb) are interior and
such that w" > ob. If the ruler attempts a strategy of the form (b, PA, -, -), in which he
makes a first pooling offer to the politician under more pessimistic beliefs, and then makes
an informative offer to the remaining politician, this will give incentives for a low-cost a
to play a mixed strategy that drives posterior beliefs to be such that w"(R) < Wb. In this
way, next period he will be the one being made a high uninformative offer and will collect
informational rents (see Lemma A4-6 in Appendix 4). Notice that for posterior beliefs about
a to fall enough as to become lower than beliefs about b, the acceptance probability must
be high enough, which reduces the value of a as it implies he will reveal his low type with
a higher probability. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium because for any given strategy o4
such that wa(R) <w b, a will always have a profitable deviation by chosing a slightly lower a "
for which the posterior following a rejection is still slightly below wb. This was not a problem
when ob = 0. since in that case no matter the mixed strategy used by a low-cost a, posterior
beliefs would always be higher than b's. As a result, under relatively pessimistic beliefs about
politician a, the ruller will not be able to make LSS offers to a. In equilibrium, HSS offers
to the politician under more optimistic beliefs will be made first, which will allow the ruler
to then make more informative LSS offers to the second politcian. Thus, competition still
has a partial capability of undermining the ratchet effect.
Highly optimistic beliefs about both politicians, on the other hand, imply that the ruler
faces a commitment problem no matter which politician he makes a first offer to. Because
politicians are sure to obtain pivotality rents in the future as a result, this allows the ruler to
induce full separation of types in the present, because pivotality rents are the same for either
type of politician. Equilibrium strategies will be of the form (t, S, PR, S). Thus, learning is
fast but implies the ruler will not be fully entrenched, since he will be ousted with positive
probability. Lemma A4-7 shows that it is always optimal for the ruler in this range of beliefs
to make a first offer to the politician under less optimistic beliefs. Finally, as beliefs become
more pessimistic, the value of pursuing such a separating strategy falls quickly, because it is
very likely a rejection will take place. D(wa) is a boundary condition that denotes the lowest
beliefs about b for which the ruler is willing to pursue this strategy for every possible value of
beliefs about a. It will be implicitly determined by the following indifference condition (See
Lemma A4-11):
ba
W - 2(14)
(1 - o)[6(p 
- )-(1 -6)0 - 6(1 - 6)10#] + W46(1 - 6)10#
The MPBE depicted above is of course, symmetric around the 45 degrees line. In the regions
where the first, offer is HSS, beliefs are highly assynmetric, i.e., relatively pessimistic about
one politician, and relatively optimistic about the competitor. The ruler makes a HSS first
offer to the politician under more optimistic beliefs, which either reveals lie is high cost, or
shifts beliefs upwards. If an acceptance is observed, the ruler is then able to make a LSS
offer to the remaining politician. Thus, the second politician either reveals he is low cost,
or beliefs about him becone more pessimistic. As long as neither politician fully reveals his
type, beliefs asymptotically converge towards (1,0) or (0, 1).
For relatively imprecise beliefs there is no learning. The ruler makes a first pooling offer (PA)
to the politician under more optimistic beliefs, and an offer to the competing politician only
off path in case t rejects. This happens because for these intermediate beliefs, the rejection
of a HSS offer drives beliefs to zero, at which point the ruler would actually prefer to make
a separating offer to ~ t. This commitment problem makes it very unattractive for the ruler
to make an informative offer in the first place (recall that a first LSS offer is infeasible here).
But beliefs are not optimistic enough to make the ruler willing to make a separating offer
either.
Finally, for relatively optimistic beliefs, the ruler is unable to commit not to make a separating
offer after a rejection, but he is optimistic enough that he prefers to make a separating offer
in the first place, expecting full learning. As mentioned above, it is always optimal for the
ruler in such case to make the first offer to the politician under more pessimistic beliefs. The
reason is twofold. First, the expected cost of a rejection is higher at the stage in which the
ruler can actually be ousted, so conditional on a rejction by t it is better for the ruler to
be facing a politician ~ t who is more likely to accept a separating offer. Moreover, the
separating offer to t must compensate him for forgoing the value of a power transition if he
accepts. This expected value is decreasing in the opponent politician's type, since the higher
it is, the less likely a power transition takes place. As a result, the offer to t is decreasing
in public beliefs about t. The ruler can be ousted with positive probability for sufficiently
optimistic beliefs. Nevertheless, separation can be successful, so there is full learning along
the equilibrium, at most in two periods. Figure 6 below depicts the learning dynamics under
relatively pessimistic and relatively optimistic beliefs.
Figure 6: Learning under pessimistic and optimistic beliefs
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6 Concluding Remarks
The increasing entrenchment and encroachment of rulers over time is an empirically widespread
but theoretically puzzling phenomenon. This paper layed down a simple model to to think
about it, by studying the political-economy implications of the strategic interaction between
political competition and ratchet effect incentives. I argued that in politically contested en-
vironments where coalitions must be forged and where providing political support is costly,
incentives to learn about the costs of competing groups arise, since more precise information
allows incumbents to capture a larger share of the spoils, and to hold a tighter grip on power.
The paper thus investigated the extent to which rulers might be able to exploit the competi-
tive nature of the coalition formation game to weaken the ratchet effect incentives of potential
coalition members, as a function of public beliefs about the costliness of delivering political
support by the competing groups. Thus, it intends to contribute to the understanding of the
political economy of weakly institutionalized environments, and of the role of learning and
informational assymetries in coalition formation games.
The model delivers a rich set of predictions. First, it identifies a key trade-off between risk
and learning, which yields an informational commitment problem that arises when rulers are
relatively optimistic and hence face strong incentives to extract information. In the short-
run, rulers' eagerness to learn by making risky offers, even if only off-the-equilibrium path,
limits the power of competition to induce information revelation, because potential coalition
members realize they might become pivotal with positive probability, and will only be willing
to accept large, uninformative offers. In the long-run, on the other hand, the possibility of
a future commitment problem actually allows a high degree of information revelation in the
present. Potential coalition members are willing to accept low, informative offers today,
because they will benefit from the commitment problem the ruler will face in the future.
These backloaded incentives are powerful enough for revelation, when the ruler can exploit
competition among potential coalition members.
The model also highlights that having certain information, even if negative, is a very powerful
information extraction instrument in the short run, because for the ruler it becomes a source
of commitment to remain in power, weakening the incentives of individual groups to attempt
dennying their support. It also implies that under some circumstances it will be attractive to
include the more expensive, rather than the least expensive group, in the coalition, and that
supermajority coalitions can emerge along the equilibrium path as information extraction
mechanisms. In the long run, on the other hand, this will limit significantly the ability of
a ruler to extract information through competition: If a group that is believed to be high
cost will be included in future coalitions, low-cost groups will have a strong incentive to be
believed high-cost by accepting only high offers in the present. But these high offers would
be too attractive for low and high cost groups, becoming uninformative. As a result, the
game is very discontinuous at the boundaries of the state-space, leading to radically different
behavior when information about one group is common knowledge relative to when there is
a slight lack of common knowledge.
Regarding the dynamic evolution of the game, the model shows that information will be re-
vealed slowly under more pessimistic beliefs about these costs, but very fast under optimistic
beliefs. The flip side of fast learning is that power transitions will be more likely, so we should
expect power transitions to be more prevalent when rulers are optimistic and thus willing to
face risks to learn. Moreover, learning negative information (from the ruler's viewpoint) will
be easier than learning positive information.
The model proposed in this paper is admittedly quite stylized. It would be of interest to allow
for a larger number of potential coalition members, to study the effects of an increased amount
of competition. By varying the majority requirements for remaining in power, this would also
allow studying the effects of a heterogenous distribution of political power. The assumption
of a discrete set of possible types was, of course, made for tractability, since introducing a
continuum of types in a non-anonymous one-sided incomplete information game introduces
several technical difficulties (see for example Schmidt (1993)). It remains an open question
whether a richer type space would alter the results significantly.
Future empirical work should try to identify observable sources of variation in the cost of
providing political support by different groups, and correlates of the precision of beliefs about
these costs. These should allow to subsequently test predictions regarding the relationship
between beliefs about the different politically relevant groups, and any observable patterns
of distribution of resources and regime stability over time.
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Appendix 1: The No-Competition Case
Equilibrium under no competition and complete information
Proposition1. When w = 0 or w 1, equilibrium strategies take the form
1 if m>0+6(1-6)# ?n(l) -0±6(1-6)0
0 otherwise
Proof. Let # < ' , and w = 1. A necessary condition for politician p to support the ruler with probability 1 is
that the offer satisfies Vo(l) = m - 0 + 617(1) > 6#.
In an equilibrium where p accepts for sure an equilibrium offer n at time t, he will accept the same offer every future
T > t. The value for p is thus Vo(1) = -, and the equilibrium offer must satisfy m > 0 + 6(1 - 6)6
In equilibrium the ruler leaves no slack in p's IC, so m = 0 + 6(1 - 6)# and the politician supports with probability
1. On the equilibrium path the ruler gets retained with probability 1, so his equilibrium value is
W'(1) = p n + 6W'(1) = - m
16-
Wr(1) 0 _ 6#I- 6
Such an offer is sequentially rational iff the ruler prefers to make it than to grab all state resouces and get ousted:
Wr(1>) 0W'1=y-6 >
which is equivalent to # < _ . For w = 0, replace 0 for 0 everywhere above. Finally, the equilibrium value for the
politician is VO(1) = 6#.
Equilibrium under no competition and incomplete information
Lemma 2: Strategies are decreasing in type: <(w)  c(mw).
Proof. Take a pair (n, ) such that o-(rn,) = 0. Assume (by contradiction) that 3(mw) > 0. Because a low-type
politician is always rejecting, posterior beliefs after support has been observed must be that the politcian is high-cost:
w(A) = 0.
Because a low-cost politician rejects, it must be that 66 > m - 0 + Vo(0). Now observe that Vo(0) is the value for a
low cost politician when beliefs are that he is high cost for sure. From Appendix I we know that under this belief the
ruler offers n - + 6(1 - 6)6. Thus,
_0 000-0
V9(0) = 0 + =0 --- + #
- 1 6 1 6
Since a high-cost politician is supporting with positive probability, it must be that in 0 + 6V-(0) > 66, which follows
from the fact that after an acceptance, the posterior is o 0. Together both ICs imply
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2 0-0 m - 0±6 '(0) > m-± 6VO(O) <7>q$-6( -±+6 )>!0 - 0<#
1-6 - - 1-6-
which is a contradiction for any 6 E (0,1). Thus, if a(m, w) = 0, b(m, w) = 0 (a high-cost type cannot be accepting
with positive probability if the low-cost type is rejecting for sure.)
Now take a pair (m, w) such that a(m, w) E (0, 1), and assume U(m, w) E (0, 1). Both low-cost and high-cost politicians
are mixing, so they must be indifferent between supporting and rejecting:
Vo(w) = m - 0 + Vo(w(A)) = 6#
and
V(o) = in - 0 + 6Vy(w(A)) = 6#
Together these two imply
in -0 + V(w(A)) = m -0+ 6V 0(w(A)) e 0 -= 6V(w(A)) - Vo(w(A))
which means that VW(w(A)) > Vo(w(A)). But notice that under beliefs w(A), whatever the offer n(w(A)) is, the
low-cost politician can always mimic the high-cost politician's strategy (the converse is not true). Thus, it must be
that Vo(w(A)) > V#(w(A)), which yields a contradiction. Thus, when a low-cost politician is playing a mixed strategy,
a high cost politician cannot be doing so too. He must be either supporting or rejecting with probability 1.
Thus. assume a(m, w) = 1. This means that posterior beliefs after support is observed must satisfy w(A) < L. Because
a low-cost politician is mixing he must be indifferent:
Vo(w) = in - 0 + Vo(w(A)) = 6p
Because a high-cost politician is supporting for sure, it must be that
V#(w) = n - 0 + 6V#(w(A)) ;> 6#
Replacing the low cost's indifference condition on the high-cost's IC,
n 0 + 6V(w(A)) ;> m - 0 + Vo(w(A))
6 [V(w(A)) - V(w(A))] 2 # - 0 > V#(w(A)) > V(w(A))
Which once more contradicts that Ve(w(A)) > V#(w(A)). We conclude that a(m, w) E (0, 1) implies 5(m, w) = 0.
Lemma Al-1: Continuation equilibrium under offers m V [0, 0 + 6(1 - 6)#).
An equilibrium in which the ruler has made an offer m [ +, 6(1 - 6)#) must be pooling: Vw C [0, 1],
if m<0
if m20+6(1
0 i f m < 51(m, w) if m0
1 fm25+6(1-6)#'
Proof. Neither type of politician can accept an offer below their cost. The ruler never makes an offer above 0+6(1-6)#
which is the offer he makes when he knows for sure the politician is high-cost, so a high-cost politician always accepts
it. By pooling on support for offers above 0 + 6(1 - 6)#, a low-cost politician does not reveal his type.
F]
Lemma 3 establishes that both types pool on acceptance when the offer is in 0 + 6(1 - 6)#, and we know that
high-cost types reject any offer below 0, and low-cost types reject any offer below 0. It thus remains to study the
equilibrium behavior of a low-cost politician when facing an offer n E [0, 0), and the equilibrium behavior of both
types of politician when facing an offer m E [0, 0 + (1 - 6).
Lemma A1-2: Continuation equilibrium under offers in E [0,9 + 6(1 - 0))).
An equilibrium in which the ruler has offered n E [0, 0 + 6(1 - 6)0) must be pooling on rejection:
a(n, w) =(ra .w) = 0
Proof. Only continuation equilibria of the form 2) or 3) can exist, given that u(n,w) = 0 (and the ruler will never
make an offer which he knows will be reject for sure). Posterior beliefs after support is observed must be W(A) 1.
A necessary condition for such an equilibrium to exist is that the offer satisfies
n - 0 + 6VO(1) 2 6#
Given Vo(1) = 6#, this condition is equivalent to m > 0 + 6(1 - 6)#. Thus, a low-cost politician will reject with
probability 1. By Proposition 2 above, the high-cost type cannot be supporting with positive probability.
LI
(0 1in w
Lemma A1-3. Continuation equilibrium under offers m E [q + 6(1 - 6)#, 6 + 6(1 - 6)#).
An equilibrium in which the ruler has offered m E [6 + 6(1 - 6)#P, 6 + 6(1 - 6)#) must be separating:
I~p o) 1 (m, W) = 0
Proof. Separating Equilibrium:
The low-type's IC is satisfied for any m > 0 + 6(1 - 6)#. By offering m = 0 + 6(1 - 6)# the low-cost politician is
willing to support.
If 0 + 6(1 - 6)# < 6, then the high-cost politician rejects for sure, and the ruler is retained with probability w. By
deviating and offering any lower m both types of politician reject and the ruler is ousted, so this cannot be a profitable
deviation. By offering a higher m the probability of remaining in power is the same, while the ruler is making a higher
transfer, which cannot be profitable either. Thus, a separating equilibrium exists. To see that m = 0 + 6(1 - 6)# is
the unique equilibrium separating offer, consider any other larger m'; by deviating and offering m =6 ± (1 - )
the ruler does not modify his probability of being retained, while he reduces the payment made, so this is a profitable
deviation. Consider any offer n' smaller than m. The ruler is ousted with probability 1, so it is always optimal to
deviate and make an offer which is accepted for sure.
If 0 + 6(1 - 6)# > 0, the high-cost type is willing to reject if
6# > n - 0 +617y(1)
V0 (1) = 64 because when the high-cost type is believed to be low cost he is offered n = 0 + 6(1 6)#. which, if he
accepts, gives him a value of 0+6(1 6 < 6#, so that he always prefers to reject. Thus, for n 0 + 6(1 - 6)# the
high-cost politician rejects with probability 1.
Low-cost Semi-Separating Equilibrium:
That such an equilibrium where a(n, w) E (0, 1) does not exist can be shown as follows. Suppose in the continuation
equilibrium the low-cost type politician is supporting with probability 0(m, w). By Proposition 2, the high-cost type
must be rejecting for sure. The following indifference condition must hold for a low-cost politician:
In - 6 + 6VO(1) = 66
which follows from the fact that after support the politician has revealed his type. Thus, the unique offer which can
induce semi-separation is n = 0 + 6(1 - 6),. Suppose that after such an offer the low-cost politician supports with
probability o. The value for the ruler is given by
W'(W) = p - Wam + 6woW'(1) p wO(0 + 6(1 - 6)#) + 6WO - 64
p W - 6 .2
= p + uOo -- -_ 626
Now we can show that for any w and o, there always exists a positive e(w, a) such that it is profitable for the ruler
to deviate and offer an m' such that in < in' < 0 + 6(1 - 6)< + E(w, a). Under such an alternative offer the low-cost
politician supports with probability 1. Thus, the value for the ruler would be
Wr(W) =Ip - m'+oW(1) =y-( + 6(1 - 6)# + E(wo)) + 6L; 60)
W(W)=y+o -- 0
The deviation is profitable iff
Vr()- w+ - -- 62# -e(wa))>JL w ( + K 6- 2# = WV(w) 
/ - 62# - E(1, 2) > A -- - 60 
E(,06 <E _6201 -o r)
Notice that E(w, a) actually does not depend on w, and that the term in square brackets is positive. Thus, for any a > 0
the ruler can offer m' which yields a strictly higher payoff, and low-type semi-separation cannot be an equilibrium.
High-cost Semi-separating equilibrium:
That such an equilibrium where a = 1 and a(m,w) - (0,1) does not exist can be shown as follows. Let n > 0, so
that both types can support. In such an equilibrium, posterior beliefs after support must be w(A) > w. Because a
high-cost politician is mixing, the following indifference condition must hold:
in - 60+ ±6V((A)) = 6#
which implies the offer must be in = 0 + 6 - 6Vy(w(A)). To proceed I make use of the following result:
Lemma Al-4: If at belief u the ruler makes an offer n which induces a High-cost semi-separating
equilibrium, then the equilibrium cannot be Pooling on support for any W' > w.
Proof. Let n(w) be an equilibrium offer under belief w which induces a High-cost semi-separating equilibrium, and
suppose that at w(S) the ruler will make an equilibrium offer which induces pooling on support. The optimal such
offer is in = + 6(1 - 6)#, which both types accept for sure, and no learning obtains. Thus,
W'(w( A)) =p601 -ci
Now, because at w the equilibrium is semi-separating, the ruler's value is
W'=() = y + [W + (1 - W)U] (6Wr(W(S)) - n(w))
Replacing the equilibrium value for the ruler under o(A), and using Bayes' rule,
m(+) = y + A - 62# m()
w(A) (1 - 6
Recall that the offer must be n(w) = + 6# - V0(w(A)). Because at w(A) the ruler induces pooling. the value of a
high-cost politician must be V#(u(A)) = 6#. Replacing in the ruler's value,
62 0-EW 
'
W+o =0 p[ + [ - 6#]
w(A) 1 - 6
W'w=+ -624--(#+60p-624) =p+ - - 0
Because the ruler's optimal offer is to induce semi-separation, it must be that W'(w) > - , which is the value
of making an offer which both types accept for sure. Thus,
ILw(A) 1-o f 1 -6 - 7(A) 1- 66 1-6 -6 1-6 1-6 6
W 61p 0 60 p > A 0
w (A) 1 -6 1 -6 1 -6 1 -
Because that w(S) > w, ' < 1, so the inequality above contradicts the optimality of semi-separation at W.
The lemma above implies that if at beliefs w the ruler is making an offer that induces a high-cost semi-separating
equilibrium, then at w(A) the equilibrium must be either high-cost semi-separating or separating. In either case
V(w(A)) = 6# because the high-cost must be indifferent between supporting and rejecting in the former case, and in
the latter case he rejects for sure. The equilibrium offer for high-cost semi-separation must then bem = #+6# -2
9 + 6(1 - 5)#, which is exactly the offer that induces pooling in separation, and which a low-type accepts. Thus, no
high-cost semi-separating equilibrium exists.
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Appendix 2: Competition under Complete Information
Competition under complete information and symmetric types.
Proposition 4:
Assume Q = (1, 1) (the derivation is identical for Q = (0,0), except changing 0 for 0). Once the ruler has picked a
politician (pl) to make him a first offer, he faces the choice of whether to give pl an acceptable offer, or to make him
an offer which he rejects for sure. The latter strategy cannot be ruled out a priori because the ruler is saving making
a payment to pl. This strategy implies nonetheless, making p 2 pivotal.
Assume the equilibrium is such that the ruler makes an offer m1 = 0 to p1 , so that o1 = 0 in every period, and an
offer m 2 to p2 in the subgame after which pl has not supported, which p 2 accepts. The equilibrium value for p 2 is
given by
V2(Q)= 2 -±+ [V (Q)+ V2(Q)
This expression takes into account that p2 by accepting, rules out triggering a power transition. He gets the offer net
of his cost, and next period with probability 1/2 he is chosen as first to be offered, and with probability 1/2 he is
chosen as second to be offered. The equilibrium value for p' on the other hand, is given by
VIG V1 ( 2) + V2(Q)v0
1 (Q) - 6 ± 9 V2(~
This expression comes from the fact that p is given no offer in the current period, and in the next period he will be
first to be offered with probability 1/2 , and second to be offered with probability 1/2. This is equivalent to
V(Q) - V2 (Q2)
2-6
Replacing this expression in the value for p2
V|(G)= m2 Q + V2(Q) + IV(GV 2(Q) = n2  2 (Q)
V2(Q)-=M 2 0±6 V() = 2 -3 (2
2 - 2(1 - 6)
The incentive constraint for p2 requires that the equilibrium value is weakly larger than the value of the single-shot
deviation in which p2 rejects in the current period. Because p1 did not support, a rejection by p 2 triggers a power
transition for sure. The IC is:
V 2 (Q) > 1
2
The equilibrium value for the ruler is given by
W'(Q) 
2
1-6
because every period the ruler offers n 2 to p 2 , which he accepts. The IC for p2 becomes
2-6 2 1 2-6 2 -) 60
2(1 -6)( - ) 6 2
2n > 0 + 6>o
- - 2-6
Of course, the ruler makes the IC bind in equilibrium, so that m 2  0 + In an equilibrium in which the ruler
- 2-6 *Ianeulbimiwhcthrlr
makes no offer to p1 and pays for the support of p2 , his value is
W p(Q - 2-6 1 6#
1-1 1-6 2-6
Now I look at an equilibrium where the ruler makes an acceptable offer to pl. Assume the ruler made an offer mi to
pi and that pi accepts the offer. The ruler now has to decide which offer, if any, to make to p 2 . If the ruler makes an
equilibrium offer n2 > 0 which p 2 accepts, the value for p2 is
V2(Q) = m2 - 0±6 V(Q)+ I V2 (Q)
This is because the ruler is retained with probability 1, and in the next period p 2 could be chosen as pl or p2 with
equal probabilities. The incentive constraint for p2 to be willing to accept an offer in2 is
V 2(Q) 6 V|Q)+ IV2(Q)
because, given that pl accepted, a rejection by p 2 does not produce a power transition. Replacing the equilibrium
2in 2> 0
This is, given that the continuation value for p2 is invariant to his support decision, he is willing to accept any current
offer which is at least as large as his cost. The lowest such offer is M 2 = 0. Now I argue that such an offer cannot be
an equilibrium offer because the ruler has a profitable deviaton. At the interim stage after pl has accepted, the value
for the ruler is
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v'(Q,A)=- m -o6W'(Q)
A profitable single-shot deviation for the ruler is to make no offer to p2 and keep playing the equilibrium henceforth.
This gives him a value of t - m' + 6W(Q), which is strictly larger than v'(Q, A). Thus, in an equilibrium where
the ruler makes an acceptable offer to pl, offering a positive transfer to p2 cannot be part of the equilibrium after all;
A supermajority coalition cannot be an equilibrium. In equilibrium it must be that n 2 = 0, and the value for p 2 is
V0
2 (Q) =.I V1(Q).
Notice that after pl has accepted the ruler does not need the support of p2 to remain in power. Nevertheless, the
fact that he will not make positive offers to p2 once pl has accepted makes pl pivotal in equilibrium, and suggests the
equilibrium offer for pl to support should be high. This intuition is wrong because pl is not pivotal off the equilibrium
path. If pl were to deviate and not support, the ruler will always find it optimal to credibly make an offer to p 2 which
he accepts. This rules out a power transition and makes such a deviation by p unprofitable. To see this, consider
the stage where the ruler makes an offer to p1 , and let ml be an offer pl accepts. The equilibrium value for pl is
V|(Q) =m -+ ± 6[ V(Q)+ V(G)
Replacing the equilibrium value for p2
V|() =m Q~oIV|C) 0 |(G =2 - 6 ( - 0)V9, (Q)+ O±6E2 o(Q) +2 2 - o 2(1 -6)
The incentive constraint for p1 is simply
VO (Q) ;>6 oV (Q) + 6 V4 (Q)
because if p1 rejects, the ruler will make an offer to p2 which he will accept for sure (below I characterize such a
credible off-the-equilibrium path offer). The IC reduces to
6 2
VO (Q)> 6V (Q)
Replacing the equilibrium value for p 2,
Vol(Q) > 6 6 V 2(Q) 4=> [A 6]2-62-6 - 2-6
This inequality is true for any 6 E [0., 1], so that any offer ml > 0 is accepted by pl. The smallest such offer is n' = 0.
The ruler can take pl down to his cost even though he is offering a Minimum Winning Coalition in equilibrium,
because he has a credible threat of including p2 in case p rejects. The equilibrium value for the ruler of making an
offer to pl is thus
1 - 0
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The ruler keeps all the surplus and is fully entrenched. Now, the ruler will prefer to make an offer to p1 over making
an offer only to p2 iff
p-O > P-0 6#
1 -6 1 - 6 2- 6
which holds for any 6 > 0. Thus, the unique sequentially rational equilibrium prescribes the ruler choosing a politician
at random to make him a first offer which the politician accepts, and ignoring the second politician. The equilibrium
values for the politicians are /(Q) 2(1 (6 - 0) = 0 and VO(Q) 0.
Finally it remains to be checked that after a deviation in which pl rejects, the ruler credibly makes an offer to p2
which p2 is willing to accept. Assume pl has rejected. If the ruler makes an offer i-u2 to p2 that he is willing to accept,
such an offer must satisfy the following Incentive constraint for p2:
-2 0+6 V1(Q)+ V(Q) 6e
which comes from the fact that after p1 's deviation and p2 's acceptance, the equilibrium keeps being played. If p2
rejects, a power transition occurs, in which case he becomes the new ruler with probability 1/2, and otherwise he will
be chosen as first to be offered with probability 1/2. The IC reduces to
22
The ruler leaves no slack in this constraint, so 7n2 = 0 + #. Making this offer to p2 is optimal for the ruler if his
payoff is higher than taking all of state resources y and being ousted:
p ± 6+W'(Q) > _ > 6W'(Q) > l2 <
p 6 6 1 161>- 0 + p0*/ -0 0- 6(1 -6)0*>p >0+ 6(1-6)$n1 -6 2 2 -2
The equilibrium is identical for Q = (0, 0), just replacing 0 for 0. Thus, the restriction for a credible threat by the ruler
when Q = (0,0) is 6p > 0 + 16(1 - 6)#, which implies the restriction above given that 0 < 0. Notice this inequality
is implied by the original assumption 6'1< > 6.
Competition under complete information and asymmetric types.
When one politician is high-cost and the other is low-cost, the optimal strategy for the ruler must optimally specify
which politician to make an offer first. Without loss of generality assume Q = (0,1), so that 0" = 0 and 6b = 0 . I
first prove the following lemma:
139
Lemma A2-1: Under Q = (0, 1), if the ruler can credibly make an offer which is accepted with probability
1 to p2 after pl has rejected, then t = b.
Proof. Assume the ruler can always make an offer to p 2 which p 2 accepts after pl has rejected. This implies that, at
the stage game where p1 must decided whether to support, rejecting can never give a higher payoff than accepting.
This is because after a rejection p2 will accept, so the continuation value is unchanged, whereas pl has forgone the
current offer. Because the first politician who is offered an acceptable transfer (weakly higher than his cost) will
always accept it, the ruler will always prefer to make a first offer to the low-cost politician (b in this case).
Proposition 5:
Proof. The proof of proposition 4 showed that such a credible offer always exists, so that T((0, 1)) = 0. The ruler
offers ml > 0 to pb. If b accepts, the ruler must decided what offer to make to p 2 (= pa). In an equilibrium where p 2
accepts the offer (which requires m 2 > 0), his value is
2M2_
V 2 (Q) =n 1-6
The Incentive constraint for p2 requires that not supporting is unprofitable:
m n2 _0 2
(Q) = 2 V(Q)1 -
which is trivially true. This is because a rejection cannot trigger a power transition in a continuation game after which
p1 has accepted. The minimum such offer that makes p2 accept with probability 1 is m 2 = 0. This gives the ruler an
interim value of v 2 (Q. A) - . Now observe that a deviation in which the ruler offers n 2 = 0 and otherwise
the equilibrium is followed is profitable for the ruler at the interim stage because the ruler is already being retained:
V2 (Q. A) = -7 <p- m + 1
1-o 1-6
Thus, making an offer to the second politician cannot be part of an equilibrium in which the ruler makes an acceptable
offer to the first politician (the coallition must be minimum winning).
At the stage where the ruler makes an offer to pl, let n' be an acceptable offer which is accepted with probability 1.
On the equilibrium path the ruler remains in office, so the value for p, is
n1 - 0
and his incentive constraint is
VO I(Q) - 1-0> wVe(11 -6 ~
which is trivially satisfied, and comes from the fact that if pi rejects, the ruler will make an offer to p2 which p2 will
accept, so no political transition takes place and the game is identical from then on. The IC is satisfied for any min,
and an acceptable offer requires mi > 0. Thus, the ruler offers m' = 0, and p1 supports.
It remains only to check that the ruler will want to offer p2 a transfer which he accepts after p' has rejected. Let 1n 2
be such offer. It must satisfy
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n- +2
On the equilibrium p2 is not included in any coalition, so V?(Q) = 0. The IC for p 2 reduces to
2 +
2
The ruler leaves no slack on this constraint, setting 7~n2 =+ ( 4. This is optimal for the ruler as long as
p -~2+ 6Wr(Q) L pz> 6W,(Q) > n2
6 fLO> 0±poop>0-6(-O)+-(1 - )$1-6 2 2
Notice this inequality is implied by the original assumption > )
Appendix 3: Competition under Incomplete Information
Entrenchment Dynamics at Q = (1,w)
Proposition 6:
Under Q C {(1,w) : w E (0, 1)} the highest possible value the ruler could attain in any equilibrium is VVr* = -
where he gives one low-cost politician just his cost of providing political support, and this politician supports the ruler
with probability 1 each period. If the ruler can sustain a strategy which achieves this value on the equilibrium path
(call it the optimal strategy), he will pursue it.
I start proving the following:
Lemma A3-1: For any Q E {(W",wb) : - 1.Wb E (0, 1)}, Vb(Q) = 0. (The equilibrium value of a high cost
politician whose type is not perfectly known is zero when he faces a competitor whose type is known
to be low-cost).
Proof. If it is optimal for the ruler to make an offer to pa first, given that p"'s type is common knowledge, it must
be that such offer is accepted with probability 1 by p" in equilibrium (the ruler knows which offer induces support,
and if it is optimal not to induce support from pa the ruler will not make him any offer). The ruler finds it optimal
to make no offer to p , so the equilibrium value of b is zero no matter his type. If it is optimal for the ruler to make
an offer to pb first, then after a rejection by pb the ruler can always make an offer that pa accepts with probability 1
because p"'s type is known. No matter the action taken by pb the ruler remains in power, and the value of rejecting
an offer is zero. Any offer which is at least as large as p s type is thus accepted by pb so the ruler. if offering to p6
first, will never offer more than 0, which gives a high cost politician a value of zero.
Now consider the following strategy: T(Q) = 1 (make an offer to pa, who is known to be low-cost, first), and offer him
mn = 0. If p" supports, make no offer to ph, and if p0 rejects, make an offer to ph which induces pooling on support.
Under this strategy, off-the-equilibrium-path after p" has rejected, the ruler is sure to achieve support of p , so that
the rejection by p" leaves him without the transfer while the ruler remains in power.
Observe that in an equilibrium where the ruler can sustain p"'s support with an offer 0, after pa has supported the
ruler does not have incentives to try to extract information from ph. This is because that would require making an
extra offer in the current period, which will be accepted with some positive probability, while there is no benefit
because no matter the type revealed, the value for the ruler cannot be higher than the one he is already achieving
under beliefs Q.
I start by characterizing the conditions under which inducing pb to pool off-the-equilibrium path can be sustained.
Take an equilibrium strategy by the ruler as prescribed above, and assume that pa has rejected. An offer n 2 that
induces pooling by both types of pb must satisfy the high-cost type's incentive constraint:
S1
where I have made use of the fact that in a pooling equilibrium beliefs remain unchanged. Now, on-the equilibrium
path p0 accepts the equilibrium offer after which the ruler makes no offer to pb. so that Vy(Q) = 0 (Claim A3-1). An
offer n2 = + makes the high-cost pbs incentive constraint bind (and clearly makes the low-cost type's IC slack).
The interim value for the ruler of making this offer is given by
v'(Q,mn2 )=y- (+61 )+oW(r(Q) = - # 1- o2 2 13
where, once again, beliefs remain at Q after pb supports.
Lemma A3-2: If at beliefs (1.w) the ruler can sustain the optimal strategy, then he can sustain it for
any ' < w.
Proof. Suppose at (1, w) the ruler can sustain the optimal strategy. This means that off-the-equilibrium-path after
pa has rejected, the ruler credibly induces pooling, so that for any other in 2 ,
vr(Q, m 2 ) = [ + (3Wr(Q) - m 2 ) > p + [wob(Q, f~ 2 ) + (1 - w)W(Q, n 2 )](Wr((1,w(A)) -2)
Observe that the pooling-equilibrium offer m 2 does not depend on w. Thus, at w' the ruler can offer the same M2
off-path, and induce pooling on support as well. Offering in 2 > n 2 can never be optimal. Assume that at w' < w it
is optimal for the ruler to offer ?in2 < n2 . If such f1~2 induces separation, then
p + o'(3WT ((1, 1) - n2) > p + (3Wr(Q') - 1-0) = v'(Q, m2 )
No separation of pb for w' < w (after a rejection by p"): The binding incentive constraint for separation or low-cost
semi-separation is n - 0 + 3Vo((1, 1)) = 614. which also does not depend on w. Thus, only 72 = 0 + o3# is offered
to induce such behavior by pb for any w.
The value for the ruler of inducing such behavior at Q is thus
Vr(Q, i-i2 )1s = y ± w(W'((1, 1) - n2) > p + I(6W, ((1, 1) - 72) > v'(Q, in 2 )
contradicting the opt imality of inducing pooling at 2.
No low-cost semi-separation of pb for W' < w (after a rejection by p"): The low-cost type politician must be indifferent:
-2 _ + 6V~(1 1)) = p
2
which requires ih2 = 0 + 6 (. Using the same argument as in Lemma A1-2, for any w there always exists some E > 0
such that the ruler could always offer e more and shift the support probability to 1, giving him a strictly higher value.
No high-cost semi-separation for w' < w: The binding incentive constraint for high-cost type semi-separation at some
w is mHss(w) - 0+ V 6((1.w(A)) =-- }. By claim A3-1 above, V((1,w(A)) = 0 for any w(A). Thus, nHSS
0+ -1} = ih2, which is the offer that induces pooling, and contradicts the fact that 7h 2 < m2
2D
Lemma A3-2 above implies that it will be sufficient to find the highest possible w for which pooling off-the-equilibirum-
path is sustainable, to know the optimal behavior for any smaller W.
The off-the-equilibrium path pooling-on-support strategy is sustainable only if the ruler has no profitable deviation.
Consider a high-cost semi-separating deviation where o-6 = 1 and Ub E (0, 1). In such a deviation posterior beliefs
must be w(A) > i, and the offer 2 must be such that the high-cost type is indifferent between support and rejection:
m2 0 5+ V((1,w(A))) 31
22
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From Lemma A3-1 above, we know that V((1, w(A))) = 0, which implies the offer Fn 2 = M 2 would induce pooling.
Consider now a separating deviation where a = 1 and 5 b 0. Posterior beliefs would be w(A) = 1. Under such an
offer the incentive constraint for a low-cost politician is
2 - 6 + L ((1, >
On the best possible deviation the ruler would leave no slack, and since Vo((1, 1)) = 0, Mi2 = 06+ , which a high-cost
type cannot accept. The interim value for the ruler would be
v'(Q)IA = P + [bM8l 1)) - - p + W -[-6-
Consider now a low-cost semi-separating deviation where ab E (0, 1) and 6b = 0. Posterior beliefs would be w(A) = 1.
Such an offer should make a low-cost politician indifferent:
n2 - 0 + 6Vo9((1, 1)) = 6-#2
so that in 2 = 0 + 6 #, which is the separating offer. As a result we need only consider if separation is a profitable
deviation. The deviation is profitable iff
p- 1 1 p1-6V'(Q) I A i + I;[6 6  0 6 - ] >[I- 0 6!~" -+6(,v'()|~p oI - -2 2 1 -6='0m
(p-) (1-6)6(1-)jW > 
-2 w(6) E (0, 1)
We conclude that for beliefs w < (6) the unique MPBE prescribes the optimal strategy.
Let u > a(6). Only two types of strategy profiles for the ruler can be an equilibrium. Either the ruler offers to
pa first (strategy a)), in which case he must make a high enough offer that pa will accept with probability 1, and
off-the-equilibrium path he separates, or he offers first to pb (strategy b))., and only second to pa in case of a rejection
bby p.
Consider strategy a) in which T(Q) = 1, and the ruler offers in such that pa accepts. From the previous analysis we
know that in case of a rejection, the ruler will offer a separating offer m 2 = 0 + 6_# to pb, which a low-type accepts
for sure, and a high-type rejects. Posterior beliefs after support are W(A) = 1. Thus, off-the-equilibrium path with
probability 1 - L the ruler is ousted. This implies that p"'s incentive constraint is given by
i - 6 + 6Vo(Q) ;> W6Vo((1. 1)) + (1 - W)6 1
2
This IC comes from the fact that if p" accepts, he gets the transfer net of his cost, and the ruler makes no offer to pb
so that beliefs remain unchanged. If he were to reject, the ruler would make a separating offer to p , which will be
accepted if he is low-cost (with probability w), in which case posterior beliefs will be Q = (1, 1), and will be rejected
if he is high-cost (with probability 1 - w), in which case the ruler is ousted. In equilibrium p" is accepting in every
period, so the binding incentive constraint can be expressed as
n -0 1
Vo( n) 6 = ( )o # r m 0 + (1 - w)(1 6)6_01 -6 2
The offer which makes pa be willing to support is decreasing in w. because as beliefs increase the probability of a
power transition falls after pa has rejected. The equilibrium value for the ruler is
1 
-
Notice that on the equilibrium path there would be no learning. The value for the ruler increases as w -4 1. The
description of equilibrium strategies also requires off-the-equilibrium path prescriptions. If a were offered second after
support, he would not be pivotal and would accept an offer m = 0. If he were offered second after a rejection, he would
be pivotal and would accept an offer that satisfies the interim IC m -0+ 6VO(Q) > 6 '#, where I have assumed off-path
posterior beliefs after p6 rejected are the same as the prior. The lowest m satisfying this IC is m = +6(1- 6(1 -w)] }#.
Off path, if b is offered first, he knows a will support if he accepts, so any type of pb is willing to support if given their
cost.
The alternative strategy b) makes the ruler exploit competition between politicians to extract information. By making
an offer first to the politician whose type is not perfectly known (pb in this case), the ruler is indirectly commiting
to remain in power because if pb rejects, the ruler is left with making an offer to a politician whose type he perfectly
knows, and thus, can always make an offer which is accepted by hin. This reduces the outside value of both types of
pb to zero because no power transition can take place. So consider a strategy with T(Q) = 0. On or off-the-equilibrium
path after pb has rejected and interim beliefs are (1, w(R)), the ruler faces a low-cost politician who is willing to accept
any offer satisfying
im - 0 + 6Vo((1, w(R))) > -#
An offer in = 0 -6V((1,(R)))+6-# is enough for pa to support. Notice that this offer is bounded above by g+61je
which we know is an offer the ruler always wants to make to remain in power rather than being ousted for sure. Thus,
the ruler will always make this offer in a subgame after which p6 rejected.
Assume the equilibrium offer to pb induces pooling by pb. The offer must satisfy the high-cost type incentive constraint:
in - 0 + 6V (Q) > 6 V ((1. w(R)))
Here it is necessary to specify off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs about pb after a rejection, given that the equilibrium
prescribes support by both low and high cost politicians. If we assume w(R) = 0 or w(R) = 1, V((1. w(R))) = 0 so
that an offer n, = 0 would be enough to induce pooling by pb. By assuming w(R) = w n' = 6 also satisfies the
high-cost type's IC (assumptions about off path beliefs are irrelevant). In this proposed equilibrium the ruler would
offer in1 = to p6 every period, which both types of pb would accept with probability 1 on the equilibrium path. The
value for the ruler of pursuing this strategy would then be Wr(Q)|b1p = . Pooling under b) is prefered to a) iff,
for some w > Z,
14r'(Q)I 1 6 W 1-)6~ 1 W(Q)I.1-6 2
This inequality is most likely to hold for the smallest possible L, which is aI. Thus, if it does not hold for D it will not
hold for any w. Replacing for D and rearranging,
(p -) - (1 - 6) - 1 (1 - 6)1
p6->_p - ) - ( - )1 - 6) #
(1 -6)(0 - 6) 1 -( 6-6)-41>004Z
6(p -6) - (1 - 6)9 -6(1 - 6)-# 2 60p - 0) - (1- 6) 6(1 # 2
6(1 - 6)2 > 6(p - 6) - 6(1 - ) < e: (2 - 6)6(1 - 6)6 > 6p - 0
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6(1 -6)2
Notice that (2 - 6)} < 1. Thus, the inequality above does not hold given that we have assumed > #. Making
a pooling offer to pb first cannot be part of an equilibrium for any w.
Assume the equilibrium offer to pb induces separation. The offer must satisfy the low-cost type incentive constraint:
ml -O+ V((1, 1)) > 6V ((1, 0))
which comes from the fact that in a separating equilibrium, w(A) = 1 and w(R) = 0. After acceptance the ruler makes
no offer to p", and after a rejection the ruler makes an offer to pa which he accepts for sure. Vf((1, 0)) = 0 because at
Q = (1, 0) the ruler never includes b in a coalition. Thus, the offer m' = 0 is enough to induce separation (this offer
trivially satisfies the IC for not supporting by a high-cost type). The value for the ruler of following this strategy is:
Wr(r)lb~s = 2 + w [6WV'((1, 1)) - 0] ± (1 - w) [Wr((1, 0)) - 0 - 6 ] -0 + 6WT * - (- # W'(r)|
Surprisingly, the ruler's value of pursuing this strategy is exactly the same as the value of strategy a) for any w.
Assume the equilibrium offer to pb induces low-cost semi-separation, where a(Q, n) E (0, 1) and U(Q, n) = 0. Posterior
beleifs are w(A) = I and w(R) < w. The IC for the low-cost type is
'iI - 0+ 6V ((1, 1)) > 6Vo ((1, w(R)))
The high-cost type's IC is
6V ((1. w(R))) 2 mi -0 + 6Vy((1, 1))
mI = 0 + 6Vf t((1,.w(R))) leaves no slack on the low-cost's IC, and relaxes the high-cost's IC as much as possible.
Replacing in the high-cost's IC, a necessary condition for a LSS equilibrium to exist is
0 - 2 [Vob ((1, w(R))) - Vb((1, w(R)))]
Notice that the RHS of this inequality is positive (because for any beliefs the value of the low-cost type cannot be
smaller than the value for the high-cost type, given that the former could always mimic the latter). Thus, if the
difference between values for low and high violates this inequality (recall from Claim A3-1 that the value for a high-
cost type is zero for any Q = (1, w)), there exists no semi-separating equilibrium. Suppose the inequality holds. The
ruler's value of pursuing this strategy is
W'(Q)|b)LSs =/-I+ Og(Q, n') [W r ((1 1)) -0 -V ((1,w(R)))
- wa(Q, in')) W614'((1, w(R))) - 0 + VJ"((1, w(R))) - #
which follows because with probability wo(, i) p6 is low cost and accepts the offer, and with complementary
probability pb rejects the offer, in which case the ruler makes an offer to p", who accepts for sure. This takes into
account that at such subgame beleifs have evolved to Q = (1,w(R)). Now I show that inducing separation is always
prefered by the ruler to inducing semi-separation, by comparing Wr(Q)|b)s to Wr(Q)Ib)LSS. First, observe that net
of p, Wr(Q)|b)s is the convex combination of the two terms in square brakets, with weights w and 1 - w. Now take
Wr (Q)|b)Lss. Net of p it is also a convex combination, this time with weights wo and 1-wa. Clearly 6WT ((1, 1))-6 >
SWr((1,1)) - q - 5V0((1,w(R))) for any positive V 1 ((1,w(R))), so the term multypling w is larger than then term
multiplying wa. Now, observe that for any w(R), it must be true that Wr((1, w(R))) + 6Vf ((1.w(R))) < W'((1. 0)).
This follows because at = (1,0) the equilibrium is efficient: the ruler is entrenched with probability 1 and is
leaving no rents to either politician. On the other hand, if under w(R) the ruler remains in power with probability
1, then social surplus is the same as under Q = (1,0), and the sum of payoffs for ruler and p" cannot exceed it. If
under w(R) the ruler is ousted with positive probability, then total surplus is lower than under Q = (1, 0). Thus,
the term multiplying 1 - w is larger than the tern multiplying 1 - wa. This means that Wr(Q)b)LSS is the convex
combination of two terms, each of which is smaller than the terms in the convex combination for W'(Q)|b)s. Now, in
both W'(Q)Ib)s and W'(Q)ILss the first term in brackets is larger than the second term in brackets. Since w > wo
for any a E (0. 1), W'(Q)ILSs puts less weight in the larger term, and more weight in the smaller term than V'(Q)|s.
Thus, Wr(Q)|s > Wr(Q)ILss for any Q = (1, w), so that low-cost semi-separation is not an equilibrium for w > D.
Now take a high-cost semi-separating candidate equilibrium. Under such an equilibrium U(Q, in') = 1 and F(Q, in') c
(0, 1). Posterior beliefs are w(A) > w and w(R) = 0. The incentive constraint for a low-cost p, is
in' - 0 + 6Vo ((1, w(A))) > WV ((1, 0))
The indifference condition for a high-cost politician is
in - 5+ V ((1. w(A))) = 6V ((1, 0))
Vo'((1, 0)) = VP((1, 0)) = 0 because if pb is believed to be high-cost he is never included in a supporting coalition.
From Claim A3-1 we also have that V#((1, w(A))) = 0, so that the high-cost semi-separating offer must be in =.
But this is the offer which induces pooling which, as shown above is never optimal.
We conclude that if the ruler makes an offer first to the politician whose type is not perfectly known, it must be a
separating offer. Moreover, that strategy yields the same value for the ruler as the strategy in which he offers first to
the politician whose type is known to be low-cost; strategies a) and b)-P are payoff equivalent, and in both the ruler
remains in power with probability 1.
Entrenchment Dynamics at Q = (w. 0).
Proposition 7:
Start by observing that Wr((0,0)) = while IV((1, 0)) = -. The ruler clearly prefers the state in which he
faces one low and one high cost politicians to the state where he faces two high-cost politcians. For any w E (0, 1), pa
has private information about his cost, while it is common knowledge that ph is high-cost. To characterize equilibrium
dynamics I start by taking the set of feasible strategies for the ruler, and restrict it using the equilibrium conditions
implied by the model. Recall a larkov strategy for the ruler prescribes chosing a politician tC {a, b} to make a first
offer, the value of the first offer in , and the value of the second offer m 2 to the remaining politician. Moreover, we
know that the politician's equilibrium strategies must be pooling on rejection (PR) where both low and high-cost
types reject, low-cost semi-separating (LSS) where the low-cost mixes and the high-cost rejects., separating (S) where
the low-cost supports and the high cost rejects. high-cost semi-separating (HSS) where the low-cost supports and
the high-cost mixes, or pooling on support (PA) where both low and high-cost types support. Given that pb's type
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is known, an equilibrium offer to pb must be such that he accepts. As a result we can denote by (t, Q) the strategy
type used by the ruler, where Q E {PR, LSS, S, HSS, PA}.
Lemma A3-3: In equilibrium the ruler never uses a strategy (b, PA).
Proof. Assume that in state Q = (w,0) the ruler uses a strategy (b, PA). Under such a strategy the ruler first makes
an offer mi to p , which must be accepted, and then makes an offer m2 to pa which is accepted by both low and
high-cost types and hence leaves beliefs unchanged. Because beliefs (w, 0) are absorbing, the ruler uses the same
strategy (b, PA) and makes the same offer in every future period. The value for the ruler is W(bPA) (Q) 1
Now consider the strategy (b, PR). Since the support decision by pb comes before the ruler makes an offer to pa ml
must also be sufficient for pb to support when the ruler makes a PR offer to pa for whatever the off-the-equilibrium
path behavior after a rejection is. Beliefs about pa also remain unchanged, while the ruler is not making a payment
to pa. The value of such a strategy is Wbprn(Q) = which is stictly larger than Wb
Lemma A3-4: The ruler can never induce full separation on the equilibrium path: No strategy (1, S)
can be part of an equilibrium for any w.
Proof. A necessary condition for a strategy (t, S) to be part of an equilibrium is that a low-cost type wants to support:
in - 6 + V,"((1.0)) > WV0 a((00))
which follows because if a low-cost type p" supports in a separating equilibrium, he reveals his type, so posterior
beliefs are w(A) = 1. If he rejects, because pb has already accepted (if t = b) or will accept (if t = a), there is no
power transition and posterior beliefs are that he is high-cost w(R) = 0. Under Q = (0, 0) the ruler offers m' = # (see
Proposition 4) to a politician chosen at random. This means that a low-cost type's value of being believed high-cost is
Vja((0, 0)) = - Recall also that under Q = (1, 0) the ruler offers in = 0 to p", so that V,"((1, 0)) 0. Replacing2 1-6
these conditions in the IC above,
2 16-0
21 -6
Another necessary condition for separation is that a high-cost type wants to reject:
6V4"((0, 0)) > n -+6V"((1, 0))
Under Q = (0, 0) the equilibrium value for 0 is V# ((0, 0)) =- 0, and notice that Va ((1, 0)) = 0 too. The latter follows
because under Q = (1,0) the ruler offers in = 0 to pa, but this offer cannot be accepted by a high-cost p", given that
0 < 0. pa must reject, after which the ruler makes an off-the-equilibrium-path offer to pb which pb accepts, and this
happens in every future period. The high-cost type's IC is simply 0 > m 2 - . Reducing Mr2 until the low-cost type's
IC binds makes the high-cost type's IC most likely to hold. For in2  0 + 61 ,
10 0 6
0 > 0+ 6 -- - 0 ;> {1([ - 0)21 -6 2(1 -6)
6-(- ) . 20> 62( - 0>36-2 < -
2(1 - 6) -- ~ 3
For any 6 larger than j separation cannot be sustained.
l
Since we are considering 6 -+ 1, separation cannot be an equilibrium. The reason is that to induce separation the ruler
must make an offer high enough that a low-type is willing to reveal his type. This is costly because if the low-type
were believed high-cost he would get an informational rent every period, whereas after revelation his value is driven to
zero. But for such a high offer, the high-cost type's IC cannot be satisfied; he also prefers to support for large enough
discount factors. This is analogous to the standard Laffont and Tirole (1988) "too much pooling" result. Notice this
argument follows no matter if the ruler's first offer is to a or to b.
Lemma A3-5: In equilibrium the value of a high-cost pa is zero for any w: VTa((w, 0)) = 0.
Proof. Assume that at state Q = (w, 0) the ruler uses a strategy of the form (t, HSS). Under such a strategy the offer
to pa is such that a low-cost type supports with probability 1 and a high-cost type supports with interior probability.
In such an equilibrium posterior beliefs are w(A) > w and w(R) = 0. For a 0 type,
m - 0+ Va((w(A), 0)) = 6Va((0, 0))
Recall that V,"((0,0)) = 0 so that the high-semi-separating offer must be m 0 6Va((w(A),0)). But since a
high-cost type cannot accept an offer below his cost of providing political support, and the equilibrium value of a
politician cannot be negative, a HSS equilibrium can only exist if V6'((w(A),0)) = 0, which implies n = . This is,
the value at posterior beliefs Q = (w(A),0) must be zero for a high-cost p", and implies the equilibrium value for a
high-cost politician at Q must be Vya(Q) = o - + 0 = 0.
Now assume at state Q = (w, 0) the ruler uses a strategy of the form (a, PA). Under such a strategy the ruler first
makes a pooling offer to pa, which both types of politician accept. If pa rejects the ruler makes an offer to pb which
he accepts. Under a Pooling equilibrium w(S) = w. The high-cost type's IC is
n - 0 + 6Va(Q) > 6 Va(Q)
where I assume that out-of-equilibrium beliefs after a rejection are w(R) = w (the specific assumption about out-of-
equilibrium beliefs is inconsequential). The IC above implies that the optimal offer in a pooling equilibrium when pa
is made the first offer is m = 6. Of course, such an offer makes the low-cost type's IC slack, and V4,(Q) = 0.
Finally, any other type of offer under Q is either (t, LSS) or (t, PR). In either case the high-cost politician gets no
transfer in the current period. Together these imply that V,(Q) = 0 VQ such that Q = (w.0).
Lemma A3-6: There are no HSS equilibrium offers.
Proof. First I show that if at Q = (w.0) the ruler makes a LSS offer, then Va(Q) <; 6(K - 0). To show this observe
that under an LSS offer to pa, a high-cost type must be rejecting, and a low-cost type mixes between acceptance and
rejection. Posterior beliefs are w(A) = 1 and w(R) < w. The IC for the high-cost type is
6V-6 ((w(R), 0)) > m - + V((1, 0)) = in(Q) -0
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The offer must also satisfy the low-cost type's indifference condition:
Vfa(Q) = n(Q) - 0 + V((1, 0)) = V((w(R), 0))
We have that Vo((1,0)) = 0 (see Appendix 2), so the offer must be m(Q) = + 6Ve((w(R),0)). At (w(R),0) the
ruler can make a PA offer, a PR offer, a LSS offer or a H SS offer.
Suppose the equilibrium offer at (w(R), 0) is PR (the ruler makes an offer to pb and then no offer to pa). Then the
ruler makes no offer to pa in any future period and there is no learning. In such case V4'((w(R), 0)) = 0. This implies
today's offer must be m = 0, which satisfies the high-cost type's IC (who rejects).
Now suppose the equilibrium offer at (w(R), 0) is PA. Then the ruler offers m = which both types accept and beliefs
remain at (w(R), 0) thereafter. The equilibrium value for a low-cost type would be V'((w(R), 0)) = -, so that today,
the offer must be m(Q) 0 + 61 . From Lemma A3-5 above we have that the value of a high-cost type must be
zero in any equilibrium, so that V-6((w(R), 0)) = 0. The high type's IC requires 0 >0 + - -0- (0- 2)[1-g - 1],
which only holds for 6 < . This implies that if at w the equilibrium offer induces LSS, the equilibrium offer at w(R)
cannot be PS. Otherwise the high-cost type would also want to support with probability 1.
Suppose the equilibrium offer at (w(R),0) is HSS. Then at (w(R),0) the ruler makes an offer which makes the
high-cost type indifferent, while the low-cost type prefers to support. From Lemma A3-5, m = 0, and tomorrow's IC
for the low-cost type is
Vfa ((a;(R), 0)) = 6 Va ((u'(A), 0)) > 6 V ((0, 0))
where w'(A) are posterior beliefs following w(R), after a support decision is observed. The right-hand-side follows
because if the low-cost type were to reject the offer, under a HSS he would be believed to be high-cost. Recall from
Lemma A3-4 that VJ((0, 0)) = -'. so that VJ'((w(R), 0)) > - . This implies that today, the offer inducing a
LSS must be n(Q) > 0 + 6- 0'9 which, as shown in the paragraph above, can only satisfy the high-cost IC for
6 < !. Thus a HSS offer cannot follow a LSS offer after a rejection.
Suppose the equilibrium offer at (w(R), 0) is LSS. Then at (w(R), 0) the ruler again makes an offer which makes the
low-cost politician indifferent. Thus. m((w(R), 0)) - 0 + SVa((1, 0)) = Va((w(R), 0)) = n((w(R). 0)) - 0. Replacing
in the indifference condition above, m(Q) - 0 = 61n((w(R),0)) - 0]. Solving for tomorrow's offer,
rn((w(R), 0)) = n() - 1
The high-cost type's IC requires that ?n(Q) < 0, so the maximum value that m((w(R), 0)) can take if in the equilibrium
the ruler will make an LSS offer after a rejection, is m""x = 16 0, which implies that V6'(Q) < m""x - =
1 6 - = 6(0 - 0).
We conclude that if at Q the ruler makes an offer which induces LSS, along an equilibrium, after a rejection -when
posterior beliefs are (w(R), 0)- the ruler can only be making a PR or another LSS offer, and the low-cost type's
equilibrium value is bounded above by 6(0 - 0).
Now consider a state Q, and suppose that under Q HSS is an equilibrium. From Lemma A3-6, m 0., and from
Proposition 4 V6,((0. 0)) = 4 , so the low-cost type's IC is
1 0 - 0<>6a((() ) 36 -2
0 - 6 V4' ((w(A), 0)) 6 - 6o ((w(S), 0))> (0-0)
2 1 - - 2(1 -6)
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For an HSS offer to be an equilibrium in state Q it is necessary that the above inequality holds. Since Vj'((w(A), 0)) =
0 if at (w(A), 0) the ruler makes a PR offer, in equilibrium a HSS offer cannot be followed by a PR offer. Since
V 0'((w(A), 0)) < 6(0 - 0) if at (w(A), 0) the ruler makes a LSS offer, in equilibrium a HSS offer cannot be followed
either by a LSS offer for large discount factors. Thus, a HSS offer can only be followed by a HSS offer or by a PA
offer after support is observed. In either case, m(w(S), 0) = .
Now, under a PA equilibrium the ruler offers 0 to pa every period, and beliefs remain unchanged. On the other hand,
under a HSS equilibrium the ruler offers 0 to pa, which, if rejected, drives the posterior to (w(R),0) = (0,0). In
every future period the ruler must offer 0 to one politician. If the offer is accepted, because an HSS offer can only be
followed by a PA or another HSS offer, the ruler will also have to make an offer 0 to pa. Moreover, if at any period
where the ruler is making a HSS offer to p" first the outcome is a rejection, the ruler will have to make an offer of
O+ jo6# to pb to remain in power. Thus, a HSS offer cannot be an equilibrium; the ruler would prefer to make PS
offer.
Lemma A3-6 above simply shows that high-cost semi-separation cannot be part of the equilibrium dynamics because
for it to be feasible the ruler must make an offer as high as the offer which is required to induce pooling. At the same
time, either "bad" information is revealed after a rejection -that pa is high cost- or the ruler must keep making the
same offer after support, while a rejection increases the value for pb to reject, which is undesirable for the ruler.
Taken together the above lemmas imply that for Q = (u. 0) equilibrium strategies must be either (a, PA) (b, PR)
or (t, LSS). Moreover, that if at Q the ruler makes a LSS offer to pa, the offer cannot be (a, PA) after a rejection
(under beliefs (w(R), 0)). The ruler either cannot learn or can only induce partial separation. Recall from above that
along an equilibrium in which the ruler makes an offer at Q and at (w(R),0) which induces LSS, the following must
be satisfied:
n((a(R), 0)) =?n(9) - 1
This equation has a unique fixed point at 0, which is the lowest acceptable transfer the ruler can make which a low-cost
politician can accept. Thus, offering n = 0 satisfies the indifference condition for the low-cost type, and yields the
highest possible payoff for the ruler when the equilibrium offer is LSS.
Notice that (a, PA) and (a, LSS) are "commitment" strategies in that pa will never be pivotal because the ruler will
make a second offer to pb which he accepts for sure whenever pa rejects. On the other hand, under a strategy where
ph is made the first offer, if after a rejection by pb the ruler has incentives not to make a pooling offer, p's outside
option will be higher than his cost, and the ruler would have to make him a higher offer on the equilibrium path.
Because the ruler's value is sure to be 0 under strategy (a. PA), analogous to the derivation of the cutoff for beliefs
Q = (1, w), there exists a c^; such that for higher values the ruler would prefer to make a separating offer (a separating
offer is feasible off the equilibrium path). The cuttof is given by the value of a for which the ruler, after a rejection
by p, prefers to make a separating rather than a pooling offer to pa
The interim value for a ruler who makes a pooling offer in 2 = + j1#, just enough for the high-cost type to accept,
is v'(Q) = p - 0 -o# + 6W'(Q), where notice that beliefs remain unchanged given that both types of pa accept.
A separating offer must be just enough for the low-cost type to support: in2 = 0 + 16# (this offer is rejected by the
high-cost type). By making a separating offer the interim value for the ruler is vr(Q) = w[6W'((1, 0)) - 0 -
Pooling off-the-equilibrium path is credible iff
61V((,. 0)) 0 5 - jo#
< 
=2
o11 -- 16#T1-6 - 2
Given that in any equilibrium under a state Q - (w, 0) the ruler's value is bounded between '-- and , there exists
a cutoff CO E . Notice the upper bound of this set is Zj as defined in
Lemma A3-2. Since a strategy (a, PA) gives the ruler a value he cannot attain under strategy (b, PR) for w > c2.
there exists some w' > L. such that the ruler will make a first offer to pa for any W > W'.
Lemma A3-7: There exist c < c2 such that for w < L the ruler prefers a strategy (b, LSS) (under
commitment) to a strategy (a, LSS).
Proof. The ruler's equilibrium value of following a strategy (b, LSS) is
Wb,LSS)(Q) = - + uxo6 - 6] + (1 - wa)6W'((w(R), 0))
which follows because the ruler first makes an offer 0 to p6 which is accepted, and then makes an offer m 2 = 0 to pa,
which is accepted with probability wo and rejected with probability 1 - wa. The ruler's value of following a strategy
(a, LSS) is
W{,L ss)(Q) = p + Wa[6 - -- _] + (1 - wa)[6Wr((w(R), 0)) - ]1-6 2
which follows because the ruler first makes a LSS offer ml 0 to p" which is accepted with probability wo and
rejected with probability 1 - wa. After a rejection, the ruler must make a second offer m 2 = + o# for p6 to
support. Take the limit as w -> 0. Given that a is bounded between 0 and 1, wa -> 0 too. It follows that
lin-oW(aQLSS>(Q) < lin oVVb,LSS)(Q). Thus, cL' > 0 exists.
Lemma A3-7 highlights the trade-off between making a first offer to p" or to pb. The former implies that on the
equilibrium path the ruler might have to make a large offer to a pivotal politician, but is a minimum winning
coalition. The latter makes no politician pivotal, but makes a supermajority coallition possible on the equilibrium
path.
El
Lemma A3-8: For any u < W and any mixing probability by a low-cost politician, the ruler prefers
(b. LSS) to (b, PR).
Proof. For any Q E {(w, 0) : L E (0. 1)}, the ruler's equilibrium value is bounded below by '-jso that
p0  i-O __ 0-
V(b,LSs)(Q) >p-O+a[ o -- 0]+(1-wa)I 1 6 +wa[O 6 -6
This is larger than W('bPR)(Q) = for any 6 large enough (6 ;> 0/).
F-
Equilibrium cutoff c for a" = 1/2.
Assume Q (0. ow), so that pa s type is known to be high-cost. Recall equilibrium behavior for ob < C,
prescribes the ruler to make a first offer mi 0d to pa the politician whose type is common knowledge, which
pa accepts. The ruler then makes a second offer m 2 - 0 to pb, which a high-cost pb rejects and a low-cost pb
accepts with probability 1/2. Posterior beliefs after k rejections are thus
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b 
Wb
Wk - 2 k _ (2 k - 1)wb
Thus, the ruler's ex-ante value can be expressed recursively as
-1 1 1o
Wr (0,w b) -p - o- a ± -b6Wr(O, 1) + [1 - wb]6W (0. Lo
2 2 2 2 -wb)
Iteratively,
Wr(0,wb) - - 5+ b [ -] +[1- wb]6{ p - Wb+ 0
2 1-6 - 2 22 -wb 1-6 -
[ b [jo -0+ 4  b 61-6 +[1- -b] +...] +...}2 2 -o w24 - 3w 1-6 - 54 -3wo
which can be reorganized as
W(.b) =I [p(+67,1 + 62T2 + 63T3 +...)+ 0 -1 1, T + 61T ofW + 62T2 1 U + 6s3 Wb + .
where Te =-Wob. Solving the equation above,
W, (0,wU) = [Ap - 01 2] 1 + [6p - - W(1 - 6)(2 -6) 1 - 6 -- 2 -
prL -0 wb '(0- 0 )
W, (0, oW - + 01-6 2-o 1- ~
Notice that for 6 > 0/0 , the ruler's equilibrium value is increasing in ob. Of course, when the ruler faces
no commitment problem following a rejection by pl. his equilibrium value should be increasing in the degree
of optimism about p2 's type. The term multiplying ob in fact represents the expected present value of
informational rents that the ruler will save from transfering to p0 in case pb reveals his type is 0. In fact,
equilibrium values for both politicians along the equilibrium are Vb(0 ob) -0 Vb(0,wb) 0, Va(0, wb) - 0,
V"(0,Wb) = - ob (26) 6)1.
c is given by beliefs such that after a rejection by p', the ruler's interim value of inducing S is higher than
the value of following the equilibrium prescribing LSS to pb. Hence. ' satisfies:
b -6 1 1 p - ; wb 6(i-6)
p+w 6 -- 0-6-6=p 
- -66+b - + - - -60)11 -6 2 2 11-6 2-6 1-6
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0( - ) -( -6)0 - 6(1 - 6)10
)1-6(uO-(1 - 6V- 6(1-)5-5
Appendix 4: Interior Beliefs
Proposition 8: Entrenchment Dynamics at Q = (w, .b.
I start by proving the following lemma:
Lemma A4-1: For any interim beliefs Q, where D1 = R, an S offer is always feasible.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume pa has rejected, and interim beliefs are (wa(R),Uo). The low-cost
type incentive constraint for separation is:
m 2 - 0 + 6VOf w(R). 1) > 6-4
2
For the high-cost type the incentive constraint is:
m 2 - 5+ 6VgJ(wa(R), 1) < 2
These ICs follow from the fact that in a separating equilibrium, acceptance drives the posterior to 1, while
rejection triggers a power transition. Reducing m2 until the low type's IC binds increases the ruler's value, and
relaxes the high type's IC. Thus, i 2 =max{6+6od-6Vj(w"(R), 1), 0}. At Q = (w"(R). 1), V0("(R) 1)
0 if wa(R) <a', in which case mn= 0 + 61(b. or V(wa(R). 1) = (1 - wa(R))6 # if wa(R) > D. in which case
mn2 = 6 + 614[1 - 6(1 - wa (R))).
If wa(R) < D, Vb(wa(R). 1) = 0 given that the ruler will make positive offers of exactly 0 to pb in the future.
Hence, a separating equilibrium is feasible iff
1 - < 1
0-0<0
which is of course satisfied.
If Wa(R) ;> a, at Q = (wa(R), 1) the ruler makes a first separating offer to pa, which is accepted if pa is low
cost. If pa rejects, the ruler makes an offer m 2 = 0 + 61d to pb, which pb rejects. and a power transition
ensues. Thus. V (wa(R). 1) = wa(R) 0+ (1 -wa(R))6j44 = (1 -wa(R))6!#. Hence. a separating equilibrium
is feasible iff
0+6 10[1 - 6(1 -wa(R))] + 62(1 _ a(R))4 < 42 2 2
0 - <0
which is also satisfied. F
The ruler can always separate after a rejection, because following a rejection the outside option of both types
of politician is the same, given that the value of triggering a political transition does not depend on the
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politician's type. Lemmas A4-2 and A4-3 now characterize equilibrium behavior at an interim stage in which
revelation has taken place.
Lemma A4-2: At Interim beliefs (1, w) after D 1 = A , the ruler's offer to b is PR.
Proof. First, assume that w < a. Trivially, making any kind of offer to p 2 is suboptimal for the ruler, who
will already remain in power achieving his maximum value.
Now assume u > D notice that if interim beliefs are (1, w), and the ruler made a first offer to pa, it must
be that a accepted. The ruler will already remain in power until next period. The ruler could make an
informative offer to pb, or wait until next period and follow the equilibrium behavior at (1, w). In the latter
case, the ruler's interim value in the current period is
v'(1, p - m 1 + 6W(1, w) = p - m1  6 -(1- w)54
First notice that for interim beliefs (1, w), the ruler can actually make a fully separating offer of m 2 = 0.
This follows because after either acceptance or rejection, next period the equilibrium value for both types
of politician is zero. Of course, full revelation is strictly prefered to LSS or HSS by the ruler. The ruler's
interim value of separation in the current period is
V'(1 ,;)|s= p d -m+w -6_0+ 61 - + (1 - w1 -o 1-
This implies that separating at the interim stage is optimal iff v'(1,w)|s > v'(1.w) e
621o~
0+6210
0626I
Now. for 6 large enough, + < D so the ruler prefers to PR for any w E [, 1) (for 6 > 0/0 this inequality
is slack). Of course, an analogous argument applies for interim beliefs (w, 1). D
From Lemma A4-2 it follows that starting from beliefs (wa. Wb) following a fully revealing acceptance decision
by a that drives interim posterior beliefs to (1, ?b), the ruler will not make a second offer to b.
Lemma A4-3: At Interim beliefs (0, w), such that w > LD, the ruler's offer to b is S. If W < C, the
ruler's offer to b is PS.
Proof. Interim belifs at (0, w) must have followed a revealing rejection by p'. Thus, pb is pivotal. From
Lemma A4-1. we know separation is feasible. Now observe that c is precisely defined as the maximum value
of beliefs about pb for which the ruler prefers not to separate following a rejection. It thus follows that that
for w > 0, the ruler will make a separating second offer. while for w < 0 the ruler will make a pooling second
offer.
Of course, a symmetric arguments applies for beliefs (. 0) following a rejection by pD.
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Lemmas A4-4, and A4-5 now show that for interior beliefs, the ruler cannot make a fully separating first
offer if beliefs about the second politician to be offered are w < c, and that after acceptance by pl the ruler
cannot make a fully separating second offer if beliefs about the second politician to be offered are w < c.
This will restrict considerably the type of equilibria that can be sustained.
Lemma A4-4: For any interior beliefs Q (w a Wb), a separating first offer to a is infeasible if
Wb < c, and feasible for b > cy.
Proof. From Lemmas A4-2 and A4-3, it follows that there are two relevant regions of the state space concern-
ing a separating offer to pl. Without loss of generality assume that p = a. After a separating offer to p",
posterior beliefs become either (1, ob) or (0, wb), following an acceptance or a support decision, respectively.
In region Q1 ={a, b) : Wb < L}, the ruler will make a pooling offer to pb following a rejection, while in
region q 2 - {a Wb) : wh > L} the ruler will make a separating offer to pb following a rejection (see Lemma
A4-3). In either region, the ruler will make no offer to pb following an acceptance decision.
Assume beliefs are Q E Q1. Incentive constraints for a separating equilibrium in this region are, for a low-cost
type,
m
1 
-0 + 6V (1, Wb) > 6Va (0, oW)
and for a high-cost type,
mI --0+ Va (Lb) < 6V",(Ob)
The ICs follow from the fact that after a rejection, the ruler will pool pb, and after acceptance the ruler will
make no offer to p5. Moreover, in this region we have that V (1, o) - V 4'(1, wb) Va(ob) = 0, while
V$(0 o) - 0-6( o -o)Vf(0,onw(R)). Reducing ml until the low type's IC binds increases the ruler's
value, and relaxes the high type's IC. Thus, m= 0 +[O - 6 +(1 - b)V(0 owb(R))]. Separation is
feasible iff under this offer the high-cost politician rejects:
62(1 - bb)Va(Ob(R)) < ( 0) (1 - 6)
This condition cannot be satisfied for large enough 6, for any mixing probability of a low-cost pb. For the
case in which ab = 1/2 (see Appendix 3 above) for example, the condition is
1 ob 6( bb(0 0{[ (1-6 2 - b D2 6}
which would only be satisfied for very small 6.
Now assume beliefs are Q E Q2. Incentive constraints for a separating equilibrium in this region are, for a
low-cost type,
m -6 + V"(1, Wb) Wb6Va(0 1) + (1 -b 1
2
and for a high-cost type,
mI - + 6 V a l b U.b6 ya ( 0 1) + ( 1 -- o,; )6 1,~z LCin 0O "''0 29
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The ICs follow from the fact that in this region, following a rejection by p1 the ruler makes a separating offer to
p2 (see Lemma A4-3), and in case p2 rejects, there is a power transition. We have that Vfa(0, 1) = V2"(0, 1) = 0.
If Wb < , V6 (, ob) - V1"(1, Wb) = 0, so that m 0 + (1 - ) j# satisfies the low-cost type politician.
Separation is feasible iff
0±+(I -Wb)6' O<( (lWb 12 2
0 - 6< 0
which is trivially satisfied. If w > 0, on the other hand, V4 (1,wo) = (1 - 2o)6# given that next period
at (1, wb), the ruler will separate b and in case of a rejection will make a high enough offer m = 0 + # for
a to accept, while V4a( b _ b)oj# since a high-cost a will reject the offer and a power transition
takes place. For separation in the current period, the ruler will offer m 1 = + (1 - o - (1 - Wb)62 1
Separation is feasible iff
2 2 2 2
0 - < 0
which is again trivially satisfied.
Lemma A4-4 shows that Separation is infeasible when beliefs about the second politician are too pessimistic,
because the upwards IC cannot be satisfied. While after low-type revelation the ruler will fully entrench and
encroach, a low-cost politician has strong incentives to be believed high cost, and collect informational rents
in the future as long as the ruler keeps testing pb. Hence, inducing separation is too costly. and requires a
current transfer that a high cost politician would be ready to accept. Thus, when in the future a ruler is
willing to reduce his encroachment to be able to entrench by giving rents, this limits his present ability to
learn because it gives incentives for low-cost politicians to try to capture those future rents. In contrast,.
when the ruler is willing to incur some risk by making very informative offers, currently he can more easlilv
learn because separation is made easier when the outside option of both types of politician is the same, in
this case. a power transition. This only happens when beliefs about p 2 are high enough.
Lemma A4-5: There exists w > a such that for any interim beliefs Q = (wd, ob) with Wa < (, and
where Da = A, an S offer to b cannot be part of an equilibrium. Moreover, for w, > w, an S
offer to b is feasible.
Proof. Separation at the interim stage requires, for a low-cost politician b,
M 2 - 0 + V"(wa.,1) ;> V (Wa. 0)
and for a high-cost. politician b.
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Notice that V0( wa, 1) = V (Wa,1). which is either 0 if wa < a, or (1 - wa>5/ if wa > U. Moreover,
V-0 (Wa, 0) = 0. The ruler will offer m 2 =mnax{O+ oVfb(wa, 0) - 6Vb(Wa, 1), Q}, and separation will be feasible
iff
6Vb(Wa.0) < 0-6
Recall Vb(wa,0) is decreasing in Wa on the interval [0,L J. Thus, if the constraint above is not satisfied for
Wa = c it will not be satisfied anywhere in the interval. For ga = 1/2, Vb(Wa, 0) = - w_ , so that
the IC above can only be satisfied for Wa > (-3 > 1. Thus, separation is not feasible for any Wa < C.
Now observe for a given support strategy of a along boundary (wa, 0), Vob(Wa, 0) is continuous and decreasing
in the interval [cD, 1], and lim ,1 Vo (wa, 0) = 0. Thus, 3 c which satisfies Vob (w, 0) = -0, such that
Vw > w, the incentive constraint for a high cost politician b is satisfied, and separation is feasible.
Finally, notice that V (Wa, 0) > Vb(W, 0) for all Wa E (W, cZ), so that separation is also infeasible in this range.
Thus, for Wa < c the ruler cannot separate b at the interim stage, and for Wa > c the ruler can separate b at
the interim stage. E
For beliefs in the region Q1  {(wa, Wb) : Wb < c}, lemmas A4-4 and A4-5 imply that the ruler either cannot
make a first fully separating offer to a. and cannot make a separating second offer to a after b has accepted.
The following lemma shows that for any interior beliefs, a strategy that first makes a pooling offer to the
politician under more pessimistic beliefs (to give incentives for the second politician to reveal his type),
followed by a LSS offer to the politician under more optimistic beliefs, cannot be an equilibrium.
Lemma A4-6: For interior beliefs (wa, wb) such that wa > wb, a strategy of the form y =
(b, PA, LSS, -) cannot be part of a MPBE.
Proof. Omitted. E
Thus, a strategy of the form = (b, PA. LSS,-) cannot be part of an equilibrium for any beliefs.
Lemma A4-7: Assume 0= ('. wab) such that wa > Wb. For given wa, strategy (a, HSS. LSS, PA)
is an equilibrium for any wb <
Proof. Omitted. 0
Lemma A4-8: Assume Q = (wa. ob) such that Wa > Wb. For given w', strategy (a. PA. PR. PA) is
an equilibrium for (wa) Wb > C
Proof. Omitted. E
Now I show that when the optimal offer strategy for the ruler is to make a first separating offer and a
second separating offer following a rejection, then he must make the first offer to the politician under more
pessimistic beliefs.
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M2 - 0+ 4V(- 1 ~f( 0)
Lemma A4-9: For beliefs Q such that -y = (t, S, PR, S-,), t is such that w' < wt.
Proof. The equilibrium value of strategy -y for the ruler is given by
IVr(Q) = P + W1 [-Mi1 + 6Wr(1.W2)] + (1 - WI) [W2 (-m 2 + 6W'(0, 1)) + (1 - W2) - 0]
=p + Li o -- (1 - W2)6 4I m + (1 - W1)LU2 6 -- - m221 -6 21 
-
which follows directly from the ruler's equilibrium values at the boundaries (see Propositions 6 and 5).
Following a rejection, a separating offer for p 2 must be m 2 = 0 + 61d. On the other hand, the Incentive
Constraints for separation of p1 are, for a low-cost politician,
1
mi - 06 + V (1, W 2 ) > W 26V (0, 1) + (1 -W 2 )6
__ 2
and for a high-cost politician,
- 1
mI - 0 + 6V (1, W) < W2 6V (0 1) + (1 - W2) 60 0 2
This implies mi = Q+ (1 - 02)610, and the high-cost's IC is slack. Replacing equilibrium offers in the ruler's
value,
p-6 19 1 2 -6 1
=I + [Wi + W2 - W1 2] ( ~- - [(1 - W2)W(1 + 6) + W9(1 - w1)]61 - 2
Notice the term [W1 + W2 - w1W2 ] takes the same value irrespective of cm1 > w2 or LLi < w2. On the other
hand, the term [(1 - W)2 )Wi(1 +6) + W2 (1 - Wi)] is not. In fact,
[(1 - w2)W(1 + 6) + w 2(1 - 01)] < [(1 - WI) 2 (1 + 6) + W 1(1 - W2 )] <
[P1(1 + 6) - W 2W1(1 + 6) + 2 - w 2c)I < [U;2(1 + 6) - L 1 2(1 + 6) + W1 - U1 W2] <
[w1(1 + 6) + 2] < [2(1 + 6) + w1] W
WA1 < UW2
which implies that it is optimal for the ruler to make the first offer to the politician which he is more
pessimistic about. L]
Lemma A4-10: Assume Q = (w 0. Lb) such that w" > Wb. For given w', strategy (b, S, PR. S) is an
equilibrium for o;b > &(,a)
Proof. Omitted.
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Lemma A4-11: Cuttof D(wa): The cutoff cD(wa) is implicitly given by equation 14
Proof. Assume for now that wa < 0. The ruler must compare following a strategy (a, PA, PR, PA) with a
strategy (b, S, PR, S). For the latter strategy, after a rejection by b the incentive constraint for a low-cost
type a is
2- 0+ 6V"(1,0) >
For a high-cost type to reject, it must be that
m2 -5+6V"(1. 0) < 6-2
which implies an equilibrium second offer of m 2 =+ 6(, given that V,(1, 0) Vy"(10)=0
Now, a first separating offer to b must satisfy the following incentive constraints: For a low-cost type,
m- + Vb( (,1) > wa6Vb(1, 0) + (1 wa)61
2
and for a high-cost type,
1
- 6Vb(Wa 1) <Wa6Vb(1, 0) + (1 - wa)60 0 2
which implies an equilibrium first offer of m1 =±(1- , given that V (wa. 1) Vb(1 0) = V 1)
V?(1. 0) = 0. (Observe that if w D > 0, then V(Wa 1) =(1-wa)o. and it would be even easier to separate.)
The ruler's ex-ante value is then
p-6 1 +-6~
W'(Q)I(b,S,PR.S) p P, + w [-o - (1 -a +  6 1( ,ba _ _2 1 -61 2 1-6
= p+ [wb+ (1 -wb)Wa] 6 - [wb+wa - 2ba]6 
Thus. (a, PA, PR, PA) is prefered by the ruler to (b, S. PR. S) if
> P + [Wb + (I -wb aL(J] ~ - 6 -[b + a - 2w1ba]61
1-6 1 -) 2
LA;b < op - 0 - WAop - 6) - (10 6 - 6(1 -- 6 (5)}
(1 wa)[6(, -0) - (1- 6) - 6(1 - 6)}#] + wa6( - 6)
This binding inequality implicitly defines (wa) (It can be shown through outright differentiation that the
condition 6[p - (1 - 6)#] - 0 > 0 is sufficient for (wa) to be decreasing and concave. Notice this condition
can be interpreted as saying that a power transition is sufficiently economically costly. I omitt it to save
space).
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Abstract
One of the most salient explanations for the distinctive path of economic and political development
of the United States is captured by the "Frontier (or Turner) thesis". Turner argued that it was the
presence of the open frontier which explained why the United States became democratic and, at least
implicitly, prosperous. In this paper we provide a simple test of this idea. We begin with the contradictory
observation that almost every Latin American country had a frontier in the 19th century as well. We show
that while the data does not support the Frontier thesis, it is consistent with a more complex "conditional
Frontier thesis". In this view, the effect of the frontier is conditional on the way that the frontier was
allocated and this in turn depends on political institutions at the time of frontier expansion. We show that
for countries with the worst political institutions, there is a negative correlation between the historical
extent of the frontier and contemporary income per-capita. For countries with better political institutions
this correlation is positive. Though the effect of the frontier on democracy is positive irrespective of initial
political institutions, it is larger the better were these institutions. In essence, Turner saw the frontier as
having positive effects on development because he already lived in a country with good institutions.
*This paper constitutes the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at MIT, and was originally written for the conference
Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: A Conference Honoring the Contribution of Kenneth Sokoloff. Our biggest debt
is to Ken for all his encouragement, friendship and inspiration over the years. We miss him. Ve also thank Giovanni Zambotti
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1 Introduction
One of the great economic puzzles of the modern world is why, amongst a group of colonies founded at
more or less the same time in the early modern period, by more or less rapacious Europeans, with more
or less the same intentions, North America became such an economic success, while Latin America did not.
What explains "American exceptionalism"? There is no shortage of candidates, of course, but one of the
most prominent is the notion of the "Frontier".' Many scholars have claimed that a crucial aspect of the
uniqueness of the United States was the vastness of the open spaces (at least where the indigenous peoples
had died, Mann (2005)) which heavily influenced the way society, economy and polity evolved.
The most famous exposition of this view, first developed in 1893, was due to Frederick Jackson Turner.
Turner, developing what has become known as the "Frontier (or Turner) thesis", argued that the availability
of the frontier had led to a particular type of person and had crucially determined the path of US society.
"The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American
settlement westward, explain American development".
"Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call
these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions" Turner (1920, pp. 1-2).
Turner emphasized that the frontier created strong individualism and social mobility and his most forthright
claim is that it was critical to the development of democracy. He noted
"the most important effect of the frontier has been to promote democracy" Turner (1920, p. 30).
and
"These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise, democracy... Amer-
ican democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the experiences of the American people in dealing
with the West" Turner (1920, pp. 259., 266).
loreover, the things that went along with democracy and helped to promote it, such as social mobility, most
likely also stimulated economic performance.
Even if some have deferred since Turner wrote. the "Frontier Thesis" has become part of the conventional
wisdom amongst historians and scholars of the United States 2 . Though the specific mechanisms that Turner
favored, such as individualism, have become less prominent, arguments about the frontier have appeared
in many places, particularly the literature on the democratization of the United States (Keyssar (2000),
Engerman and Sokoloff (2005)). Keyssar (2000. p. xxi) argues
"The expansion of suffrage in the United States was generated by a number of key forces and
factors ... These include the dynamics of frontier settlement (as Frederick Jackson Turner pointed
out a century ago)".
1 For other ideas on this topic see Hartz (1955).Ilartz (1964) and Lipset (1996).
2 For some of the debate about the applicability of this thesis to the United States see Taylor (1956), Billington (1966),
Hofstadter and Lipset (1968).
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Those who have contested this view have tended to focus on the extent to which the Frontier did or did not
have the postulated effects within the United States.
At some level the acceptance of the Frontier thesis and the nature of the debate is quite surprising. This is
because the existence of a frontier clearly did not distinguish the United States from the other colonies of
the Americas or indeed other societies such as Russia, South Africa or Australia in the 19th century. Every
independent South American and Caribbean country, with the exception of Haiti, had a frontier in the 19th
century. As in the United States, these frontiers were usually inhabited by indigenous peoples and they went
through the same pattern of expansion into this zone which, as in the United States, coincided with the
expropriation and oftentimes anihilation of indigenous communities. In these cases, however, there seems to
be much less reason to associate the frontier expansion with democracy or economic development. Indeed,
one could conjecture that if the Frontier thesis had been developed by Latin American academics in the late
19th century it would have been formulated with a minus sign in front!3
A small literature has examined the frontier hypothesis in comparative perspective, but it has come to
inconclusive results. Turner did engage in some comparative observations but refers only to Europe, noting
"The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier - a fortified boundary
line running through dense populations Turner (1920, p. 3).
Hennessy (1978)specifically addresses the applicability of the Frontier thesis to Latin America (see also the
papers in Weber and Rausch (1994))4. Noting the absence of a literature on the Frontier thesis in Latin
America Hennessy (1978, p. 13) reasons
"If the importance of the Turner thesis lies in its ... ability to provide a legitimating and fructifying
nationalist ideology, then the absence of a Latin American frontier myth is easy to explain.
Without democracy, there was no compulsion to elaborate a supportive ideology based on frontier
experiences".
Hennessy's general conclusion is that the thesis is irrelevant because
Latin American frontiers have not provided fertile ground for democracy. The concentration of
wealth and the absence of capital and of highly motivated pioneers effectively blocked the growth
of independent smallholders and a rural middle class Hennessy (1978, p. 129).
The correlation between good outcomes and the frontier in the United States and Canada but the lack of
such a correlation in Latin America raises the question of whether or not in general there is any connection
between the frontier and economic and political development. Maybe the frontier was irrelevant? A myth?
We believe the answer to this is no. Some of the mechanisms described in the case of the United States
certainly seem plausible, it is just that they don't seem to have operated in Latin America. The key to
understanding why comes from examining how frontier land was allocated 5 . In the United States it was
3Though the issue of the role of the frontier has been considered in Latin America studies, see Hennessy (1978) and Weber
and Rausch (1994), it appears that nobody has made these comparative observations before.
40ther work looking. usually critically, at the Frontier thesis is comparative perspective include Winks (1971), Miller (1977),
and Powell (1981). For more general discussions of frontier expansions in the modern world not focused on the Turner thesis
see Richards (2003) and Belich (2009).
5 Differences in labor institutions developed in frontier areas possibly also might played a role.
the 1862 Homestead Act which played the major role in governing who and on what terms had access to
the frontier. In Latin America, on the other hand, only Costa Rica and Colombia passed legislation which
resembled this in practice. In a few other countries where some legislation was passed, it seems to have never
been put in practice Jefferson (1926, p. 167), for example, points out the difference between the "elevated
aims and philantropic language" of the Argentine legislation regarding landowning in frontier areas and "the
actuality of events". More generally. frontier land was allocated in a very oligarchic pattern by existing elites,
and property rights over frontier lands of settlers were in many cases weak. Though Turner continually talks
about the frontier and 'free land' as if they were the same thing. as Adelman (1994, p. 101) points out
"Turner... overlooked two hard facts: land was not free, and workers had to be brought in from
outside the region.
Outside of Costa Rica and Colombia, frontier land was not free in Latin America and indeed was allocated
oligarchically by those with political power6 . Hennessy (1978, p. 19) observed
"Another contrast lies in the availability of "free land". Whereas free land was the magnet attract-
ing pioneers into the North American wilderness, in Latin America most available land had been
preempted by landowning patterns set in the sixteenth century.
The historical experience of Argentina is again revealing. Jefferson (1926, p. 175-178) describes several
episodes in the ParanA basin, the Nequ6n region to the South or even in La Pampa, where settlers found
difficulties in maintaining their property rights over the lands they opened, both because State officials
reneiged on past promises or because of abuses from local elites. Interestingly., when Turner does discuss
the issue of land laws with respect to the frontier, he seems to see these as an endogenous response to the
existence of the frontier. for example arguing that
"The disposition of the public lands was a third important subject of national legislation influenced
by the frontier"Turner (1920, p. 25).
and
"It is safe to say that the legislation with regard to land ... was conditioned on frontier ideas and
needs" Turner (1920, p. 27).
These arguments suggest to us not that the frontier is irrelevant, but rather that a more nuanced version
of the Frontier thesis is required. We refer to this as the "conditional Frontier thesis". This takes into
account the fact that the consequences of the frontier are conditional on the initial political equilibrium when
frontier expansion occurred. Although the openning up of a frontier might bring new opportunities for the
establishment of equitable societies as Turner suggested, in relatively oligarchic countries the existence of
an open frontier gave the ruling elite a new valuable instrument which they could manipulate to remain in
6 There is a large historical literature on the oligarchic allocation of frontier lands in 19th century Latin America. For
overviews of the central American experience see Williams (1994), Gudnundson (1997) and Mahoney (2001): McCreery (1976)
and McCreery (1994) for the Guatemalan experience. Parsons (1949) is the classic work on frontier expansion in Colombia, see
also Christie (1978) and LeGrand (1986). Dean (1971) and Butland (1966) analyze the Brazilian case, Solberg (1969) presents
the evidence for Chile. and Coatsworth (1974) and Coatsworth (1981) for Mexico. Solberg (1987) and Adelman (1994) discuss
Argentina and both books make interesting comparisons to the differential evolution of Canada.
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power. They did this through the structure of land and laws, policies towards immigrants and clientelistic
access to frontier lands. When initial political institutions were different, as they were in the United States,
Canada, Costa Rica and Colombia, elites were less able to manipulate this resource and a more open society
evolved. As Turner argued, it is quite likely in these circumstances that the existence of a frontier helped
to induce further improvements in political institutions. In countries like Argentina or Mexico, it is possible
that an oligarchically allocated frontier was worse than having no frontier at all.
In this paper we propose what we believe is the first empirical test of the Frontier thesis and particularly
the "conditional Frontier thesis". To do this we construct an estimate of the proportion of land which was
frontier in each independent country in the Americas in 1850. We combine this with data on current income
per-capita, democracy and inequality. Our first main finding is that our estimates of the relative size of
the frontier are positively correlated with long-run economic growth and the extent to which countries were
democratic over the 20th century. The relative size of the frontier is also negatively correlated with income
inequality. These initial results are quite consistent with the simple Frontier thesis.
Nevertheless, we then test for the "conditional Frontier thesis" by interacting the proportion of frontier land
in 1850 with measures of initial institutions, specifically constraints on the executive from the Polity dataset
which is available for every independent country in the Americas in 18507. When GDP per-capita in 2007
is the dependent variable we find that neither frontier land in 1850 nor constraints on the executive are
themselves statistically significant. but their interaction is. Indeed, the results imply that for countries with
the lowest level of constraints on the executive (which is almost half our sample in 1850) long-run economic
growth is lower the larger is the frontier. For higher levels of constraints. however, long-run growth is higher.
These simple regressions are very consistent with our hypothesis. With respect to democracy, when we look
at the average Polity Score from 1900-2007 we again find that once we add the interaction term, neither
frontier nor constraints themselves are significant. In this case we do not find that the frontier is ever bad
for democracy, but rather its impact on democracy is greater the greater are constraints on the executive
in 1850. These results suggest, consistent with the "conditional Frontier thesis", that the frontier on its own
had no impact on democracy. When we turn to the democracy score averaged over the post World War 11
period (1950-2007) we find different results. Here frontier on its own tends to be positively correlated with
democracy while the interaction term is not statistically significant. Finally, when we examine contemporary
inequality as the dependent variable we do not find robust results. Though frontier and constraints on the
executive in 1850 are both negatively correlated with inequality, when we add the interaction term none of
the variables is statistically significant.
Our argument about the conditional effect of the frontier is related to several important historical debates.
For example. one interpretation of the arguments of Brenner (1976) is that large shocks in the middle ages.
such as trade expansion or the Black Death had conditional effects which depended on initial institutions.
In Britain where the serfs were relatively organized and where Lords did not have large estates, the Black
Death empowered the lower orders and led to the collapse of feudal institutions. In eastern Europe, however,
where the initial conditions were different, the Black Death ultimately led to the "'Second Serfdom". A
related argument is presented in Acemoglu et al. (2005) who argue that the impact on Western Europe
of trade and colonial expansion after 1492 depended on initial political institutions. In places where there
were relatively strong political institutions, such as Britain and the Netherlands, trade expansion led to
improvements of institutions and stimulated economic growth and further political change. In places which
7Except for Canada, for which data is available starting in 1867.
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were more absolutist, such as Spain and France, trade expansion had opposite effects 8
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss how we measure the extent of the frontier
and present some basic data about its extent and nature. In section 3 we examine the correlation between
the frontier and long run economic and political outcomes. Second 4 investigates whether or not there is a
conditional effect of the frontier and section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring the Frontier
The literature on the frontier has been quite vague on how exactly to determine what was or what was not
frontier. Turner himself noted (1920, p. 3)
"In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or
more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need a sharp
definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt, including the Indian country and the other
outer margin of the"settled area" of the census reports.
It was the definition of the frontier as areas with a population density of less than two people per square mile
that led the census bureau to declare in 1890 that the US frontier had closed.
Any attempt to measure the extent of the frontier across the Americas must confront several methodological
issues. In the first place, frontiers in each country., and even within each country, looked very different around
the mid-nineteenth century. Coming up with a measure of the frontier for each country therefore requires
a compromise to select some basic simplifying but consistent criteria which will necessarily overlook many
possibly important dimensions. Following the historical literature and the relevance of the criteria in the light
of Turner's arguments regarding the frontier, the natural candidates for such a classification are the presence
or absence of native American communities not subject to state control and authority, overall population
density (including any non-native American settlers), and the presence or absence of state institutions. All of
these conditions were important determinants of the potential availability of free land and of the possibilities
for successful settlement. Especially problematic is that we would like to think of the frontier as a dichotomous
condition, whereas its defining variables are in most cases inherently continuous, and its boundaries usually
not clear-cut.
When dealing with the frontier experience of South America another issue arises; settlement of frontier lands
was not an absorbing state in some regions. Several areas in Paraguay, for example, were significantly settled
and run by Jesuit missionaries during the colonial period. After the expulsion of Jesuits from the Spanish
Empire in 1767. the Crown reassigned the control of these regions to other religious communities who failed
in maintaining the economic success of the missions and the political control of the indigenous communities
inhabiting the areas. As a result, in a matter of decades the missionary regions degenerated to a virtual
absence of State control and became frontiers once again. They remained as such until late in the 19th
century (Eidt (1971), Moniz (2006)). The case of Brazilian bandeirantes in the 17th and 18th centuries is
similar. Brazil expanded its boundaries as these settlers moved west into the Amazon and its south-western
basin. Nonetheless, many of these areas were subsequently unsettled and remained like that until late in
the republican period. As a result, Brazilian historiography refers to them as "hollow frontiers" (Katzman
SThis type of interaction also comes up in the literature of the impact of the resource curse, see M\oene et al. (2006).
(1977)). For our purposes we tried to include in our measure these regions, which around 1850 were in fact
not controlled by republican states even if they had been so earlier in colonial times.
Once such decisions have been made, the second issue is related to the availability of information about the
definitional criteria for what frontier and non-frontier lands were. Not only is detailed information scarce by
the very nature of the subject, but the comparability of the data across countries might also be problematic.
We collected three types of information, based on which we constructed three alternative measures of the
frontier; (a) historical cartographic data depicting directly information on frontier territories or on population
density for several of the countries in our sample of independent republics, at different dates starting in the
mid 19th century, b) geographic (and georeferenced) information on current-day administrative divisions
(provinces, departments or states), and c) direct country or regional historical accounts on the settlement
of frontier areas during the 19th century. The appendix contains a detailed description of the sources used
for each country. The reason that making use of current administrative divisions is helpful is that in fact
the formation of administrative units in many regions across the Americas was precisely driven by significant
settlement and State presence. The best examples of this might be the straight lines marking the boundaries
of the western states of the United States, put in place as a first effort to regulate and control the newly
occupied territories as the westward expansion moved on, or the Amazon rainforest frontier provinces of
countries like Colombia, Brazil or Peru. which were designed precisely to delimit such frontier areas.
2.1 The Frontier in the United States and Canada
For these two countries we were able to find detailed cartographic information which allowed us to calculate
the share of unsettled and settled land in 1850. More specifically, for the United States the Office (1898) and
Gerlach (1970) contain detailed maps of population density. Both sources use the 19th century United States
Census data, and following the Census Bureau, classify as frontier land the territory with less than 2 people
per square mile (0.7725 people per square kilometer). For Canada, theof Statistics (n.d) contains maps for
several years in the second half of the 19th century, depicting population density by points on the map. We
directly georeferenced these maps using GIS software, and computed the share of total land area of each
country with population density below 0.7725 people per square kilometer, in 1850 for the United States and
in 1851 for Canada. Since these maps were based on detailed census data, we believe these frontier measures
have the smallest possible measurement error, and are the only ones we consider for these two countries.
For the rest of countries in the Americas the information is not as detailed and is more scattered throughout
different sources. As a result, we decided to create a set of alternative measures of the frontier, taking into
account the differences we found when comparing the available information.
2.2 The Frontier in Central America
To measure the Frontier in Central America we relied heavily in Hall and P~rezBrignoli (2003), which contains
rich historical maps for Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama, of settlement
during the 19th century. and also has a thorough historical discussion of the frontier expansion throughout
the region. We merged the information of these maps., which depict the frontier regions in each country, with
a georeferenced sub-national level map of Central America, and coded each province department state as
frontier or non-frontier depending on whether or not it fell into the regions considered as unsettled in the
Hall and PrezBrignoli (2003) maps. Of course, with this procedure a considerable number of sub-national
units appeared as partially frontier areas. We thus created two different measures of the frontier, which
we call narrow and wide. The narrow measure classifies as non-frontier the sub-national units for which an
ambiguous coverage of the Hall and P~rezBrignoli (2003) maps had been obtained, while the wide measure
classifies them a frontier. We further refined the classification of provinces using of the Census (1956a),
which contains very detailed population density maps for all the Central American republics in 1950 at the
province/department level. The comparison with these maps allowed us to reclassify provinces that might
have been ambiguous, but which by 1950 clearly had a population density below 0.7725 people per square
kilometer, and necessarily must have been frontier areas 100 years before. The Appendix presents the coding
of each sub-national unit in its narrow and wide versions.
For the Mexican frontier we relied on the of Business Research (1975) population density map for 1900, a
state-level map based on the 1900 Censo General de Poblaci6n. together with Bernstein (1964) and Hennessy
(1978). Since population density in 1900 was considerably higher than in 1850 everywhere in Mexico, we
coded as frontier states not only those with less than 0.7725 people per square kilometer in 1900, but also any
State with at most a population density of 5 people per square kilometer in 1900, which were at the same time
mentioned in the complementary references as frontier areas. This resulted in a relatively straightforward
classification except for the state of Chiapas, which we coded as non-frontier in the narrow measure and as
frontier in the wide measure.
2.3 The Frontier in the Caribbean Republics
Only Haiti and the Dominican Republic were independent by 1850, and as such are the only two Caribbean
countries in our sample. Coding the frontier for them was a pretty straightforward job based on Anglade
(1982) and Lora (2002). Anglade presents population density maps for the late 18th century, and mid 19th
century, where it is clear that since the colonial period Haiti had population densities well above 0.7725
people per square kilometer, and almost everywhere significantly higher. Haiti therefore did not have a
frontier. For the Dominican Republic the picture is very similar, except possibly for the provinces of Barahona
and Pedernales in the south-western tip of the country. The of the Census (1956b) also contains detailed
province-level maps of these two countries in 1950. which show a low population density in the southwest of
the Dominican Republic. As a result, the narrow measure considers Barahona and Pedernales as non-frontier.
while the wide measure codes them as frontier. All the rest of the country is coded as non-frontier.
2.4 The Frontier in South America
To measure the frontier in the South American countries we followed a procedure very similar to the one we
used for the Central American republics, merging the information in usually country-specific historical maps
and accounts with current-day sub-national units. The Appendix contains the historical references used for
each country. When a sub-national unit was partially covered by settlement we again made the distinction
by coding it as non-frontier in the narrow measure and as frontier in the wide version. This is the case.
for example, of the north-eastern Brazilian province of Piaui or the Pacific coast province of Esmeraldas in
Ecuador.
For South America we found an alternative source for the frontier. Butland (1966). which discusses in detail
the frontier expansion in southern Brazil, presents a South American map depicting the frontier areas in mid
19th century. Unfortunately he does not explain how this map was drawn, but actually it coincides to a quite
large extent with our own province-level codings. We used GIS software to georeference the frontier map in
Butland (1966) and directly computed the share of each country which was frontier in the mid-19th century.
As a result we have three different frontier measures for South America: narrow, wide and Butland.
Table 1 sums up the data from these calculations. For the United States and Canada we only have one
number each, with 72.5% of the territory of the United States being frontier in 1850, while the corresponding
number for Canada is 85.3%. Map 1 shows exactly where the frontier and non-frontier areas were. This is a
pretty familiar picture with, for example, the United States being settled on the eastern seaboard and all the
way east to the western boundaries of Arkansas and Missouri. Far to the west parts of coastal California and
the central valley north of San Francisco were also settled. For the countries in South America we have three
different estimates of the extent of the frontier. For example, Table 1 shows that for Colombia the narrow
definition of the frontier suggests that 62.9% of the territory was frontier in 1850 and this exactly coincides
with the wide definition. Butland's map gives a fairly similar estimate of 58.1%. For other countries, however,
the differences between these estimates are much larger. For example, for Argentina the narrow definition is
49.3% while the wide one is 74.2%. The reason for this large difference is easy to see from Map 2. Here the
settled areas intersect with many departments. For instance the narrow definition treats the departments of
San Luis., C6rdoba, Neuqu6n, Santiago del Estero and Salta as settled, while the wide definition treats them
as frontier. For Argentina, Butland's estimate is close to our wide definition. Finally, Map 3 looks at Central
America and the Caribbean.
These calculations clearly illustrate our conjecture from the introduction which is that simply in terms of the
size of the frontier, the United States is not distinct. Uruguay had a frontier which was quite a bit larger
relative to the size of the country and Brazil's frontier was also larger. Other countries such as Costa Rica,
Nicaragua or Venezuela had frontier's which were only about 15% or so less.
3 Other Data
Apart from the data we constructed on the extent of the frontier in 1850, we use some other readily obtainable
data. For our measure of historical political institutions we use constraints on the executive in 1850 from
the Polity IV Project9 This variable is defined as the extent of institutional restrictions on decision making
powers of the chief executive, whether individual or collective. In a democracy constraints would come from
the legislative or judicial branches of government. In a dictatorship constraints may come from the ruling
party in a one-party system, a council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, or maybe the military
in polities which are subject to the threat of military coups. The extent of constraints on the executive
are coded as being between 1, meaning "unlimited executive authority" and 7, implying "executive parity or
subordination". A country would be in the first category if '"constitutional restrictions on executive action
are ignored" or "there is no legislative assembly or there is one but it is called or dismissed at the executive's
pleasure". A country would be in the latter category if "a legislature. ruling party or council of nobles initiates
much or most important legislation" or "the executive is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent
on its continued support to remain in office."
Figure 1 shows the distribution of constraints on the executive in 1850 for the 21 countries in our dataset.
One can see that 9 countries are assigned the minimum score of 1, while the United States and Canada have
9http: www.svstenicpeace.org polity polity4.htin.
the maximum score of 710. Interestingly for our hypothesis, Costa Rica and Colombia both have scores of 3
in 1850. The country with constraints of 5 in 1850 is Honduras.
We also use the Polity IV Project's measure of how democratic a country is, which they refer to as the Polity
IV score, which is the difference between the Polity's Democracy and Autocracy indices". The democracy
score ranges from 0 to 10 and is derived from coding the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. The Polity
Autocracy Index also ranges from 0 to 10 and is constructed in a similar way to the democracy score based on
scoring countries according to competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. This implies
that the Polity IV score ranges from -10 to 10.
The other data we use is GDP per-capita in 2007 PPP adjusted from the World Bank's World Development
Indicators CD Rom and from the same source we also take information of the Gini coefficient for income
distribution which we average over the period 1996-2005.
Table 2 shows some basic descriptive statistics of the data. The rows correspond to our different dependent
and key explanatory variables and we divide the sample according to the median extent of frontier land in
1850 according to our narrow definition. The first set of columns show the average data for countries with
greater than median frontier land, while the last set of columns in the table show the data for less than median
frontier land. The median country here is Mexico, 57% of whose land was frontier in 1850 according to our
narrow definition. Note that for countries below the median the average amount of land which was frontier
was 32% (with a standard deviation of 0.22), while for countries above the median the average proportion of
frontier land was 70% (with standard deviation of 0.12).
The comparison of low and high frontier countries is quite revealing. For instance looking at the third row
of Table 2 we see that GDP per-capita in 2007 on average was $11,466 for above median frontier societies,
while it was only $3,744 for below median. The data shows that those countries which had a relatively large
frontier in 1850 now have substantially higher income per-capita. In row 4 we show the average Polity IV
score over the period 1900-2007. This is 2.43 for above median countries and -0.35 for below median. In the
next row we instead look at the average Polity IV score for the period 1950-2007. Though there is a clear
upward trend in the extent of democracy, the comparison looks quite similar with above median frontier
countries which have an average polity score of 3.96 while below median countries have a score of 1.05. As
with income per-capita, there seems to be a clear pattern with countries which had relatively large frontiers
in 1850 being today more democratic than those which had relatively small frontiers in 1850.
Finally, the last row examines average inequality over the period 1996-2005. The average Gini coefficient for
high frontier countries is 49.1 while for low frontier countries it is 53.4. Just as countries with relatively large
frontiers are more prosperous and democratic, they also appear to be more equal.
These raw numbers are quite consistent with the basic Frontier thesis. It is interesting to examine them in
figures. Figure 2 plots the share of frontier (narrow definition) against GDP per-capita in 2007. There is a
pronounced positively sloped relationship which remains even if the United States and Canada are dropped.
Figure 3 examines the raw relationship between the share of frontier land against the Polity score over the
1
oAs previously noted, Polity data for Canada only starts in 1867, at which point it has a 7, which we used as the its 1850
number.
"This measure is a very standard one in empirical work on democracy, and other definitions typically give very similar results
(see Aceinoglu et a]. (2008)).
period 1900-2007. The picture is rather similar with a distinct positive correlation and with North America
and Costa Rica far off the regression line. Figure 4 shows the same picture but now with the Polity IV score
averaged over the post World War II period, 1950-2007. This is very similar to Figure 4. Finally, Figure 5
examines inequality and the extent of the frontier. This Figure suggests that there is a negative correlation
between the extent of the frontier and contemporary inequality.
All of the above give support to the Turner Thesis. We now turn to regression analysis to investigate how
robust they are and whether these numbers may also be consistent with our conditional Frontier thesis. As
we shall see, the image which emerges from the descriptive statistics and simple scatterplots is not general.
4 Empirical Results
We now examine some simple regression models to examine the long-run consequences for economic and
political development of having a frontier. In all cases we estimate Ordinary Least Squares regressions of the
form
yi + /Fi,i 850 + 'YCi,1 850 + 6 (Fi, 850 x C,185 0) + Ei (1)
where yj is the dependent variable of interest for country i. This is respectively GDP per-capita in 2007,
the democracy score of Polity averaged over different periods, or the Gini coefficient of inequality averaged
over some period. Fi,1 8 5 0 is the proportion of the country which was frontier land around 1850, Ci1850 is
constraints on the executive from Polity in 1850, and Ei is a disturbance term which we assume to have the
usual properties. Here, following the discussion above, we also allow for the interaction between constraints
on the executive and frontier land in 1850.
4.1 Income Per-Capita
We first look at regressions where yj is GDP per-capita for country i in 2007. These are recorded in Table
3. The table is split into three sets of columnis where each set uses a different definition of the frontier. The
first three columns use our narrow definition of the frontier. the second three our wide definition and the
final three columns use the Butland definition'.
The first column shows the most parsimonious OLS regression of GDP per-capita on the proportion of land
that was frontier in 1850. The coefficient 3 = 18., 324.1 (with a standard error of 9, 953.3) is statistically
significant. To see what this coefficient implies, consider Mexico, which is the median frontier country,
with 57% of its territory comprised of frontier. This coefficient implies a GDP per-capita for Mexico of
-- 1. 738 + 18, 324 x 0.57 = 8. 706, which is pretty close to the actual value for Mexico which is 8, 340. The
coefficient on the frontier share implies that if one changed the frontier from the median level to the level of
the United States, which is 0.72, GDP per-capita would increase by (0.72 - 0.57) x 18, 324 = 2, 748, which is
a 31% (= 2. 748/8, 706) increase of the predicted income for the median country. Alternatively, if Mexico's
frontier increased by 10%, from 57% to 62.7%, income would increase by (0.627 - 0.57) x 18, 324 = $1. 044.5.
It is important to note, however, that one should be very cautious about proposing any type of causal
interpretation of the data. For example, we have treated the extent of the frontier in 1850 as econometrically
12Since the Butland data are only available for the South American countries, the Butland frontier definition uses the narrow
frontier measure for the rest of the sample.
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exogenous, while in fact it may be the endogenous outcome of other factors that influence economic or
political development. Perhaps countries that had good fundamentals had expanded more, for instance by
attracting greater numbers of migrants, and thus tended to have relatively small frontiers in 1850. Of course
if this form of omitted variable bias were important, it actually suggests that we might be underestimating
the effect of the frontier because it suggests that relatively small frontiers ought to be associated with factors
that also lead to good long-run development. We are also treating constraints on the executive as exogenous,
which is again unlikely to be the case.
In column 2 we add constraints on the executive in 1850. This greatly increases the extent of variation
explained by the model and both constraints and frontier are significant, though the estimated coefficient on
frontier falls. The coefficient on constraints. = 4, 405.86 (s.e. = 1, 346.5) is statistically significant.
Column 3 then adds the interaction term. This term is highly significant, 6 = 11,843.7 (s.e. = 3,015.5) and
the estimated coefficient on frontier now changes sign so that # -13,489.29 (s.e. = 7,835.69). One can see
here that when constraints on the executive are equal to 1 (which is the case in 9 out of our 21 countries in
1850) the total effect of frontier is / + 6 x 1 = -13, 489.29 + 11, 843.7 = -1, 645.59 < 0. In other words for
countries with the lowest value of constraints on the executive, representing "unlimited executive authority"
the greater is the relative size of the frontier in 1850, the poorer is the country today. However, as long as
constraints are 2 or above, frontier land is positively correlated with long-run growth.
It is also interesting to examine the quantitative impact of these results. For example, if we held the extent
of frontier fixed and increased the level of constraints on the executive in a country from 1 to 7, then this
would imply a change in income of
(-13,849 x F1 8 5 0 ) + (11,843 x F 85 0 x 6)
= (-13849 x F1 8 5 0 ) + (71, 058 x F1 8 5 0 ) - 21, 942 = (57, 209 x F1 8 5 0 ) - 21, 942
Hence, a country with median frontier would increase its current income by 0.57 x 57, 209 - 21, 942 = 10. 667
which would eliminate about one third of the income gap between Mexico and the United States.
Columns 4-6 then re-estimate the same 3 models using our wide definition of the frontier. The results are
very similar to those in the first three columns with the narrow definition except that now neither frontier
nor constraints on the executive are significant when they are entered with the interaction. The final three
columns use the Butland definition of the frontier with similar results.
In all specifications when we enter the interaction term it is robustly estimated and very significant and in all
cases suggests that when constraints are at their minimum. the presence of the frontier was bad for economic
development. while at higher levels of constraints, the frontier was good for long-run economic growth. The
results in this section are not consistent with the Frontier thesis but they are consisted with the conditional
Frontier thesis.
4.2 Democracy
We now turn to regressions where yj is the Polity score for country i averaged over different periods. We
look at two such periods. one is 1900-2007 and the other is 1950-2007. These regressions are in Tables 4 and
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5 respectively. As with Table 3, each table is split into three sets of columns where each set uses a different
definition of the frontier.
Table 4 column 1 shows the simplest regression of the Polity score 1900-2007 on frontier in 1850. There is
a significant positive correlation with 3 = 8.189 (s.e. = 2.458). The second column adds constraints on the
executive in 1850. Constraints are also significantly positively correlated with democracy in the 20th century
with an estimated coefficient of 1.474 (s.e. = 0.195).
The third column then adds our interaction term. The interaction term is marginally significant with a
t-statistic of 1.78 and has a positive coefficient of 6 = 1.263. However, unlike in the regressions where income
per-capita was the dependent variable, the frontier share on its own remains positive and significant, even if
the magnitude of the coefficient falls by 50%.
The rest of Table 4 shows that these results are not completely robust. The interaction terms remains positive
and basically significant, but when we use the wide definition of the frontier, frontier entered on its own is
not statistically significant in column 6, or using the Butland definition in column 9. Nevertheless, there is
no evidence here of any negative effect of the frontier, unlike in the income regressions. The results in Table
4 suggest that even for the lowest level of constraints on the executive, the greater was the frontier in 1850,
the more democratic the country was in the 20th century. Nevertheless, the quantitative effect is larger, the
greater are constraints in 1850.
In Table 5 we re-estimate the same models as in Table 4 except that now we average the dependent variable
only over the post World War II period. As is quickly seen this gives some quite different results. When we
just control for frontier and constraints on the executive, the results in terms of the size and significance of
the coefficients are very similar to those in Table 4. However, once we control for the interaction we find
that the interaction term is never close to significant while the estimated coefficient on frontier on its own
remains more or less the same quantitatively and mostly significant (only marginally so in column 6). This
table shows that the conditional effect on democracy is actually a phenomenon of the first half of the 20th
century. In the second half the simpler version of the Frontier thesis captures the patterns in the data quite
nicely.
4.3 Inequality
Finally, we let y, in equation (1) be the average Gini coefficient for country i over the period 1990-2007. The
results of estimating this model are reported in Table 6. A quite robust pattern emerges in all three sets
of columns, irrespective of how we measure the extent of the frontier. When entered on its own, frontier
is negatively and significantly correlated with contemporary income inequality, as are constraints on the
executive. These results suggest that either having a bigger frontier in 1850 or better political institutions is
associated with lower inequality today. However, as columns 3, 6 and 9 indicate, once the interaction term
is included none of the coefficients are statistically significant.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed what to our knowledge is the first test of the "Frontier (or Turner) thesis".
Turner argued that it was the existence of the frontier that generated the particularl path of development that
the United States followed in the 19th century. Though his work on the United States has been criticized,
it still appears to heavily influence the ways scholars think about these issues. The basis of our assessment
has been the observation that every country in the Americas, with the possible exception of El Salvador and
Haiti, had a frontier in the 19th century. The United States was certainly not exceptional in either this or
the relative extent of the frontier. In consequence, seen in comparative context, the existence of a frontier
does not seem to be obviously correlated with long run economic and political development.
We hypothesized, however, that there may be a conditional relationship between the extent of the frontier
and political institutions at the time of the allocation of frontier land. Historical evidence suggests that
even if most countries in the Americas had an open frontier, how that frontier land was allocated differed a
lot. For example, while the United States, Costa Rica and Colombia passed Homestead Acts or something
approximating them, in places like Argentina, Chile or Guatemala, political elites allocated frontier lands to
themselves or associates in a very oligarchic manner. This suggests that the impact of the frontier might be
conditional on the existing political institutions which influenced how the land was allocated - a notion we
dubbed the "conditional Frontier thesis". Our hypothesis suggests that if political institutions were bad at
the time of frontier settlement, the existence of such frontier land might actually lead to worse development
outcomes, probably because it provides a resource which non-democratic political elites can use to cement
themselves in power.
To investigate more systematically the relationship between the frontier and long-run development we con-
structed measures of the extent of frontier land for 21 independent, countries in the Americas in 1850. Using
some simple regressions we showed that the data does indeed support our conditional hypothesis. With
respect to both income per-capita today and democracy over the 20th century, it is the interaction between
the extent of the frontier in 1850 and constraints on the executive in 1850 that plays the primary explanatory
role. For example, for a country with the lowest level of constraints on the executive, the larger is the relative
size of the frontier, the lower is GDP per-capita today. For countries with higher constraints, however, a
larger frontier is positively correlated with current GDP per-capita. With respect to democracy we found
that for a given level of constraints in 1850, greater size of the frontier is correlated with greater democracy
in the 20th century. though this effect comes primarily from the first half of the century.
There are many caveats with these findings. For example, we did not control for variation in the "quality"
of the frontier. For instance there may be a big difference between Oklahoma in the United States and the
Atacama Desert in northern Chile, both of which were frontiers in 1850. Still, the tnited States also had
large areas of the Rocky Mountains which were not high quality lands. Trying to control or adjust for this
explicitly is an important area for future research. We also intend to conduct more sensitivity analysis. While
1850 seemed to us to be an interesting year to focus on because it marked the beginning of the period of the
rapid expansion of world trade which created such huge frontier movements in the Americas. one could argue
it is too late. An important area for future research is a more intensive sensitivity analysis than is presented
here.
Nevertheless. results suggest that the role of the frontier is much more complex than the Turner thesis
suggests. The consequences of the existence of a frontier for different countries in the Americas depended a
lot on the nature of political institutions which formed in the early independence period. If these institutions
featured few constraints on the executive. having a frontier was actually bad for economic development. If
El Salvador and Haiti had had frontiers in the 19th century, this would have made them poorer today,. not
richer. Though we found no such negative effect for democracy. we did find that the impact of the frontier
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on the democratization of a society was conditional on initial political institutions. If Turner thought that
the United States frontier had a strong democratizing effect, this was only because it was in a country which
already had good political institutions. This effect was severely muted in Latin America.
Though our results are not consistent with a large part of the Turner thesis, they are consistent with the
research of Brenner (1976) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) which emphasized that the implications of large
shocks or new economic opportunities depends on the initial institutional equilibrium. More specifically in
the Americas, they are also consistent with the work of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemogiu et al.
(2001) andAcemoglu et al. (2002) who emphasized the critical importance of the creation of institutions in
the colonial period and their path dependent consequences. In a sense, our results on income per-capita show
how different paths were reinforced by the availability of frontier lands in the 19th century.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1
The Frontier'n the Americas
Frontier
Mmberof Total~arrow NumberofWide TotalWide TotalFrontir SharefromTotalNumber of from ButlandTotalLand Area errow Frontier Frontier Land Narrow Frontier Frontier FrontierLand Wide Frontier ButlandCountry Subational (square ms.) Subnational Area(square Share Subnational Area(square Share (1966)and (1966)andIkits ftouical
Uits Ks.) Units Kms.) r Hstorical
cartography cartography
Argentina 24 2,780,403 11 1,370,454 49.3% 15 2,063,942 742% 1,922,371 69.1%
Bolivia 9 1,098,581 4 685,635 62.4% 4 803,853 732% 861507 78.4%
Brazil 27 8,498,331 15 6,354,737 74.8% 17 7,192,601 84.6% 7,606,006 895%
C1ile 13 756,095 5 398,745 52.7% 5 398,745 52.7% 562,762 744%
Colombia 33 1,141,748 15 718,130 62.9% 15 718,130 62.9% 663584 58.1%
CosaRca 7 51,102 4 32,870 64.3% 5 43,011 842% 32,870 643%
Dominican Republic 32 46,891 0 0.0% 2 3,665 7.8%
Ecuador 23 256,370 7 116519 45.4% 9 151,309 59.0% 120,827 47.1%
BSalvador 14 21,040 0 - 0.0% 0 0.0%
Guatemala 22 108,889 2 44,892 412% 7 69,692 64.0%
Hbnduras 18 112,492 3 45262 402% 6 64,904 57.7%
hii 9 27,700 0 - 0.0% 0 - 0.0%
Mexico 32 1,970,774 11 1,131,990 574% 12 1207,619 61.3%
Ncaragua 17 120,339 4 77,129 64.1% 7 91,601 76.1%
Panama 12 75,071 6 35,102 46.8% 7 46,773 62.3%
Peru 25 1285,199 4 595,813 46.4% 7 709235 552% 786,028 612%
Paraguay 18 406.752 3 246,925 60.7% 13 378.370 93.0% 365,955 90.0%
Lkuguay 19 175,016 19 175,016 100.0% 19 175,016 100.0% 175,016 100.0%
Venezuela 25 916,445 6 598,945 65.4% 8 707231 772% 655,533 715%
lhied Stas 51 9,72,587 6,792227 725%
Canada 13 9,017,699 7,819,625 85.3%
Source:w  w geohive.comfor landareas ofsubnaionaladministraive units,Buland (1966), [bminion Bureau of Saisics (n.d),Gerlach,(1 970).Bureau of Business Research (1975). Fronter coding calculated
by he autiors.
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Map 1
Thne Frontier in North America circa 1850 (current administrative boundaries)
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Map 2
The Frontier in South America circa 1850 (current administrative boundaries)
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[he Frontier in Central America circa 1 850 (current administrative boundaries)
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Figure 1
Constraints on the Executive in 1850
1 3 5 7
Constraints on the Executive in 1850
Source: Polity IV dataset. Note: Data for Canada is for 1867, and data for Panama is the sane as for Colombia since in 1850 the formier was a department oftthe latter.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Countries with Frontier Share >= Sample Median Frontier Share Countries with Frontier Share < Sample Median Frontier Share
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share dFrontier Land crca1850 11 0.700 0.127 0.574 1 10 0.322 0.225 0 0.527
Constrains on fhe Exectte 1850 11 2.636 2.335 1 7 10 2.600 1.265 1 5
Per Capia Iccme 2007 11 11466.36 15725.61 980 46040 10 3744 2296.15 560 8350
Polty Score aarage 1900-2007 11 2.427 5.325 -3.537 10 10 -0.350 1.935 -3.107 2.333
Pdity Score arage 1950-2007 11 3.964 5.008 -3.293 10 10 1.052 2.482 -5.339 3.828
hicomeeGiniaerage1996-2005 11 49.113 8.389 32.560 58.770 10 53.435 2.614 50.630 59.2
Nobe:The saniple median county for Fronier Share is Mexico, wih a fronter share of 0.574 (based on our prefered measure of fronier).For he years in w hich the Poity score records apoic al ransifon we asign
ie average score of he years before and afr lhe tansilon,and y ears in w hich he Pofity s core assigns hinerruplon rhierregnum periods are excluded from Ie averages.
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Figure 2
Share of Frontier Land circa 1850 vs. GDP Per Capita in 2007
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Source: GDP Per Capita is from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2008).
Note: Share of Frontier land is our pre ferred measure (narrow frontier delinition).
Figure 3
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Share of Frontier Land circa 1850 vs. Polity IV Score
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project (2007).
Note: Share offrontier land is our preferred measure (narrow frontier deftnition).
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Figure 4
Share of Frontier Land circa 1850 vs. Polity IV Score (average
1950-2007)
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Source Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project (2007).
Note: Share of Frontier land is our preferred measure (narrow frontier definition).
Figure 5
Share of Frontier Land circa 1850 vs. In come Gini (average
1996-2005)
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Source: Income Gini is from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2008).
Note: Share of Frontier land is our preferred measure (narrow frontier definition).
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Table 3
Dependent Variable: Per Capita GDP 2007 (PPP Adjusted)
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland Frontier
Frontier Share 18324.10 15777.35 -13849.29 10535.48 10397.26 -12590.71 12611.73 14272.81 -10397.47(9953.30) (4900.72) (7835.69) (6043.12) (3884.45) (8253.17) (6934.05) (4840.60) (6118.02)
Constraints on the Executile 1850 4405.86 -3657.29 4579.16 -3029.61 4708.54 -2663.75(1346.50) (2228.71) (1526.40) (3360.24) (1371.11) (2332.80)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share 11843.70 10391.53 10341.30(3015.50) (3765.30) (2880.38)
R-squared 0.162 0.631 0.773 0.061 0.571 0.655 0.094 0.632 0.738
No. Obsermations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Nfte:RobustStandard Errors in parenthesis.
All regressions include a constant(omited).
194
Table 4
Dependent Variable: Democracy Score, average 1900-2007
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland Frontier
Frontier Share 5.264 4.737 1.839 3.866 3.837 0.070 3.654 4.007 1.329
(1.667) (0.908) (1.451) (1.460) (1.144) (1.699) (1.351) (0.902) (1.467)
Constraints on the Execute 1850 0.912 0.123 0.964 -0.283 1.000 0.200
(0.138) (0.385) (0.173) (0.564) (0.138) (0.381)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share 1.159 1.703 1.123
(0.501) (0.723) (0. 509)
R-squared 0.259 0.650 0.677 0.160 0.599 0.643 0.153 0.626 0.650
No. Obserations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: RobustStandard Errors in parenthesis.
All regressions include a constant (omitted).
The Democracy score for Panama is average over the 1903-2007 period.
Table 5
Dependent Variable: Polity IV Score, average 1950-2007
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland Frontier
Frontier Share 8.213 7.455 9.809 5.822 5.780 6.474 5.304 5.815 7.597
(2.960) (1.851) (2.676) (3.119) (2.151) (4.388) (2.873) (1.865) (3.866)
Constraints on the Executi~e 1850 1.313 1.954 1.394 1.624 1.448 1.980
(0.254) (0.959) (0.282) (1.197) (0.252) (1.080)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share -0.941 -0.314 -0.747
(1.120) (1.514) (1.354)
R-squared 0.262 0.599 0.606 0.150 0.533 0.533 0.134 0.545 0.550
No. Obseroations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note: RobustStandard Errors in parenthesis.
All regressions include a constant(omitted).
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Table 6
Dependent Variable: Income Gini, average 1996-2005
Narrow Frontier Wide Frontier Butland Frontier
Frontier Share -10.585 -9.579 -2.755 -7.086 -7.030 -1.901 -5.923 -6.596 1.723
(5.632) (4.126) (7.922) (4.628) (3.520) (8.094) (4.897) (3.707) (9.226)
Constraints on the Executie 1850 -1.740 0.117 -1.845 -0.147 -1.906 0.580
(0.676) (1.745) (0.767) (2.347) (0.745) (2.220)
Constraints 1850 x Frontier Share -2.728 -2.319 -3.487
(2.727) (3.523) (3.207)
R-squared 0.177 0.417 0.442 0.091 0.362 0.376 0.068 0.358 0.397
No. Obserations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Not:Rbust Standard Errors in parenihes is.
All regressions include a constant (omitted).
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Cartographic Source
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Butland (1966)
Dominion Bureau of Statistics (n.d).
Butland (1966)
Butland (1966)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United St
Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Sources for Frontier
Historical References
Eidt (1971), Bandeira, (2006), Jefferson, (1926), Moniz (2006)
Gill (1987), Fifer (1982)
Bandeira (2006), Katzman (1977), Katzman (1975), James (1941)
Silver (1969), Landon (1967)
James (1941), Villalobos (1992)
James (1941), LeGrand (1986), Rausch (1993)
ates Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), James (1941),
Dominican Rep. United States Bureau of the Census (1956b) Lora (2002)
Ecuador Butland (1966)
El Salvador Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United StatesBureau of the Census (1956a)
Guatemala Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United StatesGaeaa Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Duefias (1986), Sampedro (1990)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), McCreery (1976)
Haiti United States Bureau of the Census (1956b) Anglade (1982)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), Davidson (2006)Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Bureau of Business Research (1975) Bernstein (1964)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), Aguirre (2002)Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003), United States Hall and Perez Brignoli (2003)Bureau of the Census (1956a)
Butland (1966) Moniz (2006)
Butland (1966) Milla (1995)
United States Census Office (1898), Billington (2001), Billington (1962), Wyman and Kroeber (1965)Gerlach, (1970)
Butland (1966) Moniz (2006), Bollo (1896)
Butland (1966)
Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
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Costa Rica
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Mexico
Nicaragua
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Peru
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
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ATLANTDA
CHOLUEA
COMYAGUA
EL PRASO
HODURWAS GALSADO
ISLAS DE LA BAHiA
LA PAZ
LE
SANTA B RBARA
V ALLE
YORO
ARTBONITE
CENT RE
GRAN[7 ANSE .
NO
HArri NORD-EST
NOFD-OWEST
CUEST
SUD-EST
AGUASCALENTES
BAA CALIFORNIA NORTE
BAJ CALIFORNIA SU)RI
CANIECHE
CHIAPAS
CHIHUAHUA
CCAHUIL DE ZARAGOZ
COLMVA
DIS1HTFEDERAL
DURANGO
GUANAJULATO
GUERFERD
HIDALGO
,JAUSOD
MtXICO.ESTADODE
MEKO MKMoACAN-DEOCANIPO
MORELOS
NAYARIT
NUEVOLEDN
OAXACA
EEBLA
OUER3ETARODEARTEAGA
OUNTANA ROD .
SAN LUISPOTOSi
SNALOA
SONORA
TABASCO0
TAMAL.PAS
TLAXCALA
VERACRUZ-LLAVE
YUCATAN
ZACATECAS
CHNANDEGA
CHON1^ALES
GRANADA
JNOTEGA
LEON
NCARAGUA MDRE
MANAGUA
MASAYA
MTAGAMPA
NUEVA SEGOVIA
EG)ONAUTONOfMATLANTION ORT
REGIONAUTONOM ATLANTICO SLR
RIOSANJUAN
RAS
BOCAS DEL TOFR
CHRIj
coat
COLON
COMARCA EERA
PANAMA 0MARCA KUNA Y LA
COMARCA NGOBE BUGLE
DARIEN
HElIFERA
LOSSANTOS
PANAMA
VERAGUAS
AMAZONAS 39,24I9 1 1
ANCASH 35.915 0 0
AREQUIPA 63.345 a 0
AYACUCHO 43.815 a a
CAJAM0ARCA 33.318 0 0
Cusco 71.987 0 0
DEPARTANIENTO ARJRIMA C 20.896 a 0
HUANCAVELICA 22 0 0
HUIAlJCO 36.849 a I
C A 21.328 a a
JLNN 44.197 0 0
PERU LA LIBERTAD 25.500 0 1
LAABAYEQUE 14.213 0 0
LIM 34.802 0 0
L OFETO 368,852 1
MDREDEDS 85.30 1 1 1NIOCUEGA 15.734 0 0
PASCO 25.320 0 1
PIA 35.892 0 a
RUND 71.999 0 a
SANMARiT11 51.253 0 1
TACNA 16.076 0 0
TLMES 4.669 0 0
UCAYALI 1 02.411 1 1
ALTO PARAGUAY V2.349 1 1
ALTO PARANA 14.895 0 1
AMIANHAY 12.933 0 1
ASUN'JON 117 0 0
BOOUEPON 91.669 T 1
CAAGUAZO 11.474. 0 1
CAAZAPA 9.496 0 1
CANNDEYU I14.667 0 1
PARAGUAY CETRAL 2.465 0 0
CONCEFCION 18.051 0 1
CORDILLERA 4.948 0 a
GUAIRA 3.846 0 1
HTAFMA 16,525 0 1
MSINES 9.556 0 1
NEsuCOi 12.147 0 0
PARAGUARI 8.'705 0 a
PRESO6ETHAYES 72,907 1 1
SANPEDRO 20.002 a
AFETIGAS 11.98 1
CANELONES 4.3 1 1
CERFD)LARGO 13,64B 1 1
COLONIA 6.106 1 1
DURAZNO 11.64 1 1
FLOPES 5.144 1 
1
FLORIDA I. 4 17 1 1
LAVALLEJA 10.016 1 1
MLDONADD 4.793 1 1
URUGUAY MIONTEVIDEO 53
PAYSAl'00 13,922 1 1
RIO NGRO 9. 282 1 1
R1VERA 9.370 1 1
ROCHA 1U.551 1 1
SA TO 141.163 1 1
SANJOS$ 4.992 1 1
SORIAN0 9.00 1 1
TACUAREINBO 1 5.438 1 1
TRWNTA Y T WS 9.529 1 1
APMZONAS 180.145 1 1
ANZOATEGUI 43.300 0 1
APURE 76.500 1 1
ARAGUA 7.0141 0 0
BARNAS 35.200 1 1
BOLIVAR 238.000 1 1
CARABOBO 4.650 0 0
OWEDE 1 4.800 0 a
DELTA AMACURO 40,200 1 1
DEPeENNC1ASFEDERALES{E- 120I 0 0
DISTRITO FEDERAL 433 0 0
FALCON 24,800 0 0
VENEZUELA GUARCO 64.986 0 1
LARA 19.800 0 0
KIERIA 11.300 0 a
MIRANDA 7.950 0 0
IVONAGAS 28.900 1 1
NUEVA ESPARTA 1.150 0 0
FORTUGUESA 15.200 0 0
SUCR E 11.800 0 0
TACHIR 11.100 0 0
TRILULLO 7,400 0 0
VARGAS 1.497 0 0
YARACUV 7.100 0 0
ZU~LA M3.100 0 0
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